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THREE ESSAYS ON GLOBAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION 
ERZEN ONCEL  
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 
Major Professor: John Gerring, Professor of Political Science 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is comprised of three papers, which aim to improve our knowledge 
of how democracy and legislature size matter for ethnic representation among political 
leaders. 
The first paper introduces the Global Leadership Project (GLP), which provides the 
first dataset to offer biographical information on an array of leaders (i.e. members of the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary and other elites) around the world.  Personal 
characteristics and identities of political leaders influence their behavior in elective office, 
and thus carry implications for the course of politics and policy. The GLP encompasses 145 
nation-states and 38,085 leaders, each of whom is coded along 31 parameters, producing 
approximately 1.1 million data points in a cross-sectional format centered on 2010–13. This 
data allows comparison of the demographic characteristics (i.e. gender balance, age, ethnicity, 
education, languages spoken, education, and tenure) of leaders within countries, across 
countries, and across regions.  
The second paper examines the causal mechanism of how democratization increases 
ethnic descriptive representation through a longitudinal case study of Kurdish representation 
in the Turkish parliament from 1920 until 2011. It argues that ethnic descriptive 
representation increases in a competitive democracy because out-parties collaborate with 
 ix 
 
ethnic groups to gain electoral advantage over their rivals. In Turkey, the collaboration of 
emerging out-party actors with the Kurds explains the rise of Kurdish descriptive 
representation. Through process tracing, this paper examines this collaboration, explaining 
the precarious increase in Kurdish descriptive representation in Turkish political history.   
The third paper argues that larger legislatures foster greater ethnic descriptive 
representation regardless of regime type. Theoretically, larger legislatures provide more 
“room” to pay off key elites, improve the inclusion of disadvantaged groups by diminishing 
the value of a seat, and are less subject to stochastic features that might upset descriptive 
representation. The argument is tested with a series of cross-national research designs 
drawing on the GLP database. A new disproportionality index of Ethnic Representation is 
created with the aggregated data at the national level. The argument is also tested with Two-
Stage Least Squares analysis where the variation in population size is taken as an instrument 
of legislative size. 
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THE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP PROJECT: A COMPREHENSIVE DATABASE 
OF POLITICAL ELITES1 
 
The study of political leaders (also known as the study of political elites or political 
recruitment) is one of the most venerable topics in political science, stretching back to 
seminal work by Mosca and Pareto in the early nineteenth century. Yet, it is also one of the 
least developed empirically. While the study of mass publics and institutions has flourished, 
the study of leaders has languished. A small revival in this moribund field may be noted in 
recent years, thanks to the appearance of several systematic datasets. However, these datasets 
are limited in several respects, as reviewed below. 
The Global Leadership Project (GLP) promises to expand the horizons of research 
on political leaders by providing the first dataset offering biographical information on a wide 
array of leaders of most countries in the world, including members of the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and other elites whose power is of an informal nature. Currently, 
GLP encompasses 145 sovereign and semisovereign nation-states and 38,085 leaders, each 
of whom is coded along 31 parameters, producing approximately 1.1 million data points in a 
cross-sectional format centered on 2010–13.2 With this data, one can compare the 
characteristics of leaders within countries, across countries, and across regions. The GLP 
thus serves as a fundamental resource for researchers, policymakers, and citizens. 
In introducing this new project, we discuss the intellectual background of the 
project, its core elements, and its current status. We also illustrate several ways in which it 
informs our knowledge of politics across the world. Further information – as well as the data 
                                                
1 This essay is co-authored with John Gerring (Boston University, Professor) and Kevin M. Morrison 
(University of Pittsburg, Associate Professor). 
2 It is our hope to replicate coding in future years, allowing comparisons through time. 
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itself – is available on the GLP web site [website withheld]. 
Background 
The idea that leaders matter – more specifically, the idea that the identity of leaders makes 
some difference for the course of politics and policy – has a history stretching back to 
Machiavelli.3 Recently, a number of influential studies have employed systematic research 
designs to demonstrate this basic point. For example, Jones and Olken (2005) use deaths 
from natural or accidental causes to examine the effect of leadership change, finding that 
leaders impact the growth trajectory of autocratic countries but not of democratic countries 
(presumably because their actions in the latter are more institutionally constrained). 
Humphreys et al. (2006) use a field experiment to randomly assign discussion leaders in a 
deliberative democratic setting, finding that the identity of the leader affects whether 
consensus is reached as well as how participants view a number of political issues. 
If leaders matter, it seems likely that their personal characteristics matter. Research 
indicates that the individual characteristics of leaders often influence their behavior in 
elective office, apart from what might be predicted by constituency pressures (Burden 2007). 
This insight informs a long tradition of work on leadership recruitment, turnover (elite 
circulation), and descriptive representation.4   
What sorts of personal characteristics might matter?  One strand of work emphasizes 
the impact of class background on leadership perceptions and behavior (Bottomore 1993; 
                                                
3 Ahlquist, Levi (2011), Blondel (1987), Burns (1978), Elgie (1995), Hargrove (2004), Mouritzen, 
Svara (2002), Nohria, Khurana (2010), Rotberg (2012), Samuels (2003), Selznick (1957). 
4 Barber (1963); Berlinski, Dewan, Dowding (2012); Best, Cotta (2000); Bienen, van de Walle (1991); 
Borchert, Zeiss (2004); Bunce (1981); Camp (1995, 2010); Cotta, Best (2007); Dogan (2003); 
Dowding, Dumont (2009); Jones, Olken (2005); Nagle (1977); Norris (1997); Pareto (1935), Prewitt 
(1970); Putnam (1976, 1977), Roeder (1985), Schlesinger (1966), Siavelis, Morgenstern (2008). 
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Carnes 2013). A related tradition of work examines networks formed among political, 
business, and military elites (Acemoglu et al. 2013; Burnham 1960; Domhoff 1967; Fisman 
2001; Hunter 1953; Lasswell & Lerner 1952; Mills 1956; Schwartz 1987) and the circulation 
of elites over time (Best & Cotta 2000; Bienen & van de Walle 1991; Bunce 1981; Camp 
1995; Casstevens 1989; Cotta & Best 2007; Dowding & Dumont 2009; Figueroa 2008; 
Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935; Norris 1997; Prewitt 1970; Putnam 1977; Roeder 1985). The 
character of elite networks may be viewed as foundational for democracy (Higley & Pakulski 
2007; Spilimbergo 2009; Stone 1990), for autocracy (Burns 1989), or for development 
(Amsden, DiCaprio, Robinson 2012; Brezis & Temin 1999; Waldner 1999). Additionally, the 
gender of leaders may matter: Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004) find that leaders invest more 
in infrastructure directly relevant to the needs of their own gender. Finally, the “quality” of 
leaders, measured in various ways, might matter (Besley 2005). For example, Besley & 
Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democracies choose more educated leaders, a feature that 
may have important consequences for the quality of governance and for growth.5   
To evaluate these hypotheses systematically, one needs individual-level data for 
leaders, and indeed several of the studies cited above have employed such data.     However, 
where individual-level data has been exploited, it has usually been limited to one or several 
countries. Frequently, it is limited to a single organization (Barnard 1938; Blau 1955; 
Enticott, et al. 2008; Selznick 1957), local communities (Chattopadhyay, Duflo 2004), or 
small-group settings (Humphreys et al. 2006) within a single country.  Until quite recently, 
                                                
5 Alexiadou (2011), Besley, Larcinese (2011); Braun, Raddatz (2010); Bunce (1981); Chattopadhyay, 
Duflo (2004); Faccio (2006, 2010); Hellman (1998); Horowitz & Stam (2010); Humphreys, Masters, 
Sandbu (2006); Jones, Olken (2005); Lipset, Solari (1967); Mouritzen, Svara (2002); Remmer (1984); 
Reynolds (2011); Roeder (1985); Wallis (1998); Wangnerud (2009). 
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comparable cross-national data on leaders has been extremely sparse.  Though individual-
level data is taken for granted in studying behavior at mass levels (e.g., markets, elections, 
public opinion), and cross-national polls such as the World Values Survey and various 
“Barometer” surveys collect this information systematically on a global scale, the behavior of 
governments is still approached primarily at a system-level (the state) or at the level of 
component organizations (the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, an agency, political 
parties, and so forth).  
This longstanding data deficit has been addressed by several recent cross-national 
projects. Information about heads of state around the world over the past several centuries 
has been compiled by Goemans et al. (2009), Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2014), Rulers.org, 
and Worldstatesmen.org. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, a CIA 
publication (on-line at www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html), 
includes heads of state and cabinet members for the past several years. Alexiadou (2011) 
constructs a database of cabinet ministers across 18 OECD democracies, observed from 
1945–2010. The Heads of Government dataset codes ideological orientation for each leader 
from 1870–2012 for thirty-three countries. Faccio (2006, 2010) compiles a list of legislator 
names in forty-six (mostly OECD) countries. Braun & Raddatz (2010) collect data on the 
political background of cabinet members and central bank directors (but not MPs) for 150 
countries. Nelson (2014) collects educational and limited professional background data for 
key economic policymakers in 90 developing countries between 1980 and 2000. 
While important contributions to this area, these crossnational projects are generally 
limited to heads-of-state – or, at best, heads of state and cabinet ministers – and thus offer 
thin gruel for generalizing about the effects or determinants of leaders more generally. Even 
 5 
 
in highly authoritarian countries, major decisions are almost certainly the product of 
interaction between at least several persons. There is only so much one can say about the 
nature of a country’s leadership elite on the basis of a few individuals’ characteristics. 
Generalizations based upon such a small sample are prone to stochastic error. 
A much broader leadership class is represented in legislatures, and with that notion 
in mind, background information on legislators has been collected in a systematic fashion for 
a handful of western democracies as part of the EurElite (Best & Edinger 2005) and 
SEDEPE (Dowding & Dumont 2009) projects.6 This has fostered an impressive research 
agenda focused on ministers, parliamentarians, and questions related to recruitment, usually 
with a historical angle (e.g., Berlinski, et al. 2010; Best & Cotta 2000; Borchert & Zeiss 2004; 
Cotta & Best 2007; Dowding & Dumont 2009; Norris 1997). Unfortunately, data on 
legislators is limited to several dimensions (in accordance with the theoretical scope of these 
studies) and its format is not always standardized across surveys, limiting possibilities for 
cross-country comparison. In addition, none of these projects extends to the developing 
world.7 
Systematic information about legislators for a much larger universe is collected in the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) database, PARLINE (www.ipu.org/parline-
e/parlinesearch.asp). However, this data is only at the aggregate, not individual level.  It 
includes the number of members in a parliament, the distribution of seats among political 
                                                
6 EurElite projects, including Datacube, are described at: www.eurelite.uni-jena.de/index.html. The 
Selection and Deselection of Political Elites (SEDEPE) project is described at: www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/projekte/sedepe/homepage.php  
7 Several features of SEDEPE are integrated into GLP so as to maintain commensurability across 
coding categories. However, the range of data collected by GLP is much greater than SEDEPE, so 
there is relatively little overlap between the two projects. 
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parties, and the distribution of seats according to sex. Reynolds (2011) and Ruedin (2009), 
building on PARLINE, gather additional data on ethnic and gay/lesbian representation. 
However, like PARLINE, these databases include only aggregate data. 
This brief review of data on the characteristics of leaders, summarized in Table 1.1, 
yields one important conclusion. In many areas where scholars suspect that leadership 
qualities matter, the data to support such a hypothesis is extremely thin. Existing datasets are 
partial with respect to country coverage and/or the fraction of country leaders for which 
data is available. This is obviously problematic. Neither theory nor intuition tells us, for 
example, that the education of the executive is a good proxy for the education of all of the 
relevant leaders of a country. Likewise, neither theory nor intuition suggests that the causal 
effects of leader education in richer countries are generalizable to poorer countries. The 
GLP is an attempt to fill this important gap in comparable data on leader characteristics 
around the world.   
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Table 1.1:  
Crossnational Datasets of World Leaders 
 
Dataset 
Leader 
_types_ 
Background 
characteristics 
Individual- 
_level data_ Countries Years 
Alexiadou (2011) Ministers Yes No 18 1945–2000 
ARCHIGOS 
(Goemans et al. 2009) 
Heads of state No Yes 188 1875–2004 
Braun & Raddatz 
(2010) 
Ministers Yes           No 150 2009 
CIA World Factbook 
(Various) 
Ministers/Heads 
of state 
Yes No 198 2013 
EurElite (Best & 
Edinger 2005) 
Ministers Yes Yes 19 1810–2010 
Faccio (2006) MPs/Ministers No No 46 2006 
HOG (Brambor et al. 
2014) 
Heads of state Yes Yes 33 1870–2012 
LEAD (Horowitz et 
al. 2014) 
Heads of state Yes Yes 188 1875–2004 
PARLINE (Inter-
Parl. Union) 
MPs No No 193 1967–  
Reynolds (2011) MPs Yes No 50 2007 
Ruedin (2009) MPs No No 95 2009 
Rulers.org Heads of states No No 246 1700– 
SEDEPE (Dowding 
& Dumont 2009) 
Ministers Yes Yes 19 1945–1984 
Worldstatesmen.org Heads of states No Yes 308 2013 
 
LEAD = Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions. SEDEPE = Selection and Deselection of 
Political Elites. HOG = Heads of Government. 
 
Database and Sample 
Constructing a global database with comparable information on leaders obviously presented 
substantial challenges.  In this section, we discuss the coverage we were able to attain at 
several levels: time, countries, leaders, and responses. 
Coding began in June 2010 and finished in June 2013 (the details of the coding are 
discussed below). We therefore have a snapshot of a country’s elite at the time the survey 
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was completed (noted on each country page on GLP’s website). (In the event that elections 
took place during the period of coding, coders were advised to consider only the pre-election 
government.) Naturally, there are worries about making comparisons across countries at 
somewhat different points in time. However, the time-window is relatively brief, and 
fundamental changes in a country’s political elite are unlikely to materialize over such a short 
stretch of time. Consequently, it is reasonable to regard cross-country comparisons in this 
first round of the GLP as cross-sectional in nature. 
 The GLP aims to include all sovereign nations with over one-half million 
inhabitants.8 Unfortunately, it is impossible to include some countries because information 
on the characteristics of their leaders below the very top level is not obtainable. Countries 
are included in the present study if at least half of all members of parliament (MPs) are 
identifiable by name and at least some background information is available for them. 
Applying this criterion, we arrive at a sample of 145 countries, as listed in Table 1.2. This is a 
substantial sample, though somewhat biased since the excluded countries are 
disproportionately poor and small. (A larger sample of 162 countries, with less complete 
data, is available on the GLP web site.)  Within this sample of 145 countries, seventeen 
countries are afflicted by especially high missing-ness (more than 50% of the potential data is 
missing), as indicated in Table 1.2. These countries are also disproportionately small and 
impoverished, as one might expect.  
 
                                                
8 Cape Verde and Malta are also included, though they fall slightly under the threshold. 
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 Africa 
1. Benin 
2. Burkina Faso 
3. Burundi 
4. Cameroon 
5. Cape Verde 
6. CAR 
7. Congo (DRC) 
8. Congo (Republic) 
9. Cote d’Ivoire  
10. Djibouti  
11. Ethiopia 
12. Gabon 
13. Gambia 
14. Ghana 
15. Guinea 
16. Guinea-Bissau 
17. Kenya 
18. Lesotho 
19. Liberia* 
20. Madagascar 
21. Malawi 
22. Mali 
23. Mauritius 
24. Mozambique* 
25. Namibia 
26. Niger  
27. Rwanda 
28. Senegal 
29. Sierra Leone 
30. Somaliland 
31. South Africa 
32. South Sudan 
33. Sudan* 
34. Tanzania 
35. Togo 
36. Uganda* 
37. Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Americas 
38. Argentina  
39. Bolivia 
40. Brazil  
41. Canada  
42. Chile  
43. Colombia 
44. Costa Rica 
45. Cuba   
46. Dominican Rep 
47. Ecuador  
48. El Salvador  
49. Guatemala  
50. Guyana  
51. Haiti* 
52. Honduras  
53. Jamaica 
54. Mexico  
55. Nicaragua  
56. Panama 
57. Paraguay 
58. Peru  
59. United States 
60. Uruguay  
61. Trinidad/Tobago 
62. Venezuela  
 Asia 
63. Afghanistan* 
64. Armenia 
65. Australia 
66. Azerbaijan* 
67. Cambodia 
68. China 
69. Georgia  
70. India 
71. Indonesia 
72. Japan 
73. Kazakhstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74. Kyrgyzstan 
75. Korea, South 
76. Malaysia 
77. Mongolia 
78. New Zealand 
79. Pakistan 
80. Philippines 
81. Russian Fed 
82. Singapore 
83. Solomon Islands 
84. Tajikistan 
85. Thailand 
86. Turkmenistan  
87. Timor-Leste 
88. Uzbekistan 
89. Vietnam  
Europe 
90. Albania 
91. Austria  
92. Belarus* 
93. Belgium 
94. Bosnia 
95. Bulgaria  
96. Croatia  
97. Czech Republic  
98. Denmark  
99. Estonia  
100. Finland  
101. France  
102. Germany  
103. Greece  
104. Hungary  
105. Iceland  
106. Ireland 
107. Italy  
108. Kosovo  
109. Latvia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110. Lithuania 
111. Luxembourg 
112. Macedonia  
113. Malta 
114. Moldova  
115. Montenegro  
116. Netherlands  
117. Norway 
118. Poland  
119. Portugal  
120. Romania  
121. Serbia  
122. Slovakia 
123. Slovenia 
124. Spain 
125. Sweden 
126. Switzerland  
127. Ukraine 
128. United Kingdom 
MENA 
129. Algeria  
130. Bahrain 
131. Cyprus (Turkey)  
132. Egypt 
133. Iran 
134. Israel  
135. Jordan 
136. Lebanon 
137. Morocco 
138. Oman 
139. Palestinian Terr. 
140. Qatar 
141. Saudi Arabia* 
142. Tunisia  
143. Turkey  
144. UAE 
145. Yemen
 
*20–50% of the data is missing.  Seventeen additional countries are included the GLP database but not 
in the sample employed for the present study (by reason of missing data): Angola, Bangladesh, 
Botswana, Cyprus, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, 
Puerto Rico, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 1 .2: 
Countries in the GLP Sample 
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Within the sample of 145 countries we are able to identify the existence of 40,022 
leaders, which we refer to as our sampling frame. Of these, we are able to identify (by name) 
38,085 leaders, an average of 262 per country. This is our full individual-level sample.  
However, we do not have a complete set of characteristics for all leaders, as shown 
in Table 1.3. That is to say, some of our questions to coders (discussed below) went 
unanswered. It should be noted that in addition to the usual problem of obtaining factual 
data on political leaders, patterns of missing-ness may arise when a characteristic touches 
upon subjects that are deemed sensitive in a country (e.g., marital status, religion, or 
ethnicity). 
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Table 1.3:  
Completeness 
  
 Sample 
Sampling 
Frame 
Countries 145 145 
Pooled observations   
Leaders (N) 38085 40,022 
Potential responses (N) 1,180,635  1,240,682 
Actual responses (N) 838,501  
Actual/Potential responses (%) 71% 68% 
By question   
1. Name [text] * 100% 95% 
2. Year of birth * 77 73 
3. Place of birth [text] 78 74 
4. Born abroad (Y/N) * 77 74 
5. Sex * 97 93 
6. Marital status * 60 57 
7. Number of children 34 32 
8. Native language [text] * 87 83 
9. Additional languages spoken [text] * 20 19 
10. Current religion and sect [text] 56 53 
11. Religion of family [text] 58 56 
12. Ethnocultural group [text] 91 86 
13. Criteria used to determine ethnocultural identity 71 68 
14. Office type * 100 95 
15. Year service in current position began * 91 87 
16. Apex of power * 96 91 
17. Next 10 most powerful * 96 91 
18. Linked to a prominent family/clan name [text] 100 95 
19. Prior occupation * 82 78 
20. Political background (area of experience) * 59 56 
21. Location of political base [text] 40 38 
22. Party affiliation [text] 88 83 
23. Position in party [text] 41 39 
24. Member or ally of ruling party/coalition 35 33 
25. Partisan/nonpartisan (Y/N)  95 90 
26. Education (highest level completed) * 78 74 
27. Colleges/universities attended [text] 57 54 
28. Location (city/country) of colleges/universities 57 54 
29. Undergraduate degree (discipline) * 66 63 
30. Educated in west  (Y/N) * 57 54 
31. Educated abroad (Y/N) * 57 54 
Mean (%) 71 68 
Sample = leaders whose names are entered in the GLP database.  
Sampling frame = all leaders whose existence we are aware of among the studied countries.  
* Missing values imputed. 
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If all questions for all leaders in the chosen 145 countries were completed, the 
dataset would possess roughly 1.2 million data points. Because of missing data, the current 
dataset includes roughly 1.1 million data points. This means that, overall, about 32% of the 
data is missing.  
Even within the 145 sampled countries the pattern of missing-ness is evidently non-
random. In particular, the GLP is more likely to contain information about leaders who are 
prominent and those who have more impressive credentials.  Appendix B uses this imputed 
dataset to replicate all applicable data tables presented below (see Tables 5–9). Reassuringly, 
results are very similar (see Tables B1–5). 
Questionnaire 
Data contained in the GLP is gathered primarily from a lengthy questionnaire answered by 
country experts (who are discussed in more detail below). The topics of many questions are 
reflected in Table 1.3, while the full set of questions and possible responses is contained in 
Appendix A. Responses are in English, though fields for alternate names in local languages 
are included for some items.  
Questions were chosen for inclusion based on their potential relevance to problems 
of governance and data availability.  Important leadership characteristics we code are age, 
sex, marital status, ethnicity, religion, native language, additional languages spoken, place of 
birth, previous job experience, previous political experience, highest level of education 
attainment, universities attended, principal course of study, party affiliation, current position, 
and tenure of service. Several other questions (not reflected in Table 1.3) inquire about 
general country-level characteristics, such as population, the names of political parties, the 
names of salient ethnocultural groups, the kind of electoral system, salaries of MPs, and so 
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forth.  These country-level characteristics were coded either by experts or by consultation of 
secondary sources.    
 Most of the leader-level questions are coded on the basis of publicly available 
information, often contained on government web sites or CVs. A few questions (such as 
who are the most powerful individuals in a country, discussed below) require coders to 
exercise judgment. For these questions, we can anticipate some degree of disagreement 
among scholars. However, most of the questions on the questionnaire are factual in nature. 
Where there is uncertainty about the nature of a leader’s characteristics, it is more likely to be 
a matter of uncertain knowledge (where was X’s birthplace?) rather than judgments about 
larger conceptual issues.  
To indicate uncertainty (of whatever sort), coders may check a box labeled 
“uncertain” or another box labeled “assumed” (indicating that the answer to this question is 
inferred rather than based directly on source material). They are also offered an open-ended 
Notes field in which they can comment on any aspect of a question, such as problems 
pertaining to coding, special sources (published or unpublished) used to code that question, 
or any additional persons consulted.  
Coding 
Recruiting country experts is a challenge, particularly for small countries in the developing 
world. To identify potential coders, we began by contacting senior political scientists – area 
specialists with extensive networks among scholars of that region. We asked these scholars 
to recommend persons with country-specific knowledge who might be interested in the 
project. We then contacted them, informed them of the project, and – if they seemed 
appropriate for the job and willing to commit the requisite time – secured their appointment. 
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Country experts chosen for this project are generally serving as academics, graduate 
students, or professionals involved in some aspect of politics (such as the civil service or an 
NGO). Since the questions of interest to this project are mostly factual – and the non-factual 
questions do not have a pronounced partisan or ideological slant – it was deemed sufficient 
to recruit only one coder per country.9 Coders were remunerated according to the number of 
leaders and the ease of data access in that country.  Average remuneration was about $500.  
The time required to complete a GLP questionnaire depends on the number of 
leaders in a country – in turn, largely a product of the size of the legislature. China’s 
legislature, with more than 3000 members, tops the list, while Qatar’s, with 35 members, is 
the smallest in our sample. On average, coders reported spending about 50 hours on their 
work, which may have spread across several weeks or months. Most of the coding was 
conducted on the GLP interactive web site.10 However, a few coders preferred to work on 
hard copies of the questionnaire, which were then transcribed to the on-line database.  
 All coders have the option of retaining anonymity. However, most of those recruited 
to work on GLP preferred to be publically identified with their work, and thus appear (along 
with contact information) on the GLP web site. This enhances the transparency and 
credibility of the GLP database and also allows end-users the option of contacting those 
involved in the coding, to resolve ambiguities or pursue new angles. 
                                                
9 We plan to construct limited tests of inter-coder reliability in the future by enlisting multiple experts 
to code several speculative questions of this nature for the same country. 
10 All coding is contained in a consolidated database constructed with Drupal, a popular open-source 
Content Management Software (CMS), with MySQL as its database engine. This system provides the 
user-interface for coders to enter data and for end-users to view them on the website and download 
data if preferred. Data queries may be structured in various ways and may be restricted to particular 
countries. 
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Classifying Leaders 
The notion of a “leader” or “elite” (terms used interchangeably in this project) can be 
defined in many ways (Blondel 1987; Dogan 2003; Higley & Pakulski 2007; Putnam 1976). 
GLP recognizes ten categories: (1) the apex, (2) the next ten, (3) the executive, (4) cabinet 
members, (5) executive staff, (6) party leaders, (7) assembly leaders, (8) supreme court 
justices, (9) members of parliament (MPs)11, and (10) unelected persons. Most of these 
categories are defined in formal terms (statutory or constitutional). A few are informal, 
resting on the judgment of coders.  
The apex of a polity consists of the one or two persons who are judged to possess 
the greatest overall political influence in a country. Their power may be formal or informal. 
They may be the executive(s), holders of the most powerful offices, or unelected persons 
(e.g., a media patron, religious leader, military leader). Coders are asked to decide whether a 
single person occupies the apex or whether two people of virtually equal power share this 
position of influence (as in China and in many semipresidential systems). 
The next ten elites (“+10” in the tables) in a polity consist of the most powerful 
persons, after those at the apex. Similar considerations apply (for example, their power may 
be formal or informal).  
The GLP then recognizes a series of more or less formal positions that are often 
correlated with real political influence (though, obviously, to varying degrees in different 
countries), and which may overlap with the apex and the top ten. These include: the executive, 
cabinet members, executive staff, party leaders, assembly leaders, supreme court justices (understood as the 
                                                
11 MPs signify lower house MPs in all countries except for Chile, where the upper house MPs are 
coded.  
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top court, often a constitutional court), and members of parliament, (MPs, with or without 
leadership positions).  
A residual category of other unelected persons encompasses figures such as monarchs, 
religious leaders, military leaders, junta leaders, CEOs of important companies, and NGO 
leaders. They are unelected leaders who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just 
a specialized issue-area) and are not easily categorized in one of the other categories. The 
breadth of influence is important here. For example, a central bank may be influential and 
perhaps even dominant in setting monetary policy, but it does not typically influence the 
formation of policy in other areas (except by spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious 
leader, or military leader may reach into diverse areas of policy. It is the latter that concerns 
us. 
The distribution of leaders across these offices within the GLP dataset is portrayed 
in Table 1.4. Note that there can be overlap between the various categories because of one 
leader holding multiple positions—an MP can also be a cabinet minister, a part of the apex, 
and/or a party leader, for example. The first three columns of Table 1.4 indicate, 
respectively, the number of officeholders of each type in the database, the percent of 
officeholders in the database that those officeholders make up, and the number of countries 
for which there is data on that kind of officeholder.  The rest of the columns display 
important summary values across these countries: the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum.  
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Table 1.4:  
Leaders Classified by Office 
 
 _LEADERS_ ________COUNTRIES________ 
OFFICES N % N M Med SD Range 
Most  power fu l         
     Apex (1–2) 210 0.5 145 1.45 1 0.5  
     Next 10 (“+10”) 1220 3 143 9 9 2  
Execut iv e  branch         
     
     Executive 224 0.5 145 1.5 1 0.8 1/8 
     Cabinet 3664 8.8 145 25 22 14 2/86 
     Staff 759 1.8 105 7 4 9 1/54 
Legis la ture      
        
     Party leaders 1249 3 130 10 7 10 1/74 
     Assembly leaders 1915 4.6 143 13 6 18 1/103 
     All MPs 31269 75.2 145 216 139 276 23/2989 
Court  1032 2.5 136 8 7 7 1/37 
Other  une l e c t ed  1483 3.6 122 12 5 21 1/150 
TOTAL 41595 100 145     
N=number. M=mean. Med=median. SD=standard deviation.  
Range=minimum/maximum. Total=includes all previous categories except 
Most powerful (which is redundant).  Numbers are usually rounded to nearest integer.  
  
Data for the executive extends across 145 countries (the full sample). Most countries 
have one or two persons carrying out executive functions, though one country (Switzerland) 
has a collegial executive. Cabinets vary in size from 2 (Ecuador) to 86 (India), with an 
average of 25. Data for executive staff are relatively scarce, extending to only 105 countries. 
Across those countries, the GLP contains background information on anywhere from 1 to 
54 staffers, with an average of 7.  
Party leaders in the legislature are tracked for 130 countries. Among these countries, 
coders were able to identify a range of 1 (8 countries) to 74 (India) leaders, with a mean of 
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10. Assembly leaders show a similarly wide spread – from 1 (20 countries) to 103 (Mexico), 
with a mean of 13. Information about rank-and-file MPs is available for the entire sample. 
The number of MPs coded per country ranges from 23 (Trinidad and Tobago) to 2989 
(China), with a mean of 216. 
Data for members of the supreme court (or constitutional court) are available for 
most of the sample, but not for all justices. Here, we find a range extending from 1 (for 34 
countries) to 37 (Austria), with a mean of 8. 
Note that informal categories such as executive staff and “other unelected” are 
subject to the judgments of country experts. Likewise, the designation of a party leader or 
assembly leader may be open to interpretation and may be defined differently in different 
contexts. If in the judgment of the country expert an individual is sufficiently influential, 
his/her name is included in one of these categories, and relevant background information 
added to the database. One should bear in mind that these categories are not strictly defined 
(nor could they be, in our opinion). 
Overall, the GLP sample chosen for analysis in this paper contains information for 
38,085 leaders and 41,595 offices (because of leaders holding multiple offices) in 145 
countries, with a mean of 262 leaders and 286 offices per country. The smallest group of 
leaders in the dataset (N=41) is registered by Trinidad, the largest (N=3118) by China. Cuba 
follows in second place with 686. Since many of these leaders reside in the legislature 
(75.2%), the size of a country’s legislature largely determines the size of that country’s elite 
delegation as represented in the GLP.12  
                                                
12 Extant work (e.g., Stigler 1976) suggests that population size explains much of the variance in the 
size of legislatures. When the membership of the legislature (ln) is regressed against population (ln), 
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General Attributes  
We hope the dataset described above will be used to address many of the hypotheses 
discussed at the beginning of the paper, as it presents comparable leader-level data for most 
countries in the world. In the meantime, however, since this is the first comprehensive leader 
database, we thought it would be useful and interesting to present the information the 
dataset yields regarding aggregate patterns at the national and global levels.  As such, in this 
and subsequent sections, we present various details about the characteristics of political 
leaders around the world. 
We begin with Table 1.5, which presents aggregate information regarding The (1) 
Age, (2) Sex, (3) Marital status, (4) Languages spoken, (5) Educational attainment, (6) 
Educated abroad, (7) Educated in West, and (8) Tenure in current position. A lot of 
information is packed into this table, so we shall review the findings carefully, row by row, 
column by column. 
                                                                                                                                            
approximately 40% of the variance is explained. Larger countries tend to have larger legislatures, and 
hence a larger class of leaders as calculated by the GLP, though this is by no means the only factor at 
work. 
 20 
 
 
Table  1.5:  
General Attributes of World Leaders 
 
Category _______SAMPLE_____ _________ OFFICE______ WEALTH ____________ REGION________ _ REGIME_ 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. Age (years) 29244 55 4.4 42/68 61 59 56 61 54 54 55 57 54 54 52 58 54 57 
2. Male (%) 37075 81 10 52/99 92 90 82 81 81 75 83 81 79 84 77 92 80 85 
3. Married (%) 22851 91 8 54/100 89 91 92 92 90 87 92 93 86 95 88 98 90 96 
4.4. Languages (N) 35479 1.9 0.8 1/4.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 2 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.9 
5. Edu attainment 29175 4.3 0.4 3.1/5.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.3 
6. Edu abroad %) 21763 32 28 0/100 39 37 37 28 28 13 37 51 21 28 16 50 28 47 
7.7. Edu in west(%) 21763 49 37 0/100 58 54 53 48 45 80 39 37 24 27 94 32 53 32 
8.8. Tenure (years) 34829 5 2.3 1/17.5 7 6 4 7 5 6 5 4.4 4.7 5.5 5.2 6.3 5 6 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 145 143 145 136 145 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 38085 210 1220 3664 1032 31269 10459 27626 8055 5547 9794 10730 3959 27141 10944 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  Numbers are rounded to the nearest 
integer except for Languages and Educational attainment.  N=number. M=mean. SD=standard deviation. Range=minimum/maximum. 
Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or constitutional court. Parl=lower 
house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. 
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The full sample available for each analysis –that is, the number of countries and 
leaders for which we have data on each leadership class – are listed in the final rows of the 
table. The available sample of leaders for each characteristic – generally somewhat reduced 
because of missing data on a particular question – is listed in column 1.  
Subsequent columns in Table 1.5 aggregate data by country prior to calculating 
statistics. For example, the mean (M) of the sample (column 2) is derived by calculating the 
mean for each country and then a global mean across all countries. Likewise, the standard 
deviation and the range (minimum to maximum values) are derived from country-level 
statistics, averaged across all countries (note that when the minimum or maximum country 
has poor coverage for that particular question, our discussion of extreme cases below may 
not correspond with extreme values in the table, as we instead focus on countries with better 
coverage). In the “Office” section, we generate (country-level) statistics pertaining to each 
office type, which are then averaged across all countries. In the “Wealth” columns, we 
compare country averages in rich (and economically developed) and poor (and/or 
economically less developed) countries. The former are identified by membership in the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); all other countries are 
categorized as poor (and/or undeveloped). In the “Region” columns, we look at variation 
between Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), all 
based on country averages. Finally, we compare regime types. Countries are defined as 
democratic if they are categorized as Free or Partly Free by Freedom House in 2012, and as 
autocratic of they are categorized as Not Free.  
The rationale for aggregating by country prior to calculating a global statistic is that 
we do not want our statistics to over-weight countries with large leadership classes such as 
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China. (Even so, a simple pooled analyses reveals very similar aggregate results, suggesting 
that countries with large elites are not so different from countries with small elites.) 
We now discuss the results, beginning with Age and proceeding down the table. 
Among global leaders the average age is 55, with a fairly tight spread around the mean 
(standard deviation=4.4), signaling that most political leaders are middle-aged. We find 
considerable variations between extremes – from a minimum average age of 42 (Ethiopia) to 
a maximum of 64 (Cambodia). Not surprisingly, leaders at the apex tend to be at the high 
end of the age distribution. There is relatively little variation across regions, though Africa 
and MENA have slightly higher average ages, whereas Americas, Asia and Europe have 
slightly lower average ages. Likewise, there is little variation across regime types, though 
autocracies have a slightly older leadership class.  
 The global political elite is strongly gendered. Over four-fifths of leaders around the 
world are male. This bias is most marked at the top – that is, the apex and the next ten. 
Across countries, we find extreme divergence between the lowest (53% of the leadership 
class in Rwanda and Sweden are male) and highest (99% in Yemen). Across regions, we find 
that the Middle East and North Africa are less hospitable to female leaders than other parts 
of the world. Some differences are found across the OECD/non-OECD divide, with the 
developed world less male-dominated than the developing world. Democracies are slightly 
less male-dominated than autocracies.  Nevertheless, neither rich countries nor democracies 
remotely approach gender parity.  
 Nine in ten global leaders are married, with a lowest rate of 65% (Argentina) and a 
highest rate of 100% (Mongolia, Morocco, Somaliland, and Sudan). We find relatively little 
variation across offices or across the OECD/non-OECD divide. But we do find significant 
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variation across regions, with Africa, Asia, and MENA having high marriage rates and the 
Americas and Europe having lower rates. A sizeable marriage gap separates democracies 
(90%) and autocracies (96%). 
 The average number of languages spoken by a leader (defined as any language one 
speaks, including one’s mother tongue) is 1.9.  Of course, we do not know the level of 
fluency with which they are spoken. In nine countries, all elites are reported to be fluent in 
only one language (that is, no foreign languages). In one country, Kosovo, they are reported 
to speak an average of 4.5 languages, the highest number in our sample. There is little 
difference across offices, across the rich/poor divide, or across regime types. However, there 
are significant regional differences. In particular, multiple languages are considerably more 
common in Africa, Asia and Europe.  
 The fifth row in Table 1.5 shows the mean level of educational attainment, 
understood as the highest level of education completed – (1) primary, (2) secondary, (3) 
higher education (non-university, e.g., technical school), (4) university/college, (5) post-
graduate, or (6) PhD. (For present purposes, we treat this ordinal scale as an interval scale.) 
Although a fairly large range is found between the lowest country average (3.4 in Guinea-
Bissau) and the highest country average (4.9 in Kazakhstan), the standard deviation is small, 
suggesting that these are extreme outliers. Interestingly, relatively little variation can be found 
across rich and poor countries, different regions, different regime types, and different office 
types 
 The sixth row presents the share (percent) of leaders who were educated in a foreign 
country at some point in their post-secondary schooling. Globally, about 32% were educated 
abroad, though the spread between the extremes, Russia (less than 1%) and Cape Verde 
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(94%), is enormous. We find that top leaders – members of the apex, the next ten, and the 
cabinet – are much more likely to have had a cosmopolitan educational experience than 
jurists and backbench MPs. Leaders of poor countries are much more likely to receive a 
portion of their education abroad than leaders of rich countries. This makes sense of the 
disparity across regions, where the lowest level of trans-national education occurs in the 
richest regions (Europe and North America), and may also account for why autocratic elites 
(who often rule over poor countries) are more likely to be educated abroad than democratic 
elites. 
 The seventh row tracks the share (percent) of leaders who received some higher 
education in the West (defined as Europe, North America, Australia, or New Zealand). 
Though only 17 percent of the leaders in our sample are in the West, about half of the 
leaders in our global sample are coded positively for this attribute, suggesting the enormous 
influence of universities in Europe and European offshoots. A western education is more 
common among members of the apex, the next ten, and cabinet members than among the 
supreme court and MPs. Differences across the rich/poor divide, across regions, and across 
regime-types are probably a product of location. Countries within the west are, not 
surprisingly, far more likely to have leaders educated in the west.  
 The final row in Table 1.5 illuminates leaders’ length of tenure. This is not to be 
confused with their tenure in politics or in top political positions. It is, quite simply, the 
length of time they have served in their current position, as classified by the GLP 
questionnaire. Mean tenure in office is just above 5 years for our global sample, with a 
standard deviation of 2.3. The lowest country average is about 1 (Morocco) and the highest 
about 11 (United Kingdom). Members of top offices enjoy longer tenure than fellow elites 
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other than supreme court members. Elites in rich countries have slightly longer tenure than 
elites in poor countries. Elites in autocracies enjoy slightly longer tenure than elites in 
democracies. Across regions, elites in Middle East and North Africa enjoy the longest 
tenure, while elites in Africa suffer the shortest periods in office, a fact that may be related to 
instability and/or a lack of professionalization among political elites.  
Languages 
In Table 1.6, we explore in more detail the languages spoken by political leaders around the 
world. We list only “world” languages, understood as those spoken widely beyond several 
countries. For present purposes, the country-level aggregates are perhaps more revealing 
than the pooled sample (where Mandarin Chinese occupies a somewhat higher position due 
to the size of the Chinese elite). So measured, the following languages are spoken most 
commonly among political elites, in order of prevalence: English, French, Spanish, Arabic, 
Russian, German, Portuguese, Chinese, and Other, the latter of which includes all local and 
other languages. English, the global leader, is spoken by over a third of political leaders in a 
country, on average. Of course, the prominence of English and certain other global 
languages results partially from the fact that we are using country averages, and therefore the 
numbers are affected by former colonial possessions that retain the colonial language as a 
primary (or in some cases secondary) language.  If the Chinese empire had collapsed (or 
collapses at some point in the future) into constituent parts that retained the Chinese 
language, it would move quickly up these rankings.  In simple numeric terms – that is, using 
simply the number of elites in our database that speak the language (column 1) – Chinese 
ranks fifth.    
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Table 1.6:  
Languages Spoken by World Leaders 
 
Category ____SAMPLE____ ________ _OFFICE________  WEALTH_ __________ REGION__________ _ _REGIME__ 
Sub-category 
   
Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. English 10068 37 37 59 50 49 35 34 46 34 38 33 37 40 29 39 27 
2. French 5953 19 35 21 23 22 20 18 15 21 43 9 2 13 26 17 26 
3. Spanish 4399 14 34 13 15 15 15 14 7 16 4 72 4 4 0.5 17 3 
4. Arabic  3815 12 31 10 12 12 12 12 1 15 9 0.02 0.5 0.3 80 5 36 
5. Russian 2834 11 29 13 13 12 9 11 5 13 0.1 0.4 30 19 0.9 10 15 
6. German 1865 5 17 7 5 6 4 5 17 1 0.1 0.4 0.9 16 0.8 6 0.4 
7. Portuguese 1273 4 18 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 8 5 2 3 0.07 4 3 
8. Chinese 3278 2 11 1 2 2 2 2 0.02 2 0.0 0.02 8 0.0 0.01 1 3 
9. Other 23841 75 39 74 76 75 72 75 72 75 77 76 86 83 27 80 55 
Full sample                
   Countries 144 142 141 144 132 144 33 111 37 24 26 41 16 112 32 
   Leaders 35478 197 1153 3340 940 29258 10144 25334 6779 5228 9581 10031 3859 24880 10598 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. 
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer except where N<1. 
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Disciplinary Background  
In Table 1.7, we explore the disciplinary background of political leaders, defined as the 
principal course of study in their undergraduate degree. This information is available for 
25,190 elites (66% of the total sample), spread across 145 countries. Disciplines are grouped 
as follows:  (1) Agronomy; (2) Engineering; (3) Math, Computer Science; (4) Biology, 
Chemistry, Physics; (5) Medicine; (6) Economics, Business, Management; (7) Social Sciences; 
(8) Law; (9) Humanities; (10) Military; and (11) Other.  
 The categories with the largest membership, by far, are law (21% of global leaders) 
and economics (which, along with related fields, encompasses 22% of global leaders). The 
remaining social sciences run a distant third place (12%). Given the closeness of these three 
disciplinary areas, one might argue that a majority of the global political elite share a 
common disciplinary orientation. This dominance is even greater among top offices.  On 
average in a given country, 67% of those occupying the apex of political power, 62% of 
those occupying the next ten most important positions, 55% of cabinet members, and 96% 
of supreme court justices are trained in these associated disciplines. (Not surprisingly, the 
latter have a predominantly legal background.) 
Nevertheless, cross-country variation is fairly large, as suggested by standard 
deviations and the spread between minimum and maximum values. Clearly, there is a quite a 
bit of country-level variation in what elites choose to study (or what they are expected to 
study) prior to taking up a career in politics. For example, South Korea and Rwanda have the 
largest percentage of leaders with a social science background and Mongolia (a very poor 
country) has the highest percentage of leaders with an engineering background. Elites in 
poor countries (non-OECD) are somewhat less likely to have focused on the triumvirate of 
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law, economics/business/management, and the social sciences than elites in rich countries, 
and democracies seem to prize the triumvirate more than non-democracies. Poor country 
elites tend more to engineering, medicine, and the military. The military, as expected, holds a 
higher standing in autocracies – though perhaps not as high as one might imagine. Russia 
has the largest percentage of leaders with a military background, while 45 countries have no 
leaders with military education. 
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Table 1.7:  
Disciplinary Background of World Leaders 
 
Category ________SAMPLE________ ______ OFFICE____ 
 
WEALTH_ ________REGION_____ REGIME_ 
Sub-category 
    
Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. Agronomy 766 3 3 0/12 2 0.7 3 0 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 1 3 3 
2. Engineering 2347 9 6 0/33 5 9 10 0.9 9 7 10 6 8 11 10 12 9 10 
3. Math/CS 364 2 2 0/9 3 1 1 0.2 1 1 2 2 0.8 2 2 3 1 2 
4.Bio/Chem/Physics 731 3 2 0/17 3 3 3 0.1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
5. Medicine 1525 6 4 0/25 4 4 6 0 7 5 7 7 6 5 7 6 6 6 
6. Econ/Bus/Manag 5196 22 8 4/59 35 24 26 2 23 19 23 25 22 23 19 22 22 24 
7. Social Sciences 2908 12 8 0/33 15 15 12 4 13 15 11 12 12 12 12 11 12 11 
8. Law 5216 21 10 2/54 17 23 17 90 16 24 21 20 29 17 22 19 23 18 
9. Humanities 2332 9 7 0/46 4 7 9 3 10 10 9 8 6 12 9 8 9 8 
10. Military 516 3 3 0/16 9 5 2 0.08 1 0.7 2 3 1 2 1 4 1 4 
11. Other 3289 11 10 0/52 5 9 10 0.3 13 12 11 12 9 8 12 13 11 10 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 132 142 144 127 144 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 25190 183 1016 2932 928 19879 8569 16621 3461 4089 6860 8801 1979 19310 5880 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. 
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa.  
Numbers rounded to nearest integer except when N<1 
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Occupational Background 
Table 1.8 examines the occupational background of political leaders. In this analysis, 31,398 
individual elites from 145 countries are included. Categories include (1) White collar 
(including self-employed, interest group, international organization), (2) Blue collar, (3) 
Education (primary, secondary, university), (4) Media (pundit, journalist, columnist, etc.), (5) 
Military, and (6) None or politics. (The latter are categorized together because of the 
assumption that someone who has no apparent occupational background but currently 
occupies a political position is likely to have been pursuing a political career for some time.) 
 We draw attention to the dominance of two categories: white collar (55%) and 
none/politics (22%), which combine to encompass the occupational background of 77 % of 
the sample. Only 2% of the leaders have a military occupational background, though leaders 
in the apex are far more likely to have such a background. There is of course wide variation 
among countries in this regard. The country with the highest percentage of leaders with a 
white-collar background is Guyana, while the country with the lowest percentage is Georgia.  
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Table 1.8:  
Occupational Background of World Leaders 
 
Category ______SAMPLE______ ________ OFFICE________ _WEALTH_ ________ _REGION_________ _ REGIME_ 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. White collar  15504 55 22 0/98 36 45 50 69 57 58 54 48 65 54 58 53 57 49 
2. Blue collar  676 2 4 0/30 0.4 2 1 0.3 2 4 2 2 1 1 4 1 2 1 
3. Education 3252 12 8 0/33 10 11 14 10 12 10 12 14 10 9 11 15 11 14 
4. Media 779 1 2 0/8 2 0.8 0.8 0 1 1 1 0.7 2 0.9 1 1 1 0.9 
5. Military 298 2 4 0/39 9 6 2 0 2 0.5 3 3 0.8 3 0.7 5 1 6 
6. None or politics 8737 22 23 0/98 35 29 29 16 21 23 22 26 16 26 21 17 21 25 
7. Other 2152 6 11 0/100 9 5 4 6 5 3 6 7 5 6 4 9 6 6 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 138 141 144 120 141 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 31398 195 1102 3079 824 25725 10170 21228 4852 4983 9013 10129 2421 23552 7846 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation.      
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer except when N<1.   
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Political Experience 
Table 1.9 evaluates the prior political experience of leaders. The sample comprises 22,553 
elites drawn from 143 countries. Categories are defined as (1) None, (2) Trade union, (3) 
Employers organization, (4) Interest group, (5) Non-governmental organization (NGO), 
international non-governmental organization (INGO), or social movement, (6) Local 
government or municipal office, (7) Previous Member of parliament (MP) or minister, and 
(8) Partisan (political advisor or person active in party youth branch or party 
organization/administration). 
 The largest category by far is partisan (38% of the pooled sample), suggesting that 
many political leaders work their way up the ranks from party service to national office. A 
good number also gain entry by way of prior service to local government (16%) or as an MP 
or minister (22%). Among top offices other than the supreme court (for fairly obvious 
reasons), the dominant pattern of recruitment includes MP/minister or other partisan 
activities. A fair number of top officials have a background in NGO, INGO, or political 
movement work. 
Cross-country variation is quite extreme, as judged by standard deviations and the 
range between minimum and maximum values across most of these categories. This suggests 
that political recruitment operates quite differently across countries. For example, Cambodia 
is the country with the highest percentage of leaders with prior political experience at the 
local or municipal government level (67%) while four countries (Namibia, Niger, Singapore, 
Uzbekistan) have no leaders with such experience. Australia has the highest percentage of 
leaders with prior experience with trade unions (5%), while thirty-four countries have the 
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lowest (0%). Senegal has the highest percentage of leaders with prior experience with NGOs 
or INGOs (72%), while nine countries have no leaders with NGO or INGO experience. 
Differences across the developed and developing world are noticeable. For example, 
local government serves as a platform for higher office to a greater extent in OECD 
countries (23%, on average) than in the non-OECD (14%), perhaps reflecting the greater 
prominence of local government in the advanced industrial world.  
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Table 1.9:  
Political Experience of World Leaders 
 
Category ______SAMPLE______ __________OFFICE__________ WEALTH _______REGION____________ REGIME 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. None 1651 7 12 0/70 6 6 7 32 6 9 6 6 10 8 4 11 7 7 
2. Trade union 242 2 9 0/100 0.8 0.9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 5 0.8 0.8 1 4 
3. Employers org 195 2 7 0/73 0 1 2 6 2 0.3 2 3 2 2 0.2 1 1 2 
4. Interest group 463 3 6 0/40 3 1 3 12 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 0.8 2 3 
5. NGO/INGO 1796 9 15 0/72 7 9 9 8 10 5 11 15 13 7 4 8 10 8 
6. Local govt 4301 16 18 0/98 5 6 10 4 18 23 14 9 24 14 22 10 17 13 
7. MP/minister 4935 22 20 0/80 29 25 27 20 22 20 23 29 13 22 22 19 22 22 
8. Partisan 8970 38 27 0/99 50 50 40 19 38 40 38 34 33 40 45 36 39 35 
Full sample                
   Countries 143 122 137 138 61 137 33 110 38 24 26 41 14 113 30 
   Leaders 22553 178 948 2442 239 18633 8743 13810 3698 3830 4389 9066 1570 19107 3446 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. 
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer.   
 
 35 
MP Salaries 
Table 1.10 presents the salaries of parliamentarians (MPs), expressed in current US dollars 
(row 1) and as a share of per capita GDP (row 2). These are official salaries for the lower (or 
only) house of parliament, and do not reflect extra payments for which members of the 
leadership may be eligible. They also do not reflect non-salary perquisites (e.g., tax benefits) 
or other irregular forms of compensation.  
The data were collected by research assistants (with assistance from country experts) 
from online sources, including newspaper articles and websites of governments and NGOs. 
The analysis includes 79 countries located in various regions around the world. Because 
there is no intra-country variation, we adopt countries as the sole unit of analysis. 
 The mean salary of MPs in our sample is just over $70,000, with a substantial spread 
around the mean, anchored by Guyana at the low end ($1,774) and Chile at the high end 
($369,984). Differences across the developed and less developed world are marked, as one 
might expect, with MPs in the rich countries earning well over twice the salary of their 
brethren in the developing world.  
However, when these numbers are considered in light of the domestic economies, 
the situation is reversed. For example, parliamentarians earn less than the average per capita 
income in Hungary (a relatively rich country, but one with a socialist past), while they earn 
116 times the average income in the Democratic Republic of Congo (a very poor country). 
More generally, parliamentarians earn about fourteen times the per capita income in poor 
countries and only three times the per capita income in rich countries. Cross-regional 
differences follow this pattern, with Africa having the lowest salaries but the highest 
proportional salaries (29 times the per capita income in their countries). We also find a 
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dramatic difference in MP salaries manifested across democracies and non-democracies, 
though much of this may be largely due to per capita income differences. 
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Table 1.10: 
Salaries of Parliamentarians around the World 
 
Category _________SAMPLE_________ ___WEALTH___ ________________REGION_____________ __REGIME__ 
Sub-category    Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic M   SD Range M M M M M M M M M 
1. Salary (USD) 72,081 64,721 1,774/369,984 113,362 45,420 44,411 75,849 81,797 80,039 78,186 75,658 35,281 
2. Salary/GDPpc 9.6 18 0.3/116 3 14 29 8 6 3 6 8 25 
Full sample           
   Countries 79 31 48 17 10 15 31 6 72 7 
  Lower House MPs 18587 8298 10289 3719 2181 3452 7768 1467 17352 1235 
 
All data are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics (numbers of lower house MPs is provided for reference only and does not 
mean that salaries are collected at the leader level).  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. Range=minimum/maximum. Amer=Americas.  
MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Official salaries of members of parliament (MPs) expressed (1) in USD, rounded to the nearest integer, 
and (2) as a share of per capita GDP. 
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Descriptive Representation  
The GLP identifies the ethnic identities of political leaders, defining the latter according to 
cultural, ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic features that set one group apart from others. 
Such judgments are never hard-and-fast and always open to interpretation; likewise, realities 
on the ground are often in flux. Nonetheless, we anticipate that the codings assigned by 
GLP country experts reflect common understandings in the country at the time the survey 
was administered.  
We also ask country experts to rank-order all (previously identified) ethnic groups in 
a country by their socioeconomic status, allowing for ties in instances where several groups 
are not easily distinguished. This rank-ordering rests on survey or census data wherever 
possible, and otherwise is based on the judgments of country experts. We expect that it is 
fairly accurate in identifying the most privileged and least privileged groups, whose status is 
generally widely known and commented upon. This data is gathered for 1,204 groups across 
121 countries. Within each country, the group(s) accorded the highest socioeconomic status 
is classified as privileged, a status bestowed upon 291 groups (24.1%). Likewise, the group(s) 
with the lowest socioeconomic status is classified as underprivileged, a status accorded to 287 
groups (23.8%). Finally, we estimate the share of each ethnic group in the general population 
based on survey and census data drawn from extant sources.  
Using this information, we calculate a measure of descriptive representation for 
privileged and underprivileged groups by subtracting that group’s share (percent) of the 
population from their share (percent) of leadership positions. A positive number signifies 
over-representation; a negative number signifies under-representation. These country-level 
figures are then averaged across all countries to obtain the statistics displayed in Table 1.11.  
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As can be seen in the table, privileged groups are (on average) over-represented by 7.4 
percentage points among leaders around the world; that is, the share of privileged groups in 
government is greater (by 7.4 percentage points) than their share in the general population. 
(This is calculated country by country and then averaged across all countries.) Meanwhile, 
underprivileged groups are under-represented by 11.3 percentage points.  
As one might expect (since this is a “lumpy” measure), the spread between the 
extremes is considerable. In Paraguay, privileged groups are actually under-represented (by 
29 percentage points) while in Chile they are over-represented (by 66 percentage points). In 
Jamaica, underprivileged groups are under-represented (by 90 percentage points) while in El 
Salvador they are over-represented (by 1 percentage point).  
Despite the high degree of variance around the mean, we find that the connection 
between money and power is consistent across all offices, across rich and poor countries, 
across regions, and across regime-types. Among the chosen categories displayed in Table 
1.11, there are no exceptions to the general rule that socioeconomic status is associated with 
greater political representation. That said, there are some interesting patterns in the manner 
and degree to which this representational disparity is manifested. 
Across offices we find that privileged groups are most over-represented on supreme 
courts (21.4 percentage points) and least over-represented among parliamentarians (7 
percentage points). Underprivileged groups are under-represented in all offices, but in a 
somewhat different pattern. Specifically, underprivileged groups are more under-represented 
in parliament than in other – presumably more consequential – positions. We are not sure 
how to account for this pattern. It could be that the practice of tokenism – granting 
underprivileged groups token representation on a body – translates into a higher share of the 
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total when the resulting body is small. For example, token representation on a supreme court 
might involve one seat among 8 (the average size of this body across our sample, as shown 
in Table 1.4), while token representation in a legislature might involve a few seats among 226 
(the average size of legislatures in our sample). 
Patterns across rich and poor countries also run in contrary directions. Privileged 
groups are more over-represented in rich countries than in poor countries, while 
underprivileged groups are more under-represented in poor countries than in rich countries. 
It is easy to understand why poor social groups might even be less likely to achieve political 
representation in poorer countries; presumably, they are much poorer and suffer from 
corresponding disadvantages of education, health, infrastructure, and organization. It is not 
apparent why well-off groups achieve higher representation in rich countries than in poor 
countries. 
Regional variations are evident. Disparities in representation – both among 
privileged and underprivileged – are greatest in the Middle East and least in Europe. Africa, 
the Americas, and Asia generally follow a pattern of modest over-representation for 
privileged groups and immodest under-representation for underprivileged groups.  
Variation across regime types is not as great as one might expect. Privileged and 
underprivileged groups achieve a level of representation that is closer to their population size 
in democracies relative to autocracies, but only by a few percentage points. It would be rash 
to conclude that regime type has much effect on the political representation of “in” and 
“out” groups.
 41 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11 
Descriptive Representation 
 
 
All data are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. Range=minimum/maximum. 
Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or constitutional court. Parl=lower 
house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Descriptive representation is calculated by subtracting an 
ethnocultural group’s share of the population (%) from the share (%) of leaders who belong to that group. A positive (negative) number 
signifies over- (under-) representation. 
 
Category ____SAMPLE____ ________OFFICE________ _WEALTH_ ___________REGION___________ _REGIME_ 
Sub-category    Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. Privileged (%) 7.4 13.8 -29/66 9.6 11.6 14 21.4 7.0 10.5 6.5 3.9 7.7 8.2 6.2 17.6 7.0 9.5 
2. Underprivileged 
(%) -11.3 19.8 -90/1 -4.4 -2.3 -8.7 -7.7 -10.0 -6.7 -13.5 -13.7 -18.2 -10.6 -4.9 -18.4 -11.1 -14.3 
Full sample                
Countries 121 112 120 117 95 117 31 90 26 21 24 37 13 98 23 
 42 
Conclusion 
In reviewing previously available information about leadership cadres worldwide, we noted 
that extant datasets suffer from one or both of two limitations.  First, they generally have 
limited scope, in the sense that information may be provided for top leaders such as 
executives or cabinet members but not for others, or information may be provided only as 
country aggregates rather than at the individual level.  Second, the existing datasets often 
have limited country coverage.  
To what extent have these limitations affected common understandings of the topic? 
To what extent, that is, do extant datasets render a biased or curtailed vision of political 
leadership around the world? We can shed light on this question by examining various 
features of the GLP database.  
 With respect to the problem of scope, we may contrast the characteristics of top 
leaders – at the apex, the next ten, or in the cabinet – with backbenchers (MPs). Here, we 
find fairly marked contrasts on some dimensions. For example, top echelons are older, more 
male-dominated, longer-serving, more likely to be educated abroad and in the West, more 
likely to have training in business or economics or in the military, and more likely to have 
held prior offices in party organizations and MP positions (see Tables 5 and 9). Along other 
dimensions, there is little or no difference between top and intermediate echelons. 
 Other contrasts are more fine-grained, focused on specific offices. For example, 
leaders at the apex are more likely to have a professional background in the military than 
occupants of other leadership (top or intermediate) positions (see Table 1.8). Jurists (that is, 
members of the supreme court) have higher educational attainment than other leaders (see 
Table 1.5). Leaders in the apex, cabinet, and supreme court are more conversant in world 
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languages than other leaders (see Table 1.6). 
 With respect to country coverage, we may contrast the picture of global leadership 
derived from rich (OECD) countries with the picture of global leadership derived from 
countries in the developing world. We find that political leaders in rich countries are 
somewhat less likely to be male, less likely to be married, and less likely to be educated 
abroad than their brethren in the developing world (see Table 1.5). The educational 
background of rich country leaders is more likely to be in law, 
economy/business/management, or the social sciences, while their brethren in the 
developing world favor engineering, medicine, and the military (see Table 1.7). Leaders in 
rich countries are more likely to have prior political experience in a local government or 
party positions than their counterparts in the developing world (see Table 1.9). 
 Regional differences, and differences across regime type, are also marked, though we 
shall not burden the reader with a recitation of contrasts contained in the foregoing tables. 
The general point is clear: leadership characteristics vary across offices and across contexts. 
Without an encompassing view of our subject, this variation is lost. Writers over-generalize, 
or under-generalize (failing to see general patterns where they exist). 
 In these respects, we expect that the GLP can contribute to the development of a 
more global – and at same time, more nuanced – field of study focused on political 
leadership. Several areas of research seem especially fruitful. While the present study employs 
a set of nominal categories – rich/poor, Africa/Americas/Asia/Europe/MENA, 
democratic/autocratic – to explore variation across the world of elites, these categories are 
obviously somewhat arbitrary. When the full range of variation is introduced, one can 
provide a more sensitive analysis of descriptive and causal relationships. Why are some 
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countries more male-dominated than others? Why are some leadership classes more 
cosmopolitan than others? Do democracies enlist more educated leaders than autocracies? 
Are certain offices more prone to have educated leaders fill them?  
Arguably, within-country variation provides the most satisfactory approach to 
measurement and to causal identification. To this end, the individual-level data provided by 
the GLP – including 38,085 leaders across 145 countries – provides ample opportunities for 
analysis. 
Because data about leaders is associated with each leader’s name, the GLP database 
may be used in conjunction with other databases that have a similar structure. For example, 
one might merge the GLP with databases containing names of elites in business or the 
military, using common surnames to indicate family ties across these spheres. One might 
merge the GLP with constituency-level data on election results (e.g., from the Constituency-
Level Election Archive) to gauge how electoral dynamics condition the types of MPs who 
reach office. 
Note that because GLP collects individual data across a wide range of social and 
political dimensions, it offers the possibility of aggregating the data at a variety of different 
levels: social groups (defined by ethnicity, language, and/or religion), political parties, institutions 
(executive, legislative, judicial), position (apex, top ten, executive, cabinet, executive staff, party 
leaders, assembly leaders, supreme court justices, back-benchers, and unelected persons), and 
country. As an example, consider the possibility of comparing attributes across parties. Here, 
one might wish to compare the characteristics of small parties and large parties, parties on 
the left and the right, parties in government and opposition parties, and so forth. 
Individual level data may also be mustered to provide measurement instruments for 
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hard-to-measure latent concepts. By way of example, suppose one is willing to assume that 
education is a marker for aptitude. Building on this postulate, it follows that one ought to see 
an association between education and leadership position in countries where meritocratic 
rules apply. Where a strong association exists – that is, where top leaders are more educated 
than intermediate or low-level leaders – we may assume that meritocratic procedures are 
being applied. This, in turn, may pave the way for an analysis of fundamental causes. 
While we have given a taste of some of the interesting variation in personal 
characteristics of leaders around the world, we are sure that scholars will be able to enlist 
GLP data in ways we cannot imagine. Ahlquist and Levi (2011) noted recently that the 
subject of leadership, after decades of neglect, is back in fashion. Our hope is that the Global 
Leadership Project will be a fundamental empirical resource in this new resurgence of 
research on leadership and that it will enable policymakers, researchers, and citizens to make 
more accurate and precise comparisons within countries, across countries, and across 
regions of the world.   
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Appendix A: 
GLP Questionnaire 
For most of the following questions (except the most obvious), three additional fields are 
available:  
a) Uncertain. If checked, this means that the coder is uncertain about the answer to 
this question. Default: unchecked. Evidently, certainty will be greater for some 
questions (e.g., sex) than for others (e.g., political power). However, in checking 
the Uncertainty box we are asking for an estimate relative to other answers to 
that particular question. Thus, if a coder is more uncertain about one person’s level 
of power, relative to other persons’ political power, the coder should register this 
uncertainty by checking the appropriate box.  
b) Assumed. If checked, the answer to the question is inferred, rather than based on 
source material. Default: unchecked. 
c) Notes. An open-ended field that offers space (lots of space) for coders to 
comment on any aspect of a question. This includes problems pertaining to the 
coding. Here, the coder can explain why s/he checked the Uncertain box. S/he 
can also describe special sources (published or unpublished) used to code that 
question and any additional persons consulted. If someone other than the 
principal coder enters data for an entry, or changes that entry, this should be 
noted here. 
A few coding categories are adopted from the SEDEPE codebook 
(http://sedepe.net/?page_id=169), as designated below.  
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A number of the questions require the coder to define a category, e.g., family/clan, a region, 
religion, or ethnic/racial/cultural group. In these instances, the coder is instructed to use 
whatever categories are common in the country, making sure that the terminology is 
consistent through the questionnaire. 
 Likewise, where party groupings are indistinct, the coder must make a judgment 
about which party groupings are real and which are artificial. For example, it is traditional to 
code the German CDU and CSU as the same party. Likewise, some independents in the US 
Senate are perhaps better coded as members of one of the major parties. This is left to the 
coder’s discretion. 
Country-Level Questions 
I. Election Dates 
1. Date of most recent presidential election (if any): (day/month/year)  
2. Date of most recent national legislative election (if any): (day/month/year)  
II. Ethnocultural Identity 
1. List all salient ethnocultural (cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic) groups. Salient 
means politically, socially, or culturally significant – regardless of size. For each 
group:  
2. What is the total population (raw number)? 
3. What is the size of that group as a share of total population in the country (%)?  
4. Is the group defined by ethnicity?  Y/N  
5. Is the group defined by language?  Y/N 
6. Is the group defined by religion?  Y/N 
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7. Which description best characterizes the location of this ethnic group within the 
country? Are most members of this group… 
(a) Living in one area?  
(b) If yes, where? 
(c) Living together but in different places? 
(d) Living diffusely across country? 
8. Rank the foregoing ethnocultural (cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic) groups 
according to their relative economic status (the mean economic status of all 
members of each group). 
III. Legislature  
All questions pertaining to assemblies or legislatures in the following survey are assumed to 
refer to the body listed below.  
1. If unicameral, list the name of the legislature. 
2. If bicameral, list the name of the more powerful house or (if equal in power) the 
lower house.  
3. If no legislature (in the usual sense), list the preeminent unelected consultative body. 
IV. Parties  
1. List all political parties with seats in the national legislature (most powerful house, if 
bicameral; both houses if symmetrical in power) 
2. For each party, list the ethnocultural group or groups that it is identified with (i.e., its 
social base), if any. 
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V. Other 
1. Does the country have a mixed electoral system? Y/N 
2. What is the annual salary of an MP?  
Individual-Level Questions 
I. Types of Leaders 
1. Executive – the person or persons who administers the executive branch agencies (the 
person to whom agency chiefs report). Typically, this is a president or prime 
minister. Note that in some polities this person takes orders or pays obeisance to an 
unelected official, e.g., a monarch, military ruler, or religious figure. In designating 
the executive you are not making any claims about the executive’s de facto authority 
but merely his/her de jure authority. Occasionally, the executive is truly collegial, as 
in Switzerland. However, in most parliamentary systems there is a single “prime” 
minister or chancellor who is primus inter pares, and who should therefore be 
designated as the executive.  
2. Cabinet/Ministers – ministers, including ministers without portfolio. For each, answer 
the following question… 
What is his/her policy area? (If the minister is in charge of more than one policy area 
please list each of these policy areas.)  
a) First  
b) Second (if more than one) 
c) Third (if more than two) 
OPTIONS [SEDEPE]: 
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1 PM or equivalent 
2 Vice or deputy PM 
3 Without portfolio 
4 Finance/Treasury/Budget 
5 Economy 
6 Justice 
7 Foreign affairs 
8 Defence 
9 Interior 
10 Agriculture 
11 Fisheries, sea 
12 Industry 
13 Commerce 
14 Social affairs 
15 Health 
16 Labour, employment 
17 Family, youth 
18 Transport 
19 Construction, housing, urbanization 
20 Environment 
21 Research, technology 
22 Culture 
23 Foreign trade 
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24 Posts, telecommunications 
25 Sports 
26 Foreign aid  
27 Civil service 
28 Public works 
29 Energy 
30 Planning, land management 
31 Regional affairs 
32 War veterans, refugees and repatriation 
33 Relations with parliament 
34 Education 
35 Information 
36 Leisure, tourism 
37 Consumer affairs 
38 Food 
39 Women (gender–equal opportunities?) 
40 European affairs 
41 Other 
99 Not known 
3. Executive staff – important members of the executive who serve in an advisory 
capacity but are not presidents, cabinet members, ministers, or MPs.  
For each, designate their principal policy area: 
a) General (non-specific) 
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b) Economy/finance/budget 
c) Other domestic 
d) Foreign/defense 
4. Party leaders – leaders of parties seated in the assembly (they may or may not hold a 
seat in the assembly or some official position in government).  
5. Assembly leaders – includes all those with official party and legislative positions (e.g., 
the speaker, caucus leaders, whips, committee chairs, but not subcommittee chairs). 
6. Assembly backbenchers – all those in the assembly not designated as leaders (above). 
7. Supreme court – members of the top court or constitutional court (that which has 
jurisdiction over constitutional issues). 
8. Other unelected bodies – unelected persons (e.g., a monarch, religious leader, military 
leader or junta) who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just a 
specialized issue-area). The breadth of influence is important here. For example, a 
central bank may be influential (perhaps even dominant) in setting monetary policy, 
but it does not typically influence the formation of policy in other areas (except by 
spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious leader, or military leader may reach into 
diverse areas of policy. In this respect, and to the extent that they are able to 
influence these other policy areas, they are rightly considered as key political leaders 
within a polity.  
II. Questions applied to each leader listed above 
1. Official position (English)? 
2. Official position (local language)? 
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3. Year in which service in current position began (the date on which the person 
assumed office, not the date of election or appointment)?  
4. For countries with a mixed electoral system, which system was s/he elected under?  
(a) PR or (b) FPP 
5. Is the person at the apex of power in the country? This refers to the 1 or 2 most 
powerful people in a country. Note that sometimes there is a single most powerful 
person (e.g., president). At other times, there are two people of roughly equal power 
(e.g., a president and prime minister). Y/N 
6. Is the person among the next 10 most powerful people in the country? (Does not 
include those at the apex.) Y/N  
7. Non-political occupation (prior or concurrent with current political post)? 
[SEDEPE] 
a) No previous occupation (including unemployed) 
b) Self-employed: professional (accountant, architect, lawyer, medical doctor etc.) 
c) Self-employed: small businessman  
d) Self-employed: farmer, fisherman 
e) Employed: professional (accountant, architect, lawyer, medical doctor etc.) 
f) Employed: middle management (department head, technician etc.) 
g) Employed: top management / director / CEO 
h) Employed: other white-collar worker 
i) Employed: blue-collar worker 
j) Education: school teacher 
k) Education: university professor 
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l) Full-time politician (paid by party organisation, parliament, government; think 
tanks; living of politics) 
m) Full-time interest group official (trade union) 
n) Full-time interest group official (employers’ association) 
o) International organization top management 
p) International organization other 
q) Unemployed 
r) Military Officer 
s) Media (Pundit, journalist, columnist, etc…)  
t) Landlord 
u) Other 
8. Political experience?  
a) National trade union 
b) National employers organization 
c) National other interest group 
d) Supra-national trade union 
e) Supra-national employers organization 
f) Supra-national other interest group 
g) Governmental international organization 
h) NGO 
i) Local government 
j) Municipal position 
k) Party organization/administration 
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l) Party youth branch 
m) Political movement 
n) Political Advisor 
o) Previous MP 
p) Previous Minister 
q) None 
9. Highest level of education completed? 
a) Primary  
b) Secondary  
c) Higher education non university 
d) University / college 
e) Post-graduate (anything except Ph.D. degree)  
f) Ph.D. 
10. List all post-secondary colleges/universities attended? 
11. Locations (city/country) of college/university?  
12. Principal course of study for undergraduate degree? [SEDEPE] 
a) Agronomy 
b) Economics/Business/Management 
c) Engineering  
d) Mathematics/Computer science 
e) Biology/Chemistry/Physics 
f) Humanities 
g) Social sciences 
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h) Law 
i) Medicine 
j) Military 
k) Other 
13. Course of study for highest degree (if different than undergraduate degree)? 
[as above] 
14. Year of birth?  (day/month/year) 
15. Sex?  (M/F) 
16. Party affiliation?  (English) 
17. Party affiliation?  (local language) 
18. Position in party, if significant?  (English) 
19. Position in party, if significant?  (local language) 
20. Coalition affiliation (if different from the previous)?  
21. Member of, or closely allied to, the current ruling party or coalition? (Y/N)  
22. Nonpartisan? (Y/N). This may be inferred if partisanship is very difficult to obtain. 
What we are Interested in is a person’s official partisanship; if s/he chooses to keep 
this secret, s/he should be classified as nonpartisan. 
23. Linked by birth or marriage to a prominent family or clan? (Y/N).  
24. If yes, what is the family or clan name? 
25. Place of birth (i.e., location in which family was residing when person was born)?  
26. Born abroad? (Y/N) 
27. Marital status? (Married/Single/Divorced) 
28. Place of long-term affiliation or current political base? 
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29. Native language? 
30. Additional languages spoken? 
31. Religion of family (at birth)? (Options include “none” and “none apparent.”) 
32. Current religion and sect? (Options include “none”, “atheist” and “agnostic.”) 
33. Ethnocultural affiliation? 
34. Criteria used to determine ethnocultural identity? 
(a) Birth place 
(b) Skin color 
(c) Language  
(d) Name  
(e) Family background 
(f) Religion 
(g) Education 
(h) Self-proclamation/Official Statement 
(i) Interaction with "in-group" members 
(j) Participation in group- related activity 
(k) Secondary Sources  
(l) Political discourse  
(m) Political Base 
(n) Political Party membership 
(o) Other 
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Appendix B: 
Imputed Data 
As a check against possible bias induced by this pattern of missing-ness, we have imputed 
missing values for all of the individual-level variables reported in the following tables except 
ethnocultural group, which involves myriad categories and is therefore difficult to impute. 
The imputation involves all leaders in the sampling frame in Table 1.3 (N=40022). Note that 
the variables of concern are mostly nominal. To approximate what a ‘complete’ data set 
would look like, we impute missing data using the Amelia II program developed by Honaker 
et al. (2011). This program converts each nominal variable into a series of binary variables, 
imputes missing data, and then uses the imputed values to calculate a probability for each 
category. Data in the final imputed dataset represents draws from a discrete distribution 
based on those probabilities. This appendix replicates Tables 5–9 using an imputed dataset, 
as described in the text. 
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Table B1 (repl i cat ing Table 1.5) :  
General Attributes of World Leaders (imputed dataset) 
 
Category _______SAMPLE_____ _________ OFFICE______ WEALTH ____________ REGION________ _ REGIME_ 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. Age (years) 29244 55 4.4 42/68 61 59 56 61 54 54 55 57 54 54 52 58 54 57 
2. Male (%) 37075 81 10 52/99 92 90 82 81 81 75 83 81 79 84 77 92 80 85 
3. Married (%) 22851 91 8 54/100 89 91 92 92 90 87 92 93 86 95 88 98 90 96 
4. Languages (N) 35479 1.9 0.8 1/4.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 2 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.9 
5. Edu attainment 29175 4.3 0.4 3.1/5.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.3 
6. Edu abroad (%) 21763 32 28 0/100 39 37 37 28 28 13 37 51 21 28 16 50 28 47 
7. Edu in west (%) 21763 49  37 0/100 58   54 53 48 45 80 39 37 24 27 94 32 53 32 
8. Tenure (years) 34829 5 2.3 1/17.5 7 6 4 7 5 6 5 4.4 4.7 5.5 5.2 6.3 5 6 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 145 143 145 136 145 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 38085 210 1220 3664 1032 31269 10459 27626 8055 5547 9794 10730 3959 27141 10944 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  N=number. M=mean. SD=standard 
deviation. Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme 
or constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers are rounded to the 
nearest integer except for Languages and Educational attainment. This table replicates Table 5 using an imputed dataset, as described in the 
text. 
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Table  B2 (repl i cat ing Table 1.6) :  
Languages Spoken by World Leaders (imputed dataset) 
 
Category ____SAMPLE____ ________ _OFFICE________  WEALTH_ __________ REGION__________ _ _REGIME__ 
Sub-category 
   
Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. English 10068 37 37 59 50 49 35 34 46 34 38 33 37 40 29 39 27 
2. French 5953 19 35 21 23 22 20 18 15 21 43 9 2 13 26 17 26 
3. Spanish 4399 14 34 13 15 15 15 14 7 16 4 72 4 4 0.5 17 3 
4. Arabic  3815 12 31 10 12 12 12 12 1 15 9 0.02 0.5 0.3 80 5 36 
5. Russian 2834 11 29 13 13 12 9 11 5 13 0.1 0.4 30 19 0.9 10 15 
6. German 1865 5 17 7 5 6 4 5 17 1 0.1 0.4 0.9 16 0.8 6 0.4 
7. Portuguese 1273 4 18 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 8 5 2 3 0.07 4 3 
8. Chinese 3278 2 11 1 2 2 2 2 0.02 2 0.0 0.02 8 0.0 0.01 1 3 
9. Other 23841 75 39 74 76 75 72 75 72 75 77 76 86 83 27 80 55 
Full sample                
   Countries 144 142 141 144 132 144 33 111 37 24 26 41 16 112 32 
   Leaders 35478 197 1153   3340 940 29258 10144 25334 6779 5228 9581 10031     3859 24880 10598 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation.    
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer except where N<1. This table replicates Table 1.6 using an imputed dataset, as described in the text.
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Table  B3 (repl i cat ing Table 1.7) :  
Disciplinary Background of World Leaders (imputed dataset) 
 
Category ________SAMPLE________ ___________ OFFICE______  WEALTH_ ___________ REGION________ REGIME 
Sub-category 
    
Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. Agronomy 1641 4 3 0/12 2 3 3 0.2 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 5 
2. Engineering 4053 10 5 1/33 6 10 10 2 11 8 11 9 10 12 10 12 10 11 
3. Math/CS 885 2 1 0/7 3 2 2 0.6 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 
4. Bio/Chem/Phys 1591 4 2 0/10 3 3 3 0.6 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 
5. Medicine 2859 7 3 1/20 5 5 7 0.6 8 6 8 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 
6. Econ/Bus/Mng 5439 14 7 8.0/46 28 19 22 2 13 16 14 12 15 17 16 10 15 13 
7. Social Sciences 4680 12 6 0/26 13 14 13 5 12 14       11 13 11 12 12 11 12 11 
8. Law 7493 20 8 5/48 19 23 18 85 17 22 19 17 28 17 20 17 21 16 
9. Humanities 3988 10 5 0.8/24 4 7 8 3 10 11 9 10 7       11 10 10 10 10 
10. Military 1291 3 2 0/9 9 5 3 0.8 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 5 3 5 
11. Other 6102 14 7 2/45 7 9 11 1 12 13 14 16 12 11 13 16 13 15 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 145 145 145 136 145 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 40022 306 1517 3358 1028 31406 10787 29235 8616 5713 10360 11029     4304 28534 11488 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation.   
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer except when N<1.  This table replicates Table 1.7 using an imputed dataset, as described in the text.
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Table  B4 (repl i cat ing Table 1.8) :  
Occupational Background of World Leaders (imputed dataset) 
 
Category ______SAMPLE____ _________ OFFICE_________ _WEALTH ________ _REGION_______ _ REGIME_ 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. White collar  17712 49 21 1/94 34 43 46 64 49 55 47 39 60 49 54 44 52 41 
2. Blue collar  1254 3 4 0/30 0.7 3 2 1 4 4 3 4 2 2 4 4       3 4 
3. Education 4593 12 6 0/31 11 11 14 10 12 10 13 14 11 10 11 15 12 14 
4. Media 1404 2 2 0/6 2 2 1 0.9 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
5. Military 657 3 3 0/14 9 5 3 2 3 1 4 4 2 4 2 6 2 6 
6. None or 
politics 11036 24 20 2/98 36 30 29 16 24 24 24 29 18 27 23 20 23 26 
7. Other 3266 7 6 0/41 7 7 5 6 5 4 7 7 6 7 5 9 6 8 
Full sample                
   Countries 145 145 145 145 136 145 33 112 38 24 26 41 16 113 32 
   Leaders 40022 306 1517 3358 1028 31406 10787 29235 8616 5713 10360 11029     4304 28534 11488 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. 
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest  
integer except when N<1.  This table replicates Table 1.8 using an imputed dataset, as described in the text.
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Table  B5 (repl i cat ing Table 1.9) :  
Political Experience of World Leaders (imputed dataset) 
 
Category ______SAMPLE______ __________OFFICE__________ WEALTH _______REGION____________ REGIME 
Sub-category     Apex +10 Cab Court Parl Rich Poor Africa Amer Asia Europe MENA Demo Auto 
Statistic Leaders M SD Range M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
1. None 1651 7 12 0/70 6 6 7 32 6 9 6 6 10 8 4 11 7 7 
2. Trade union 242 2 9 0/100 0.8 0.9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 5 0.8 0.8 1 4 
3. Employers org 195 2 7 0/73 0 1 2 6 2 0.3 2 3 2 2 0.2 1 1 2 
4. Interest group 463 3 6 0/40 3 1 3 12 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 0.8 2 3 
5. NGO/INGO 1796 9 15 0/72 7 9 9 8 10 5 11 15 13 7 4 8 10 8 
6. Local govt 4301 16 18 0/98 5 6 10 4 18 23 14 9 24 14 22 10 17 13 
7. MP/minister 4935 22 20 0/80 29 25 27 20 22 20 23 29 13 22 22 19 22 22 
8. Partisan 8970 38 27 0/99 50 50 40 19 38 40 38 34 33 40 45 36 39 35 
Full sample                
   Countries 143 122 137 138 61 137 33 110 38 24 26 41 14 113 30 
   Leaders 22553 178 948 2442 239 18633 8743 13810 3698 3830 4389 9066 1570 19107 3446 
 
All data (except for the first column, Leaders) are pooled at the country level prior to calculating statistics.  M=mean. SD=standard deviation. 
Range=minimum/maximum. Apex=most powerful one or two positions. +10=next ten most powerful. Cab=cabinet. Court=supreme or 
constitutional court. Parl=lower house of parliament. Amer=Americas. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. Numbers rounded to nearest 
integer.  This table replicates Table 1.9 using an imputed dataset, as described in the text. 
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DEMOCRATIZATION AND KURDISH DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 
IN TURKEY: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS 1920–2011  
Introduction 
Descriptive representation can be defined as a situation in which the composition of the 
political elite mirrors the social, demographic, ethnic, racial, and religious characteristics of 
the citizenry (Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995). This may be regarded as a normative ideal in 
several respects. First, there is an argument for justice in the name of democracy (Ruedin 
2013: 253–4). In democracies, all citizens are to be treated equally. An extension of this 
principle is that citizens should have equal access to positions of influence. Shortcomings of 
descriptive representation may be regarded as prima facie evidence that the latter has not been 
achieved. It follows that if an ethnic group has been historically discriminated against, special 
arrangements such as quotas may be put into place to fulfill the principle of equity.  
Second, ethnic descriptive representation may help achieve better substantive 
representation because personal experiences as a member of an ethnic group may enhance 
one’s understanding of the group’s experience and accordingly make one a better 
representative (Mansbridge 1999). Studies also show that more diverse groups are better at 
deliberating and may reach better decisions. Thus, it may be preferable for a deliberative 
body such as a legislature to include a wide range of people (Kymlicka 1995; Chappell 2012).  
Third, ethnic descriptive representation provides a symbolic function insofar as 
ethnic representatives become role models for the youth and thereby better integrate the 
ethnic minority into the larger society. As challenges to multiculturalism are growing, this 
symbolic function may support social cohesion and the incorporation of minorities (Bird et 
al. 2011: 3). 
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Writers generally assume that democracy fosters descriptive representation (Anwar 
2001; Bergh and Bjorklund 2003; Bird 2005; Black and Hicks 2006; Donovan 2007; Messina 
2007; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Saggar 2000; Studlar and Welch 1992; Togeby 2008; 
Wust 2006), and there is strong evidence in the literature to support this relationship. Many 
studies have focused on the representation of women (Tremblay 2007; Bird 2003; Paxton 
1997) and a few have focused on race or ethnicity (Mousseau 2001; Mansbridge 1999; 
Ruedin 2009). Although the empirical connection between democracy and descriptive 
representation is well established, the reasons for this connection remain obscure (Bird et al 
2011: 2).  
This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by illustrating how democratic 
political contexts provide the conditions for the rise of ethnic descriptive representation. I 
argue that ethnic descriptive representation increases in competitive democracies because 
out-parties are incentivized to collaborate with poorly represented ethnic groups so as to 
gain electoral advantage over their rivals. That is, democracy creates competition among 
elites for support from the electorate (Schumpeter 1942). Parties (and candidates), especially 
those who are out of power, search for new constituencies that may provide support. One 
such constituency base is provided by ethnic identity. And one way to appeal to ethnically 
identified voters is to nominate candidates from that ethnic group and to make sure that at 
least some of them gain office. This generates a connection between the social group and the 
party, one that may result in enduring party loyalties. Although both in-parties and out-
parties are subject to this electoral pressure, I argue that out-parties are more strongly 
incentivized to reach out to excluded groups, who may be stigmatized and thus involve some 
cost to the party with respect to its traditional constituencies. Losing parties are thus more 
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likely to play this entrepreneurial role. As a consequence, I hypothesize that there is a natural 
affinity between out-parties and out-groups. 
 To demonstrate this argument, I focus on the historical experience of Turkey vis-à-
vis its largest ethnic group, the Kurds. Because of its political history, Turkey serves as a 
useful case for uncovering the causal dynamics between democracy and ethnic descriptive 
representation that might apply elsewhere. From a research design perspective, Turkey 
provides rich ground for examining the relationship between democracy and ethnic 
descriptive representation because it has had several democratic, semi-military and military 
periods (as marked in Table 2.2). Turkey was declared as a republic in 1923, replacing the 
Ottoman Empire. There was one party rule until 1946; military coups in 1960, 1971, and 
1980, as well as an indirect coup in 1998, and periods of democratization between 1983 and 
2010. This variation in democratization provides an opportunity to do a longitudinal analysis 
to explain the different levels of ethnic descriptive representation. As such, Turkey provides 
this case study design known as the “causal pathway”	(Barnes and Weller 2014; Gerring 
2007). 
Theory 
The literature suggests the following causal mechanism between democratization and 
descriptive representation. If a country’s citizens have political rights, and both citizens and 
members of the elite can exercise them freely, then the incentives to vote and get elected 
increase (Zimmerman and Rule 1998; Paxton 1997; Matland 1998; Reynolds 1999; Diamond 
2002; Paxton et al. 2007; Viterna et al. 2008; Viterna and Fallon 2008). Free exercise of 
political rights enables political communication through which both citizens and elite can 
freely express themselves. These political rights affect incentive structures such as the 
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formation of attitudes towards women as political leaders and towards marginalized groups 
in society, the supply of candidates, the formulation of vote choice, and the actions of the 
elite (Reynolds 2013). The role of political rights in representation becomes obvious in 
countries with no political rights or freedom, wherein the oppression of ethnic minorities 
and opposition party supporters results in limited or no descriptive representation. The 
significance of political rights for ethnic representation is clear, but the literature focuses 
only on democratic countries to illustrate this mechanism.  
Bird et al. (2011) elaborates the conditions under which political rights are used and 
ethnic groups are mobilized to have their political rights represented among the elite. The 
model Bird et al. (2011) develops examines how democratic circumstances enhance minority 
representation. This model is circular and comprehensive, and benefits from the sociology of 
movements literature. However, Bird et al. (2011) does not provide the data to test this 
model because her data focuses on established democracies of Western Europe and North 
America to the exclusion of partial democracies. 
Bird’s model (2011) suggests that the political opportunity structure, created as a 
result of democratization, provides the context in which ethnic minority political actors can 
develop their strategies (Bird et al. 2011: 13). Even in established democracies, it is difficult 
to tease out the causal mechanism through which democratic opportunity structures 
promote ethnic descriptive representation. Bird (2005) analyzes a few developed 
democracies and develops a model that underlines “citizenship regimes, institutional features 
and interest constellations”	as significant factors. However, studies of established 
democracies do not explain how these countries have accomplished ethnic descriptive 
representation as they became more democratic. Her study is synchronic and does not 
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explain the process. 
Building on this literature (e.g., Ruedin 2013, Bird et al. 2011) but focusing on 
Turkey as a semi-democratic case study, I argue that competitive democracy enhances 
descriptive representation through the mechanism of competition. Democracy provides the 
mechanism for competition among the political leaders (Schumpeter 1942). The weaker 
political party or leader expands the “scope of conflict”	by introducing new participants in its 
struggle to gain advantage (Schattschneider 1960). Thus, the scope of the conflict will 
expand since the losing party will involve more and more people in its cause.  
Ethnic, gender, religious, tribal, and sectarian groups provide one such constituency 
base for party leaders to seek support. Political leaders deliberate under different given 
circumstances on how best to maximize their votes through appealing to one or more of 
these groups. Each of these groups carries different characteristics for the purposes of the 
elites. An ethnic group is usually spatially organized, making it convenient for winning 
particular seats. One way to appeal to these groups is to nominate candidates from these 
groups and make sure that at least some of them gain office. This strategy, if successful, may 
help to build strong party loyalties from these groups. Through this mechanism, as out-
parties gain power, they also become the vehicles of ethnic descriptive representation.  
 In addition to increasing their party’s voting base, the political elite learn the value of 
ethnic descriptive representation for social integration. The establishment of democratic 
institutions informs the elite regarding minorities and their political rights. The elite learn the 
symbolic significance of descriptive representation. In other words, it is not enough to raise 
the demands of ethnic minorities but instead one must make them identify with the political 
authority of the nation-state. This can be realized through increasing descriptive 
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representation of ethnic minorities in the national representative bodies (Pantoja and Segura 
2003). As a result, the political elite learns that descriptive representation symbolically 
integrates minorities into the nation-state. 
In competitive democracies, the ethnic minority elites also develop more effective 
strategies to represent the interests of their constituencies, including collaboration with out-
parties who need their support. When the minority belongs to the lower socioeconomic 
classes, their voices could not become effective in public sphere as a pressure group 
(Schattschneider 1960). If that is the case, the minority elite would seek methods such as 
coalition building and cooperating, even with parties that are ideologically distant from them, 
so as to benefit from the competition among the mainstream parties. In other words, 
competitive democracies lead minority elites to take advantage of the competition existing 
among parties. Their position is often stronger because out-parties are ready to make more 
concessions, including the nomination of more members of the minority from their 
candidate lists.     
My longitudinal case based on Kurdish representation in the partially democratic 
Turkey tests and improves the model Bird (2011) proposed by explaining how 
democratization increases ethnic descriptive representation.  In Turkey, competitive 
democracy increases ethnic descriptive representation as out-parties propose more Kurdish 
candidates and get them elected. The detailed evidence section below illustrates how Kurdish 
political actors have used the strategy of coalition building with parties out of power, which 
has led to an increase in ethnic descriptive representation. However, there are several 
potential confounders in place as well, but none of them explains the causal mechanism of 
how democratization works through out parties’ collaboration with ethnic minorities. 
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Potential Confounders 
Electoral  System:  The electoral system in democracies is often announced as the 
mechanism through which democracy impacts the level of ethnic descriptive representation. 
PR electoral systems are argued to be more favorable for disadvantaged group representation 
than are majoritarian electoral systems. Despite some findings that electoral systems do not 
have an impact on descriptive representation (Ruedin 2009), proportional representation 
electoral systems do indeed favor minority groups. This can cause political instability because 
many small parties are represented in the assembly, which often leads to weak coalition 
governments.  
From the foundation of the Republic in 1923 until 1950, there was single party rule 
in Turkey and the elections were not free and fair. In 1950, Turkey experienced its first free 
and fair elections. Between 1950 and 1957, Turkey applied a majoritarian electoral system, 
which included multimember constituencies and provincial lists. The drawback to this 
system was that the first party was heavily represented even though the votes between 
opposition and ruling party were close. (Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu 2009). Although there was 
an increase in Kurdish descriptive representation after the introduction of multiparty politics 
in 1946, from eight to twelve per cent, the level of representation stayed stable for the 1950s.  
Since 1961, however, Turkey has applied different forms of PR system but this has not 
guaranteed higher levels of ethnic descriptive representation.  
In 1982, a ten percent nationwide threshold, the highest in the world, was introduced 
into the electoral system. However, it was possible to bypass this through coalition building 
before the elections and declaring a separate party with the elected MPs. Indeed, the People’s 
Labor Party, the first pro-Kurdish party, entered the parliament in the 1991 elections thanks 
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to the coalition they made with the mainstream left Socialist Populist Party.  
Electoral laws are undoubtedly an important background condition for greater 
descriptive representation, but in the Turkish case it seems that they do not account for 
(most of) the patterns over time in Kurdish representation.  
Pol i t i ca l  Culture :  The findings in the literature on the relationship between democracy and 
ethnic descriptive representation are tentative and do not account for the causal pathways 
through which democracy enhances ethnic descriptive representation. For instance, in his 
cross-sectional analysis Ruedin (2009, 2013) argues that liberal attitudes of the population 
toward minorities determine descriptive representation more than anything else. He 
concludes that democracy and free society can provide the environment in which elites learn 
to recognize minorities’ political rights. However, only in the long run could the whole 
society complete this learning process. The attitudes of political culture concerning the 
acceptance of “others” have not changed much in Turkey since the 1990s, as shown by 
responses to a World Values Survey question which simply asks whether someone from a 
different race would be accepted as a neighbor. In other words, the cultural attitude of 
society toward minorities can change only very slowly. However, there has been some 
progress in the incorporation of Kurds in Turkey, which suggests that we need to take a 
closer look at Turkish political institutions and actors over time.  
Through the observed period in this study (1920–2011), the political culture of the 
elite in Turkey—which can be defined as Republican, secular, and Western-oriented 
ideologically—remains fairly constant. Hence, changes in the outcome of ethnic descriptive 
representation cannot be attributed to changes in the political culture of the elite. It is true 
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that the advent of the conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP) represents a shift 
in political culture, but it is not a shift that one would anticipate to foster the representation 
of minorities. If anything, one would imagine that a secular, western orientation would be 
more amenable to descriptive representation. But that is not what we see. Instead, the JDP, 
not the Republican People’s Party (RPP hereafter), has been the major party vehicle for 
Kurdish integration, suggesting that the primary mechanism for descriptive representation is 
electoral competition (as this article suggests) rather than democratic ideology. 
Moreover, a synchronic analysis (e.g. Ruedin 2009) is not apt for measuring the 
learning curve of a society under a democratic regime. Comparing ethnic descriptive 
representation in democratic and partially democratic countries can only explain if a 
democratic regime affects ethnic descriptive representation. Any synchronic data will run 
into this limitation. Instead there is a need for longitudinal analysis, which measures how 
majority and minority elites learn to increase their power and representation through 
collaboration in competitive democracies over time. 
 Indeed, the finding of this study illustrates how the political elite, minorities, and 
society at-large incrementally change their political culture. Political rights are associated with 
the formulation of attitudes (such as cultural ones) towards marginalized groups in society 
and towards political issues such as women as political leaders. They are also associated with 
the supply of candidates, the formulation of vote choice – through the information on the 
candidates available – and the actions of the elite (Ruedin 2013). Negative cultural attitudes 
of the larger society toward disenfranchised minorities’ leaders capacity for political 
leadership can change only incrementally through free public discourse. The minorities and 
their leaders acquire self-confidence to propose and vote for more candidates from within 
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their groups to represent themselves. The political elites also learn to derive more votes from 
minorities by proposing minority leaders higher up on their candidate lists. Especially in 
close electoral competitions, leaders from all political parties come up with candidates from 
minorities. All these indicate that at each stage, learning and practicing political rights 
changes political culture in favor of ethnic descriptive representation (Rule and Zimmerman 
1994; Paxton 1997; Matland 1998; Reynolds 1999; Diamond 2002; Paxton et al.; Viterna et 
al. 2008; Viterna and Fallon 2008)  (Ruedin 2013: 701–8).  
Emergence o f  the Kurdish National is t  Movement :  Another explanation for the increase in 
Kurdish representation is the rise of ethnic nationalist movement among the Kurdish 
population. In the case of Turkey, some argue that the rise of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in the 1980s and its involvement in party politics since 1990 increased Kurdish 
ethnic representation in the parliament (Romano 2006). The first pro-Kurdish party, Halkin 
Emek Partisi (HEP), was established in 1990 and entered the elections the following year; 
however, its effect on Kurdish descriptive representation has been minimal. Before HEP the 
percentage of Kurds in the parliament was seventeen, and this did not change for the year 
when HEP entered the elections and the parliament in 1991. It only increased one percent, 
in 1999. That said, there is some debate as to whether the ten per cent national threshold 
had a negative impact on the political participation of Kurds and the contribution of pro-
Kurdish parties to Kurdish descriptive representation.  
In sum, the illiberal and nationalist political culture of Turkey, with its incremental 
changes in accepting the “other,” cannot explain the fluctuations in Kurdish ethnic 
descriptive representation during the democratization of Turkey. The proportional 
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representation electoral system in place after 1960 has encouraged further descriptive 
representation than the majoritarian electoral system in 1950–60, but it did not guarantee the 
rise of Kurdish representation after 1960. The Kurdish nationalist movement bypassed the 
ten percent national threshold of the electoral system by running its candidates for the 
parliament as independents, so that, once elected, they could form a party in the parliament.  
The research design of this study, which involves the ceteris paribus condition of the 
causal argument between democracy and ethnic descriptive representation, does not delve 
into the details of how the rise of the Kurdish nationalist movement affected Kurdish ethnic 
descriptive representation. Given the limits of alternative explanations, we must closely 
examine the causal mechanism through which ethnic descriptive representation rises in 
Turkey with an eye toward implications concerning the broader question of how exactly 
democracy promotes ethnic descriptive representation.  
Case Selection  
Because of its varied history of democratization, Turkey provides a revealing case of process 
tracing (using within-case evidence) to explain how democratization causes ethnic descriptive 
representation.  
The foundation of the Turkish Republic was based on the principles of nationalism 
and secularism with the purpose of “reaching the level of developed nations,”	as the 
founding father of the country, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk put it. This goal—establishing 
Turkish nationalism and French-type secularism while reaching the level of developed 
nations, which meant establishing liberal democracy—has not been easily attained, and has 
been interrupted by repeated military interventions. However, the introduction of multiparty 
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politics in 1946 and the political reforms required to enter the European Union (hereafter 
EU) have propelled further democratization. Despite the progress Turkey made in 
democratization to join the EU, the country is still categorized as “partially free,”	according 
to Freedom House Index, or as an “illiberal democracy”	(Candar 1999).  
Two groups in Turkey are of sufficient size to have acquired political salience: Alevis 
and Kurds. Alevis are a sectarian syncretic community who have historically kept their 
identities hidden for fear of discrimination from the Sunni population. They are a sizeable 
sub-group, estimated to comprise around ten to fifteen per cent of the total population, but 
only since the mid-1990s have they raised their group demands for public recognition. 
Historically, they were supportive of the founders of the Republic, and they are still affiliated 
with secular and Kemalist politics, supporting the Republican People’s Party (hereafter RPP) 
in elections. Moreover, Alevis are spread all over the country, which makes it difficult to 
identify them for the purposes of this study, which involves coding members of the 
parliament according to their group identity.   
This study focuses on Kurds because they are the largest minority, and the most self-
conscious and politicized one. Kurds are the largest minority group in Turkey, though they 
also reside in three neighboring countries (Iran, Iraq, Syria), where they are mostly in conflict 
with their respective governments. Turkish official discourse and practices have denied 
Kurdish identity. Leading scholars in the field such as Henri Barkey (1998) and Kemal 
Kirisci (1997) suggest that Kurds have been always represented in the parliament. However, 
they do not provide any details to illustrate the extent of this representation. This article is 
the first systematic attempt to code the ethnic identity of the Members of Parliament 
(hereafter MP) in the Turkish parliament.  
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The scholarship on Kurdish representation is limited for a number of reasons. First, 
it is a challenging task to code ethnic descriptive representation for a group with no 
distinguishing physical characteristics in a state that denies Kurdish identity. Kirisci (1997) 
refers to studies that have used only birthplace –	a crude proxy –	as the criterion of Kurdish 
identification. Only after the 1990s, with the rise of Kurdish ethnic identity politics, have 
people begun to publicly identify themselves as Kurdish. One might note parenthetically that 
the literature on descriptive representation of gender is extensive, in part, because gender is 
easy to code. Second, until recently the Kurdish Question has been treated only as a struggle 
against terrorists, which has made studies on Kurdish representation difficult to carry out.  
Data Collection 
Before presenting the details of the data collection and coding process, some basic 
information on the Kurdish population and its geographic distribution is required. 
Geographic origin of MPs is helpful as a starting point but not enough to code their ethnic 
group. In order to calculate the level of Kurdish ethnic descriptive representation among the 
political elite in Turkey, the first issue is to estimate the size of the Kurdish population.  
There are no established figures for Kurdish population because ethnic identity is 
not asked in censuses. In the 1965 census, people were asked to identify their mother 
tongues. According to this survey, some 2.2 million claimed Kurdish as their mother tongue 
and 1.2 million said it was their second language (Andrews 1989: 100). There have been 
other studies based on the 1965 census, one of which concluded that the Kurds represent 
12.6 percent of the population, corresponding to slightly over 7 million in 1990 (Mutlu 1996: 
517). These figures should be questioned, for several reasons. In 1965, people may have 
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hidden their Kurdish identity for fear of prosecution from the state, distorting the collected 
data. Moreover, intermarriage and migration to cities tends to assimilate non-Turkish 
(including Kurdish) identity. Authoritative figures in the field estimated the percentage of 
Kurds in Turkey to be around nineteen percent (McDowall 1992: 32). 
In the coding of the Kurdish MPs, geographic concentration of the Kurdish 
population was the first indicator. Despite domestic migration to bigger cities for economic, 
political, and security reasons, the areas known to be traditionally Kurdish are known as 
shown in Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1:  
       Distribution of Kurdish Population in the East and Southeast of Turkey 
 
 	 I. Area (12 Provinces)	 II. Area (7 Provinces)	  	
 Ethnic 
Origin	 Agri-Batman-Bingol-Bitlis-Diyarbakir-Hakkari- Mardin-Mus-
Siirt-Sirnak-Tunceli-Van	
Adiyaman-Elazig-
Erzurum-G.antep-
K.maras-Malaty-S. Urfa	 Total of 19 Provinces in the East and Southeast	
 Population	 Percent	 Population	 Percent	 Population	 Percent	
Kurdish	 4.987.068	 80,49	 2.191.819	 32,62	 7.178.887	 55,59	
Turkish	 243.037	 3,92	 3.701.857	 55,10	 3.944.894	 30,55	
Zaza	 550.018	 8,87	 319.065	 4,75	 869.083	 6,73	
Arab	 372.117	 6,00	 488.353	 7,27	 860.47	 6,64	
Other	 42.971	 0,69	 16.256	 0,24	 59.227	 0,45	
Total	 6.195.211	 100,00	 6.717.350	 100,00	 12.912.561	 100,00	
(Bilgesam 2010) 
 
Data collection and coding has been the most challenging part of this study. Use of 
parliamentary almanacs, online and archival research, as well as personal interviews with 
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Kurdish notables, made this data collection possible. Several identification criteria have been 
used to determine ethnic identity. An MP is identified as Kurdish based on his or her 
proclaimed native language (Kirmanchi or Zazaki), birthplace, electoral district, membership 
in a Kurdish tribe, pro-Kurdish discourse or self-proclamation of Kurdish identity.  
The coding of an MP as Kurdish during single party periods has been challenging: 
because of the denial of Kurdish identity, few MPs in the past dared to publicly proclaim 
themselves as Kurdish. In addition, since the state denied recognition to Kurdish language, 
MPs who knew Kurdish would not have been able to declare it. In such cases, place of birth 
and electoral district in Kurdish populated areas became an important criteria of Kurdish 
identity. The most challenging cases were the cities with mixed ethnic groups in Area II, 
such as Sanliurfa that has Turks, Kurds, and Arabs, among others. It required detailed review 
of historical sources, including references to tribal belonging, to clarify the ethnic identity of 
the MPs from such cities.  
To code an MP as Kurdish, I took the following steps. First, I carried out 
background checks for people who were born in or elected to cities in Area I and Area II, 
which are known to be mostly Kurdish populated. I have checked publicly available sources 
for MPs self-proclamations of their identity, their mother language, or tribal belonging to 
confirm their Kurdish identity. Second, people who were born in one of the cities in Areas I 
and II but elected to other cities were coded with a question mark. Further online and 
archival research and interviews have been conducted to determine the ethnic identity of the 
MPs from these cities. Last, I checked the remaining cities, which are known to not have 
dense Kurdish population to see if there are well-known Kurdish MPs from those cities. In 
total, this study involved the coding of 4382 MPs, 628 cabinet members, 9 parliaments, and 
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20 cabinets through this method, which took nearly two years. It has been a long and 
difficult process, but the collection of this data makes a significant contribution to the 
literature. 
Table 2.2:  
Kurdish Representation in Turkish Parliament  
 
Period Regime Type Parliament # 
Kurdish 
Rep 
(%) 
Cabinet # 
Kurdish 
Rep. 
(%) 
1923–46 Single Party Rule 6 
 
9 
 
12 8 
13 0 
1946–60 Democratization 9 12 
19 0 
20 0 
1960–61 Military Regime National Union C. 2.5 
National Union 
C. 2.5 
1961–65 Semi-Military Regime 12 15 
26 8 
27 13 
28 30 
29 7 
1965–71 Democratization         
1971–73 Semi-Military Regime Military junta 4 Military junta 0 
1973–80 Democratization 
15 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
36 8 
37 21 
38 11 
39 17 
1980–83 Military Regime National Security Council 0 
National Security 
Council   
1983–97 Democratization 
17 
19 
 
19 
13 
 
45 9 
49 15 
50 10 
1997–2002 Semi-Military Regime 
21 17 56 4 
 
 57 7 
2002–2011 Democratization 
22 
23 
 
 
17 
19 
 
 
58 20 
59 20 
61 19 
62 19 
  Periodization is based on Kuru 2013 
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Table 2.2 also illustrates Kurdish representation in the parliament, as well as whether 
the representation in parliament had any corresponding impact on the ethnic makeup of the 
cabinet. A closer examination of the ethnic descriptive representation of the cabinet is 
important because the ministries of the government have a greater role and more power in 
the decision-making process than do members of parliament. Government (cabinet and 
executive) is referred to as “an elite within an elite”	(Frey 1965: 269). If an ethnic group is 
represented highly in the parliament but not in the cabinet, it would show that the 
representation of that ethnic group remains largely symbolic and does not have an impact on 
the sharing of power. This is intuitive, since equal representation of an excluded ethnic 
group in higher positions of power would be more challenging to achieve. For instance, in 
the 1946–60 period, Kurdish representation in the cabinet was non-existent, compared to 
twelve percent Kurdish representation in the parliament.  
In the subsequent periods of democratization, Kurdish representation in the cabinet 
and parliament converged. The parliament during the 1973–1980 period of democratization 
produced four cabinets that resulted in unstable coalition governments. The average level of 
Kurdish representation in these cabinets was fourteen percent, compared to fifteen percent 
in the parliament. During the 1983–1997 democratization period, the average Kurdish 
representation in the parliament was sixteen percent and the average for the three cabinets in 
the same period was lower at eleven percent. Despite this divergence between Kurdish 
representation in the cabinet and parliament, during the 2002–2011 democratization period 
Kurdish representation in the cabinet became higher than in the parliament, at nineteen 
percent and eighteen percent respectively. Thus, despite some exceptions, Kurdish 
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representation in the parliament and cabinet are comparable. Moreover, democratization 
periods favor the convergence of Kurdish representation in the cabinet and parliament.  
However, more broadly, how exactly does democratization encourage ethnic 
descriptive representation in the parliament? How does the causal mechanism that increases 
Kurdish representation unfold in the Turkish political history? The following section 
addresses these questions, focusing on the four periods during which Kurdish representation 
increased while also addressing the periods of military and semi-military rule where Kurdish 
representation drops.  
Democratization and Kurdish Representation 
The data on the historical development of Kurdish descriptive representation in the Turkish 
Assembly becomes highly important for understanding democratization in Turkey. This data 
covers nine elections, from the beginning of the Republican period until the 2007 elections. 
The election periods are selected from different political atmospheres including military, 
semi-military and democratic rule.  
 The dotted line in the figure 2.1 represents the percent of Kurdish MPs in various 
parliaments, beginning from the last Ottoman assembly (seven percent). The first parliament 
of the new Republic (1920) shows a sharp increase (seventeen percent) in Kurdish 
representation, which drops rapidly during one party rule and then start to increase again 
with a slow but constant upward slope, reaching its peak (nineteen percent) in 1983 and 
2007, despite significant drops during the three military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The 
full line is an imputed score of Polyarchy (with Polity2) from the V-Dem Project of the 
University of Notre Dame. Polity2 and V-Dem polyarchy measures begin in 1923. As the 
solid line illustrates, Turkey has been on a precarious journey of democratization. In addition  
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Democratization and Kurdish Representation in Turkey  
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to the three military coups, there was an indirect military intervention in 1998, the so-called 
“soft coup” in which the pro-Islamic Welfare Party’s coalition government resigned due to 
pressure from the military. The military coups have been intermittent, but the military rules 
were brief and transitioned with relative speed to civilian regimes. Interestingly, the 
democratization score went up after the 1960 coup and did not change after the “soft coup” 
of 1998.  
A comparison of the two lines in the figure illustrates that there is a co-variation 
between the level of democracy and Kurdish representation in the parliament: the single 
party regime and low levels of Kurdish representation in the early years of the Republic, and 
the incrementally but steadily increasing Kurdish representation that largely follows the 
increasing levels of democracy in the following decades. On the one hand, democratization 
has had a more precarious path, which has been interrupted with four coups and reached its 
peak in the early 1960s. On the other hand, the level of Kurdish representation has been on 
the rise since the 1960s, reaching its peak of nineteen percent in 2007. This article argues that 
Kurdish representation increases because out-parties seek the support of Kurdish voters to 
come to power, for which they nominate and help to elect Kurdish candidates as MPs. Thus, 
we need to take a closer look at each time period in which democratic competition among 
parties increases Kurdish representation in the parliament. 
As the figure above illustrates, there are four periods in which Kurdish 
representation has risen significantly: in 1920, 1946–1960, 1973–1980, and the period since 
the mid-1990s. In all four periods, political actors made an alliance with the Kurds against a 
dominant party often backed by the military. Firstly, in 1920, the Turkish Republic was not 
yet declared and Mustafa Kemal was just preparing for the war of national independence. 
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These were the revolutionary years in which Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist independence 
movement was struggling against the old regime and expansionist European powers. Under 
these circumstances, he made an alliance with the Kurds, including them in the first Turkish 
assembly, to gain their fighting support during the war for national independence against 
European powers. However, after consolidating his power with the Lausanne Treaty of 
1923, Ataturk and his successor Ismet Inonu’s single party rule focused on a secular nation-
building process, ousting the Kurds from the parliament and even regarding them as a threat 
to the new Turkish nation-state. Secondly, after the introduction of multiparty politics in 
1946, Kurdish descriptive representation increased with the rise of the DP as the first 
challenge to the Kemalist establishment’s RPP. Thirdly, in the 1973–1980 period, the rising 
leftist movement and its parties collaborated with the Kurds, leading to the rise of Kurdish 
representation in the parliament. Lastly, since the mid-1990s, the rising pro-Islamic parties 
such as the WP and JDP against secular Kemalist and center parties have further increased 
Kurdish representation. 
Until recently Kurds were represented not by parties that were philosophically allied 
with them but rather by parties—on the far left and the religious right—that needed their 
votes. Out-parties, in particular, were the vehicle of descriptive representation. Rising 
oppositional forces such as the Kemalists in 1920, the DP in 1946, leftist parties in 1973–80, 
and pro-Islamic parties since the mid-1990s, have worked with the Kurdish leadership in 
collaborations that have served both Kurds and these oppositional forces and increased 
Kurdish ethnic descriptive representation in the parliament. In order to explain how these 
emerging political actors collaborated with the Kurds, this article elaborates on these four 
historical periods to illuminate the causal mechanisms through which Kurdish descriptive 
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representation has increased. There have also been military coups and semi-military regimes 
during which Kurdish representation drops, as outlined in Table 1.2. 
Regression Analysis 
A time-series analysis of Kurdish representation in the Turkish parliament was conducted 
for this study. The data starts in 1920 and continues until 2011 (93 years). Kurdish 
representation (KurdREP), the percent of Kurdish MPs in the legislature during democratic 
periods and the percent of Kurdish members of the council during military regimes, is the 
outcome variable. The mean Kurdish representation percent is  12.3, with a standard 
deviation of 5. The data was gathered for nine election periods, which created gaps in the 
data. These gaps in the outcome variable were imputed by linear interpolation technique. In 
the empirical analysis, I examine whether democratization (at T -10), measured by the 
Polyarchy imputed Polity 2 measure (from the V-dem Project), predicts changes in Kurdish 
representation (T). 	The regression model below predicts Kurdish representation  
Y(KurdREP)= 6.96 + 14.4 (Polyarchy_imp)(T-10) 
adjRsquare: 0.22,  	p=0.000 
The model shows the change in Kurdish representation (Y) corresponding to a given 
change (ten year lag period) in the level of democracy (X). Lagging the independent variable 
indicates that ten years after an increase in democracy score Kurdish representation 
increases. Figure 2.1 illustrates this lagged effect of democratization on Kurdish 
representation. Likewise, lagging the independent variable a long time (ten years) separates it 
from the predictor. This separation provides protection against X:Y endogeneity issues that 
might greatly affect the results (Gerring 2013).  
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The analysis also shows that as the democracy score (Polyarchy) increases, Kurdish 
representation increases. The slope of the coefficient is 1.44, which indicates that, for a one-
unit (0.1) increase in the level of democracy, the Kurdish representation increases, on 
average, by 1.44 percent. The Polyarchy measure ranges between 0 and 1 with a dense 
distribution. The countries that are measured 0.1 higher than Turkey are Bulgaria, India, and 
Mexico. One standard deviation (0.17) increase in democracy score changes Kurdish 
representation by 2.44 unit. And the p value of the coefficient proves that the relationship 
between the predictor and outcome variable is statistically significant (p<0.001).  
There might be unmeasured confounders that cannot be readily operationalized in 
quantitative analysis. However, by observing changes in a single ethnic group’s 
representation over time within a single country, where all other factors are held constant, 
the confounders are constrained. 	An in-depth analysis of the varying outcomes of the 
variable (Kurdish representation) in successive democratic and military periods reveals the 
causal mechanism.  
 
Evidence: Historical Development of Kurdish Representation in Turkey 
Regime Change and Its Aftermath (1920) 
The First World War marked the end of empires in the world (including the Ottoman 
Empire), and the rise of new nation-states. This entailed the redistribution of power and 
drawing of new borders through nation-building processes. The transition from the 
Ottoman Empire to Turkish nation-state is the first phase in which to examine how Kurdish 
descriptive representation has risen. The implications of this transition can be realized when 
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the social and political conditions of ethnic representation are compared before and after the 
transition. The Kurds during the Ottoman Empire were part of a broader Sunni Muslim 
population within a multiethnic empire. The empire defined its minorities in religious, not 
ethnic terms. The sizable Christian and Jewish minorities were legally recognized, but 
Muslim ethnic groups did not have legal minority status. Turks, Arabs, and Kurds made up 
the dominant Muslim social and religious core of the Empire. “Even if their languages and 
cultures differed, their religion basically did not: Sunnis were all equally Muslims and 
believers; ethnic and linguistic differences among them were of no legal consequence”	
(Barkey and Fuller 1998).  
Arabs and Albanians were the two Muslim ethnic populations that had 
representatives in the Ottoman parliament. Among 115 MPs, there were 69 Muslim and 46 
non-Muslim MPs. There were no Kurdish MPs among the 69 Muslim representatives in the 
First Ottoman Parliament of 1876. Kurdish representation was marginal in the Second 
Ottoman Parliament of 1908 and last Ottoman Parliament of 1918. In the Ottoman 
Parliament of 1908–1913, among 250 MPs only 6 (2.4 percent) of them were Kurdish 
(Ahmad and Rustow 1976: 276–278). In the last Ottoman parliament of 1918, there were 15 
Kurdish MPs (6 percent) (Demirel 2011: 92–100). Kurds were not considered a threat to the 
territorial unity of the Ottoman state at the time and thus had representatives, whereas 
nationalism was on the rise in the Arab peninsula and the Balkans and these groups were not 
present in the parliament. 
The foundation of the Turkish Republic provides the first example of nearly 
proportional representation of Kurds. In the first assembly of the Turkish Republic in 1920, 
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Kurdish representation was seventeen percent. This level of representation appears again 
eighty years later in the 2000s. The regime change from constitutional monarchy to 
democratic Republic constitutes the first significant increase in Kurdish descriptive 
representation in the national assembly. This meant that the republican regime change 
worked as a new social contract, which included all ethnic groups, resulting in the increase of 
Kurds in the parliament.   
 Why were the Kurds so highly represented in the first parliament (1920) during the 
transition to the Republic? The rules of democratic competition were not laid out but there 
was a clear competition for power between the newly forming national resistance movement 
around Mustafa Kemal and the last Ottoman Sultan. Both sides were coming up with 
religious edicts that delegitimize the other side. The out party in this process was Mustafa 
Kemal and his followers who were a newly emerging political actor, not even recognized by 
the international actors yet. The Sultan on the other hand represented the Ottoman state and 
the Khalifate. As the weaker out party, Mustafa Kemal mobilized all the social forces 
including the Kurdish tribes on his side against the Sultan and the international actors 
dividing up the empire’s territories.   
The role of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk appears to have been critical, because he led the 
rising oppositional force against the old regime. He was rebelling against the Ottoman Sultan 
and was engaged in a war for national independence against the European powers. He 
mobilized all the support he could obtain from all peoples of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal 
promised partial autonomy for Kurds. He also promised that local government would 
accommodate ethnic specificity. He used the term “Turkiye halklari”	(meaning “the peoples 
of Turkey”) in referring to Kurds and Turks, rather than a monolithic “Turkish nation”	
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(Mango 1999: 12). “In the beginning of the War of Independence, Kemal often invoked the 
equality of Turks and Kurds, the commonality of the struggle, and the brotherhood of the 
two peoples”	(Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 10).  
 In a similar vein, Ataturk referred to the assembly of 1920 as Millet Meclisi or 
National Assembly, avoiding putting “Turkish”	in front of it. “In his first speech to the 
newly gathered parliament in April 1920, Mustafa Kemal argued that the parliament was not 
composed of the representative of Turks, Kurds, Circassians and the Laz, but rather the 
representatives of a strongly unified Islamic Community. [Mustafa] Kemal had even 
envisaged, according to some accounts of his speeches and conversations with journalists, 
that where Kurds were in a majority they would govern themselves autonomously”	(Barkey 
and Fuller 1998: 11). Even after the 1923 assembly, which was dissolved shortly thereafter, 
Ataturk’s emphasis on recognizing Kurds in the new Republic continued. “Kurds had freely 
represented themselves in the 1920–22 Turkish Grand National assemblies as Kurdish tribal 
leaders. Article 13 and Article 88 of the 1924 constitution had laid the groundwork for a 
potentially inclusive understanding of national identity by acknowledging the existence of 
racial variety. ‘With regards to citizenship,’	the article read, ‘everyone in Turkey is called a 
Turk without discrimination on the basis of religion or race’”	(Watts 1999: 634). After 1923, 
however, “any idea of the self rule of individual Muslim ethnic communities dropped out of 
the Turkish political agenda”	(Mango 1999: 22). 
 All these acts and examples from Ataturk’s discourse at the time show that he 
wanted to win the support of the Kurds to fight against a common outsider enemy. This 
accords with the idea that when elites are insecure they reach out to ethnic minorities. 
Religion was used as a basic common denominator: “Ataturk was thus able to paint the 
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ongoing struggle as a contest between the infidel Western powers who supported the 
Christian Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds fighting to save 
the Sultan, Caliph, and homeland.”	(Romano 2006: 30) 
 Thus, Kurdish representation in the Ottoman parliament was nonexistent or 
marginal, but the first Turkish parliament shows a significant increase of Kurdish MPs to 
seventeen percent. All the evidence above illustrates that Ataturk made an alliance with 
Kurds to fight against non-Muslim outside powers for an independent nation-state. So, 
rather then introducing the rule of people, it was politically necessary to make an alliance 
with Kurds that significantly increased Kurdish representation in the 1920 parliament. The 
conservative Kurdish tribal leaders rebelled when the promises of autonomy or recognition 
were not fulfilled and, moreover, when secularism was introduced. After the 1925 Sheikh 
Said Rebellion, which had both Islamic and ethnic characteristics, the Kurdish population 
was suppressed and Kurdish descriptive representation dropped to record lows of eight 
percent in the single party regime of Ataturk’s party, RPP. Ataturk led movement succeeded 
to establish its power against the Ottoman Sultan and the European Powers, which meant 
that his party became the dominating party and no longer the out party. Moreover, 
competition through free and fair elections had also disappeared. Thus, Kurds had very 
limited representation in the parliament until the introduction of the multiparty system in 
1946. 
 1923–1946 was a single party era of the RPP. In the 1939 election, Kurdish 
representation was as low as eight percent. Kurdish identity was suppressed. It was against 
official state ideology to talk about Kurds because everyone in Turkey was categorized as 
Turk; Kurds were considered “mountain Turks”	(Yegen 1999). The low level of Kurdish 
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representative presence is directly correlated with the oppressive measures of the state. In 
the same period, seventeen revolts took place that had a combination of ethnic, religious, 
sectarian, and tribal characteristics. The state’s goal was to suppress the revolts such as 
Sheikh Said (1924), Agri (1926–30), and Dersim (1937–8). The ruling single party of Ataturk 
appointed to Kurdish populated cities members of the parliament who were from Ankara, 
MPs who had never even been to these cities. In short, authoritarian and single party rule 
denied any place for Kurdish descriptive representation, until the first steps of 
democratization were taken in 1946.  
The Democratic Party and the Kurds (1946–1960) 
Competitive democracy provides the impetus for greater descriptive representation. The 
primary condition of democracy is free and fair elections. Until 1946, Turkey had single-
party rule in which only the RPP could run for elections. The Turkish modernization project 
aimed at joining the Western bloc, but this required fair elections. The introduction of 
multiparty politics as a first step toward Western liberal democratic standards created the 
opportunity for new oppositional parties to come to power. Previous opposition parties 
were co-opted, intimidated, or banned. Indeed, during the first democratic elections of 1946, 
the Democratic Party (hereafter DP) established only a year before, was not fully organized 
and lost the national elections. However, it won a landslide victory in the 1950 elections and 
the conservative DP came to power against the RPP. When the 1950 multiparty elections 
were held, the electoral system was based on plurality rather than proportional 
representation, which was meant to serve the interests of the Kemalist RPP rule. However, it 
worked for the advantage of the DP, which gained around 360 to 400 out of 450 seats in 
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three consecutive elections.  
How did the rise of the DP serve to increase Kurdish representation in the 
parliament? The DP was the out-party during the 1946 elections, which was the first 
multiparty election since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The RPP was the only 
party during the single party regime in 1923–1946 and its policies were oppressive toward 
Kurdish and religious identities. The rise of the DP as an oppositional out party was fueled 
by the discontent that had built up during the single party period and the oppressive policies 
of the RPP that denied any expression of religious or ethnic identity. The suppression of 
Kurdish identity was at its most grievous between 1923 and 1946. Many Kurdish notables 
and religious leaders were forced to relocate or executed for conspiring and uprising against 
the Turkish Republic. Indeed, the representation of Kurds had dipped to eight percent in 
1939, down from seventeen percent in the 1920 parliament.  
As the emerging out party DP’s strategy was to rally the support of the Kurds against 
the hegemony of RPP in the elections. In order to attract all the electorate, including the 
Kurds who were displeased with the Kemalist single party rule, the DP enlisted the Kurdish 
leaders of prominent families who had been exiled during the one party rule to run on their 
party lists in their regions of origin (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 14). Moreover, the DP’s 
conservative policies also attracted votes among religious Kurds. The collaboration between 
Kurds, most of whom were conservative and religious, and the DP served to increase the 
number of Kurds in the national assembly. Kurdish representation in the parliament 
increased from eight percent in 1939 to twelve percent in 1950. The DP’s contribution in 
this increase is demonstrated by the following figures. In the 9th parliament during 1950–
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1954, the DP had 43 Kurdish MPs whereas the RPP had nine (there were eight independent 
Kurdish MPs). The DP had won the majority of the seats, but votes from the Kurdish 
populated regions also illustrate Kurdish support for the DP and the DP’s role in bringing 
more Kurdish MPs to the parliament. For instance, “In the election of 1954, 34 of Turkish 
Kurdistan’s 40 seats went to the Democratic Party” (Romano 2006: 40).  
How did the DP mobilize Kurdish votes? The Kemalists represented the elite and 
bureaucrats, whereas the DP appealed to the landowners in the Kurdish populated southeast 
to get the votes of the peasants who worked on their land. These landlords, or agas in 
Turkish, out of self-interest negotiated the votes of the peasants that worked on their land. 
The DP collaborated with these Kurdish agas to get their support, in return for which the 
party provided them a voice. These aga origin MPs demanded not ethnic identity recognition 
but state supported development projects for their regions. “As regionally elected 
representatives from Kurdish areas, Kurdish representatives, like all politicians, have sought 
to encourage legislation that economically benefits their regions and their constituents—
without any mention of the Kurdish cause per se”	(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 75). 
 In this process, “Local traditional voters, who gained new importance by delivering 
votes to the governments in the multi-party period, became supporters of the regime”	
(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 77). However, the increasing representation of Kurdish agas in the 
parliament did not guarantee substantive representation of Kurdish interests. “In this sense, 
wider representation has come to mean a narrower representation for the Kurdish 
population…In the final analysis, mainstream parties’	use of Kurdish representatives as ‘bulk 
vote generators’	has not served Turkish democracy well”	(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 77).  
 Kurdish identity politics became a dominant force on the global scene after the 
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1990s. Until then, there was no reference to recognition of Kurdish identity in national 
politics (such as language policies). The Kurdish population was still rural and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged, and Kurdish MPs raised these interests instead. 
Nevertheless, “the Democrat Party Decade (1950–1960) was also notable for the new and 
relative freedom of expression that allowed all, including Kurds, to articulate their 
grievances”	(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 14). 
 Thus, Kurdish descriptive representation rose through the collaboration between 
Kurdish elite and the out-party DP, which ruled between 1950 and 1960. The DP was the 
first strong oppositional party to come to power at the first democratic elections in the 
country. As an out-party, it appealed to Kurdish voters by nominating Kurdish landlords as 
candidates and got them elected, which increased Kurdish representation in the parliament.   
1960 Military Coup 
This period ended with a military coup against the Democrat Party government on May 27, 
1960. The coup was staged by a group of 37 young military officers acting outside the chain 
of command, and was eventually led by General Cemal Gürsel. The military junta composed 
of these officers called itself Milli Birlik Komitesi, or the National Union Committee. The 
president, prime minister, and several other members of the administration were put on trial 
under the supervision of this committee. The politicians were charged with high treason, 
misuse of public funds, and abrogation of the constitution. These trials ended with the 
execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu 
and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan on September 16, 1961. Although the 
administrative authority was returned to civilians the following month, the military continued 
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to dominate the political scene until 1965, making the 1961–5 period a semi-military regime.  
The National Union Committee had two and half percent Kurdish representation 
among its ranks. Moreover, the Kurdish identity of officers in the Turkish army had largely 
been assimilated through Turkish nationalist indoctrination. The ensuing level of 
representation was much lower than the twelve percent during the previous period of 1946–
60. The lack of competitive elections among parties during military regimes and coups does 
not allow the causal mechanism of out parties making an alliance with Kurds to unfold. In 
other words, military interventions hampered, among other things, Kurdish representation. 
The 1960 coup affected the relationship between the DP and Kurdish voters as well. 
Some Kurdish members of parliament realized that descriptive representation through 
Kurdish landlords did not guarantee substantive representation. So, they founded the New 
Turkey Party (hereafter NTP) to get votes from all regions of Turkey, including Kurdish 
areas, in which they partly succeeded.  However, they quickly turned into a party supported 
mainly in Kurdish populated areas. In the 1961 elections, the party received 13.7 percent of 
all votes and gained 65 seats in the lower house of the parliament, but this support eroded 
down to 2.2 percent in the 1969 elections. 
Democratization, the Rising Left, and the Kurds (1973–1980) 
After the semi-military regime of 1961–5, there was a brief period of democratization that 
ended with another coup in 1971. The control of the military over politics continued until 
1973. The period of 1973–80 was a time of democratization during which leftist politics was 
also on the rise. Indeed, this trend was widespread globally. The 1970s were dominated by 
ideological splits, political tension, and turmoil in many parts of the world, including Turkey. 
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Class-consciousness was on the rise and the socialist system in the Soviet Union was 
challenging the capitalist world. Workers and students were calling for revolutions and 
demanding equality.  
The periods of democratization amidst military interventions increased Kurdish 
representation. In 1961, Kurdish representation was at twelve percent and it had risen to 
fifteen percent by 1973. What explains this increase in Kurdish representation in the 
parliament? The out-party, now the RPP, under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit redefined 
itself as a center-left party and aimed to gain power against its rival center-right Justice Party 
under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel, who claimed to continue the heritage of 
Menderes’	DP. As the new out party Ecevit’s RPP competed against the legacy of DP and its 
continuation under JP. This was a highly competitive political system in which no single 
party gained the majority to establish a single-party government. Instead there were many 
weak coalitions, and parties needed every single vote they could get. This political setting 
favored Kurdish representation, but leftist parties had an edge because of the global and 
socio-political context of Turkey in the 1970s.    
Bulent Ecevit, the new leader of the RPP came to power several times (in 1972, 
1977, and 1978). The political scene was quickly changing due to unstable and weak 
coalitions. Ecevit’s center leftist RPP appealed to all working class voters, including the 
Kurds, to increase its power against the Justice Party (hereafter JP). The proportionally high 
number of Kurdish MPs from the RPP supports this. In the 15th parliament term between 
1973–80, there were 67 Kurdish MPs—30 of them were from Ecevit’s RPP, and the next 
largest number of Kurds were 15, from the JP. Ecevit once said, detailing his family 
genealogy, that he “could have Kurdish origins”	(Yavuz 2004). However, he explained that 
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ethnic identity would bring neither disappointment nor pride for him, reflecting the spirit of 
the 1960s and 70s when class-consciousness mattered the most.  
Ecevit’s center-left RPP appealed to Kurdish voters by nominating Kurdish MPs, 
some of whom were elected. However, Kurdish involvement in leftist politics had 
sociological origins as well. First, before the 1960s, self-interested Kurdish landlord MPs 
engendered discontent among the emerging Kurdish counter-elite who engaged in leftist 
politics. Kurdish landlord MPs represented only their individual interests, whereas this 
emerging counter-elite learned how to represent their group interests based first on class and 
later on ethno-national identity. Second, Kurds, like other rural populations, moved to urban 
areas in the 1960s in search of jobs and a better future. This urbanization and the increase in 
the education level of Kurds increased awareness of class difference and socio-economic 
inequality. This class-consciousness also resulted in the involvement of Kurds in the Leftist 
movement and parties because, socio-economically, the most disadvantaged group in Turkey 
has been the Kurds. “It was a period of left-wing mobilization, and many politically active 
Kurds threw their lot in with the Turkish Left in search of their ‘national rights’”	(Barkey 
and Fuller 1998: 15).  
1971 Military Coup 
However, there was also a turbulent political scene in the 1970s, during which widespread 
social unrest was marked by street demonstrations, labor strikes and political assassinations 
(Cleveland 2004: 283). There were left-wing and right-wing workers’	and students’	
movements, which took the form of Islamist and militant nationalist groups such as Grey 
Wolves. Both leftist and rightist groups carried out bombing attacks, robberies, and 
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kidnappings—from the end of 1968, and increasingly during 1969 and 1970. On the political 
front, Prime Minister Demirel’s center-right Justice Party government, re-elected in 1969, 
was unable to stop the violence in the streets. The military intervention came on March 12, 
1971, as the military gave an ultimatum demanding that the government end the “anarchy, 
fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest”	(Peretz 1994: 189). On the day of the coup, 
the public prosecutor opened a case against the Workers’	Party of Turkey for carrying out 
communist propaganda and supporting “Kurdish separatism,”	which indicates the extent to 
which leftist parties and Kurdish nationalism was linked in the eye of the military. Demirel’s 
government resigned and a semi-military regime began until 1973. This was neither a normal 
elected government, nor an outright military dictatorship that could entirely ignore 
parliamentary opposition (Hale 1994: 195). The Kurdish representation during this semi-
military regime (1971–3) was only at four percent. In the 1973–80 period, the troubles for 
which the 1971 coup demanded resolution continued, but it was also a more democratic 
period. In this period, Kurdish representation in the parliament rose to sixteen percent. 
1980 Military Coup 
The civil conflict between Left and Right ideological movements intensified before the 1980 
military coup which crushed both movements. Their leaders either fled the country or were 
imprisoned, tortured, and in some cases executed. The military junta ruled the country 
through the National Security Council until 1983. During this period, Kurdish representation 
dropped to null, as there was no Kurdish member of the Council. Since there were no free 
and fair elections in military rule periods, the causal mechanism through which an out party 
allying with the Kurds to become competitive against a dominant party did not work and 
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Kurdish representation remained low.  
The collaboration between leftist parties and the Kurdish movement became more 
direct in the 1980s. Kurdish leftist MPs collaborated with mainstream leftist parties such as 
the Social Democratic Populist Party (hereafter SDPP). However, when the SDPP did not 
voice the Kurdish cause, Kurdish MPs decided to set up the People’s Labor Party (hereafter 
PLP), the first Kurdish political party. The PLP emerged out of the leftist political 
experience of Kurdish MPs. The first generation of MPs in the PLP was largely independent 
of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (hereafter PKK), but the next generation turned the PLP 
and its subsequent iterations into a party engaging in pro-Kurdish politics (Watts 1999).  
However, the disillusion of the Kurds with the Turkish leftist parties led to a shift 
from class-based appeals to a Kurdish ethno-national consciousness. Turkish leftist parties 
did not want to recognize the Kurds as a separate group but aimed at addressing their 
concerns under the rubric of lower socio-economic classes. In 1991, the pro-Kurdish PLP 
made a coalition with the leftist SDPP and entered the parliament. However, when these 
MPs participated in a pro-Kurdish conference in Paris, they were expelled from the SDPP 
with the accusation that they cooperated with PKK terrorists. This marked a clear separation 
between the Turkish left and Kurdish leftists. Politics based on ideological lines were largely 
replaced with ethnic identity politics due to the global political changes transpiring with the 
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s in Turkey. 
Emergence of pro-Islamic Parties and the Kurds (1990–2011) 
Religious and ethnic identity politics have taken center stage in Turkish politics since the 
early 1990s. The rise and transformation of Islamist and Kurdish ethnic politics provides the 
 107 
context to examine Kurdish representation today. The rising pro-Islamic political parties 
have become the new oppositional force against the staunchly secularist and nationalist 
hegemony of Kemalism, institutionalized in the military and bureaucracy. The Turkish 
democratization process since the 1990s has witnessed the changing balance of power 
between civil-military relations to the advantage of the former.  
The most significant out-parties in Turkish politics in this period have been new pro-
Islamic parties. Parties on the center right and left built coalition parties and the pro-Islamic 
parties challenged them. Islamist politics has emerged primarily through the rise of the 
Welfare Party (hereafter WP). The WP’s leader Necmettin Erbakan appealed to religious 
Kurds, asking them to vote for the WP. Islamic identity, he argued, could be the basis for 
collaboration between Muslim Turks and Kurds. The WP received the largest share of votes 
and became the larger coalition partner in the 1995 coalition government. The WP had 34 
Kurdish MPs, which gave the party a chance of becoming a serious contender for Kurdish 
votes (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 79).  
However, the Kemalist military establishment that regards itself as the main center of 
power and protector of Turkey’s secular regime considered pro-Islamic parties as a threat to 
the regime. In this period, the last military intervention to civil government—the so-called 
“postmodern military coup”—took place on February 28, 1998. The Kemalist military 
establishment pushed the pro-Islamic WP coalition government out of office, demanding 
the government take draconian measures to curb the rise of Islamic movements through the 
constitutional institution of National Security Council, which was dominated by generals. 
The regime of the country was again semi-military between 1998 until 2002; Kurdish 
representation dropped to four percent in the parliament during this period.  
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 In 2001, the younger generation of politicians within the WP set up a new party 
called the Justice and Development Party (hereafter JDP). The JDP courted Kurdish votes 
by nominating Kurdish candidates and getting them elected. The pro-Islamic parties have 
incorporated more ethnic Kurds into their party to gain an advantage over other parties and 
find an ally against the military. In 1983, Kurdish representation was at seventeen percent 
and in 2007 it increased to twenty percent, reaching its peak. If the percentage of Kurds in 
Turkey’s population is considered to be nineteen percent (McDowall 1992: 32), this would 
mean that Kurds have reached slightly more representation than their population size.  
 Conservative Muslims joined this political system in the mid-1990s and consolidated 
their power with the rise of the JDP, which has won three consecutive elections, increasing 
its vote to nearly 50 percent in 2011. After 2002, Kurdish MPs in the JDP increased because 
of the competition over which party best represents Kurds in the parliament. The pro-
Kurdish parties and the JDP were the two most powerful contenders to represent the Kurds.  
The leader of the JDP, Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan, declared in 2007 that he has 55 
Kurdish MPs and then increased the number to “75 Kurdish origin MPs in his party”	
(Iflazoglu and Benli 2007). These statements have been a reminder about the longtime 
exclusion of Kurds from Turkish politics. His political motive has been to outrival both the 
pro-Kurdish Party of Peace and Democracy (hereafter PPD) and the Kemalist military’s 
persisting power. Nevertheless, the question of ethnic representation has become a central 
part of Kurdish inclusion within the Turkish political system. 
The relationship between pro-Kurdish parties, such as the PPD, and the pro-Islamic 
or “Muslim Democratic”	JDP has been one of rivalry and collaboration. On the one hand, 
both parties aim to gain the support of the Kurds by getting as many Kurdish MPs as 
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possible in their parties. The PPD considers itself the primary voice representing Kurdish 
interests in the assembly. On the other hand, the JDP aims to resolve the Kurdish Question 
through indirect negotiations with the PKK through its captured leader Abdullah Ocalan. 
The PPD serves as the middleman between Ocalan in prison and PKK leaders in the 
mountains of Northern Iraq. The JDP’s initiative to resolve the question through political 
negotiation has also weakened the hand of the military, which has often used the military 
struggle against the PKK as political leverage against civilian governments.  
The JDP has introduced many pro-Kurdish policies, such as removing the ban on 
the use of Kurdish language in public and in the education system. These policies have been 
made in the name of democratization. However, this collaboration and competition between 
the JDP and the PPD has been more effective in promoting Kurdish descriptive 
representation. In the 2011 elections, the number of Kurds in the JDP declined. This fact 
also shows that democracy is not an independent factor simply raising Kurdish descriptive 
representation. Instead, it is the political alliance of a rising pro-Islamic party with the Kurds 
that has been the driving force behind this increase. Moreover, as the JDP has consolidated 
its power since 2008, its efforts to collaborate with pro-Kurdish parties have declined. 
 The political inclusion of the Kurds remains the biggest challenge and opportunity 
for Turkish democratization. The largest number of Kurds lives in Turkey, and the Turkish 
state seems to have engaged in a “resolution”	or “peace”	process with the representatives of 
the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, the Kurdish experience in the democratization 
process of Turkey requires close examination to deduce any lessons for the relationship 
between democracy and ethnic political incorporation. After all, the PKK, which had aimed 
to create an independent Kurdistan, eventually declared that it no longer has this aim. 
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Instead, it has decided to continue its struggle in the political arena for greater recognition of 
Kurdish rights and identity within the framework of the Turkish state.  
In other words, Kurds in Turkey, despite their long history of exclusion and 
suppression, are willing to be incorporated into the Turkish state. The pro-Islamic parties of 
the WP and the JDP have appealed to Kurdish votes and carried many Kurdish MPs to the 
parliament as they challenged center right and left parties along with the Kemalist military 
establishment. In fact, the military intervention of 1998 to halt the rise of pro-Islamic parties 
actually served to increase their power. The consolidation of the JDP’s power by 2008 shows 
that it no longer feels required to appeal to Kurdish voters. Indeed, in the June 7, 2015 
elections, Kurdish votes switched from the JDP to the People’s Democratic Party (hereafter 
PDP), which is transforming itself from a pro-Kurdish to a party of the whole country. 
Conclusion 
The historical pattern through which Kurdish representation increased in the Turkish 
parliament illustrates the causal mechanism of how democratization enhances ethnic 
descriptive representation. In general, democracy provides an electoral incentive for elites to 
mobilize previously excluded minorities. Specifically, where minority groups are 
enfranchised, and where multiparty competition is allowed, major parties must court voters 
of every description—particularly where they are numerous. In order to make a credible 
claim to represent voters who define themselves as members of a distinctive ethnic group, 
parties are more or less obliged to nominate candidates from that group, and ensure that at 
least some of them are elected. In this fashion, democratic competition enhances descriptive 
representation.  
 111 
More specifically, as the Turkish case detailed above proves, each regime change or 
step towards democratization (such as introducing multiparty politics) brings in new 
competitors for state power. These rising oppositional forces—such as Mustafa Kemal’s 
republican secular nationalism against the Ottoman Sultan, the DP against the RPP in 1950s, 
the Leftist movements in the 60s and 70s against Rightist nationalism, and the Political 
Islamic movement against the secularist bureaucratic and military elite since the 1980s—all 
developed the strategy of collaborating with the Kurdish elite to increase their own power. 
As a minority, Kurds have willingly joined this collaborative strategy to further their causes 
of representing their identities and socio-economic concerns.  
The implications of this long-term, detailed case study for the literature include 
elaborating other case studies in a search for other possible strategies that minorities and 
rising oppositional forces take advantage of during democratization processes. These 
mechanisms would inform policy makers on how to make democracy work when it comes 
to ethnic representation. As for the implications of these findings for resolving the Kurdish 
Question in Turkey, the significance of continuing on the path for further democratization, 
as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU, is enormous. Both the JDP and pro-
Kurdish parties have benefitted from a collaboration strategy, which has increased Kurdish 
ethnic representation in the parliament. However, if the government’s efforts for 
democratization wanes, this strategy and mechanism will disappear until pro-Kurdish parties 
search for new collaboration partners. During the June 7, 2015 general elections, the PDP 
(which has roots in the pro-Kurdish parties but aims to become a party of all of Turkey) 
managed to pass the ten percent threshold by getting just above thirteen percent of the 
votes, and is now represented in the parliament with 80 MPs. Despite some setbacks, if 
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democratization in Turkey continues, Kurdish representation in the parliament could persist 
at its current level or continue to increase.  
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LEGISLATIVE SIZE AND REPRESENTATION:  A CROSS-NATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Do ethnic groups have greater descriptive representation in larger legislatures than in smaller 
ones? While previous works of descriptive representation have focused on electoral type and 
special electoral designs (e.g. quotas, reserved seats) as the main institutional factors 
increasing representation, the relationship between legislative size and ethnic descriptive 
representation has yet to be explored in a cross-national fashion. This study pursues a new 
line of research by demonstrating how legislative size matters for higher ethnic descriptive 
representation. I argue that larger legislative size fosters greater ethnic descriptive 
representation regardless of regime type. Theoretically, larger legislatures provide more “room” to pay off key elites; improve the inclusion of disadvantaged groups by diminishing 
the value of a seat; are less subject to stochastic features that might upset descriptive 
representation; and more efficiently translate votes into seats, almost regardless of the 
electoral rules in place. 
The biggest impediment to studying the effect of legislature size on ethnic 
descriptive representation has been the lack of a cross-national dataset (Allen and Stoll 2014: 
14). This study is made possible by the Global Leadership Project (GLP) database, which is 
detailed in the first paper of this dissertation. The GLP contains new cross-national data that 
specify the ethnic identities of 31,259 leaders and 1017 ethnic groups in 118 countries. A 
new disproportionality index of Ethnic Representation is created with the aggregated data at 
the national level. The argument is tested with a series of cross-national research designs 
drawing on the GLP database. Lastly, exogenous variation in population is examined as an 
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instrumental variable for legislature size in order to estimate its impact on ethnic descriptive 
representation. The instrumental variable method strongly supports the contention that the 
relationship between legislature size and ethnic descriptive representation is causal, and not a 
mere correlation.  
 The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I explore previous works on 
and causal pathways of ethnic descriptive representation. I define the concepts and then 
explain the data collection and how I created Ethnic Representation Index. In the empirical 
section, I test the hypothesis with cross-national data through different techniques.  The final 
section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence.  
Previous Works 
Descriptive representation refers to the political representation of social groups within a 
society. A descriptively representative polity is judged to be one that mirrors the 
demographic characteristics of the body politic. Understanding the causes of ethnic 
descriptive representation is important because political equality is a principle towards which 
democracies generally strive. Arguably, the ideal of political equality presupposes that all 
sizable social groups in a polity should be represented in elite positions within government. 
However, this degree of inclusiveness does not exist anywhere, even in longstanding 
democracies. For example, In France, Maghrebis held no seat in the National Assembly until 
2009 although they comprise an estimated 6–7% percent of the population (Bird 2005). That 
said, there is considerable variation in ethnic representation in polities around the world. 
Some polities approach the ideal of equal demographic representation more closely than 
others. 
Because of an increased emphasis on political equality in recent years, there has been 
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a growing interest in both the causes and effects of descriptive representation13 with a 
special focus on underprivileged minorities and women (Philips 1995; Young 2000; Htun 
2004; Hughes 2009, 2013; Bird 2005; Ruedin 2009; Stoll 2013). These studies offer electoral 
and cultural explanations for increasing descriptive representation outcomes.  
This research on descriptive representation falls into two categories: studies of the 
effects of descriptive representation and studies of its causes. These two lines of research 
have developed somewhat independently of each other. Studies of the effects of descriptive 
representation address the value of group representation with respect to larger normative 
goals such as democracy, equality, and justice (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1993; Philips 1995; 
Williams 1998). Studies of descriptive representation suggest that an inclusive and diverse 
political elite, mirroring the demographics of its citizenry, reassures “out-groups” in a society 
(minorities and indigenous peoples, women and other traditionally oppressed communities) 
that they have a role in decision making. These arguments in support of descriptive 
representation focus on trust, psychological benefits (e.g. an enhanced feeling of the ‘ability 
to rule’), and increased responsiveness to group interests. The converse assumption is that 
systematic under-representation of a group in positions of political power within a country 
will lead to the under-representation of its interests in setting the agenda and in making 
policy decisions (Philips 1995; Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Young 2000). Studies also probe 
whether, and under what circumstances, institutional measures intended to improve a 
group’s representation, such as quotas, are justifiable.  
Whereas those studies tend to be theoretical, the second body of literature is largely 
empirical in nature. These studies focus on descriptive representation not a cause, but rather 
                                                
13 In this paper, ethnic descriptive representation and ethnic representation are used interchangeably.   
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as an outcome of specific political and social processes. Studies of women representation are 
numerous—owing, perhaps, to ease of measurement. In explaining cross-national variation 
in women’s legislative representation, these studies typically focus on three categories of 
factors: political, cultural, and supply and demand factors in the recruitment process. In 
regards to the first, several authors (Lovenduski 2005; Norris 1985; Norris 1993; Paxton 
1997; Paxton et al 2007) sought to explain variation in women’s representation by focusing 
on the political system (e.g. electoral system, district magnitude, reserved seats), party 
ideology, and party organization (e.g. leftist ideology, quotas) (Studlar & McAllister 2002; 
Kittilson 2006; Freidenvall 2006). One of the strongest findings is that women’s 
representation increases in electoral systems with party lists, proportional representation, and 
large district magnitudes (Matland & Brown 1992; Norris 1996; Rule 1987). Second, gender 
culture in various regional, social, and ideological settings has also been studied as a factor 
influencing women’s representation (Studlar and McAllister 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Teigen and Wangnerud 2009). Last, supply and demand factors 
in the recruitment process (e.g. social background of the candidate, her socioeconomic 
status, motivational factors, etc.) have been studied for their impact on women’s 
representation.  
Research on ethnic representation is narrower in scope than that on women’s 
representation, and is usually focused on a single country (Bird et al. 2011; Anwar 2001; 
Bergh and Bjorklund 2003; Bird 2005; Black and Hicks 2006; Donovan 2007; Messina 2007; 
Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Saggar 2000; Togeby 2008) or several countries (Bird 2005; 
Klimova 2002; Reynolds 2006; Kostadinova 2007). The impact of electoral systems and their 
corresponding institutions on ethnic representation is central to several cross-national 
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studies. Kostadinova (2007) examines the effect of electoral systems on group representation 
in 15 East European countries. She argues that mixed (PR and FPP) systems have been less 
representative than pure PR systems, and that representation improves regardless of the 
system when the ethnic community is both large and concentrated. Reynolds (2006) 
examines 33 countries with ethnic quotas and suggests the electoral system as a factor that 
can improve cooperation between members of different ethnic groups at the national level. 
 To date, there have been only two large N cross-national studies of ethnic 
representation: Hughes (2008; 2013) on minority women’s representation and Ruedin (2009) 
on ethnic representation. Hughes’s (2008) study is a comprehensive investigation of factors 
that explain minority women’s legislative representation in 81 democratic and semi-
democratic countries (461 racial, ethnic, and religious groups). She argues that factors such 
as group size, ethnic-religious fractionalization, and minority quotas explain variation in 
minority women’s representation and that PR electoral systems do not increase the 
representation of minorities. Conversely, Ruedin (2009) studies 95 democracies, focusing 
principally on the role of electoral (electoral system, quotas, political rights) as well as cultural 
factors (measured as regional variables and toleration towards neighbors based on a question 
in World Values Survey). He argues that electoral factors seem to have no impact on the 
levels of ethnic representation and singles out cultural attitudes as the primary catalyst for 
greater ethnic representation.  
There are several problems with Ruedin’s ethnic representation data, however. First, 
Ruedin’s study is based on aggregate group level data drawn from secondary sources. The 
information on ethnic group sizes and their representation is not mentioned in his study. 
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Second, Ruedin’s ethnic classifications are cruder than those in the Global Leadership 
Project, seemingly based on the ease of data collection in a given country rather than the 
relevant country context. Ethnic group members are coded in binary ethnic classifications 
(such as “White” and “non-White”) in 10 countries. For instance, in Belgium, the majority 
group category is “White”—a racial category—rather than Flemish and Walloon, which are 
the well-known ethnic groups in the country. Third, Ruedin makes use of the category of “other,” which cannot in any meaningful way be treated as an ethnic group, in nineteen 
countries. In Burkina Faso, Ruedin listed only Mossi and “other”—a very modest 
classification of that country’s ethnic composition. In contrast, the GLP dataset classifies 
seventeen tribes in addition to Mossi group, which comprises only 45% of the population. 
Lastly, because of these differences in ethnic group classifications, Ruedin’s ERS scores 
correlate weakly (0.3) with those of the GLP. This is in spite of the fact that 60 of the 95 
democratic countries in Ruedin’s study are covered in the GLP dataset. This study’s country 
sample includes 58 additional countries over one-half million inhabitants, thereby making the 
sample more representative of the whole world.  
Regardless of the specific countries or ethnic classifications, there is general 
agreement that ethnic minorities are significantly underrepresented among political elites 
around the world (Bird 2003; Hughes 2008; Togeby 2008). However, as yet there has been 
no attempt to systematically measure this issue on a global scale or to explain it. Most 
attempts to explain variation in representation focus primarily on electoral laws, which seem 
unlikely to be the only factor at work. 
This study focuses on the size of the legislature (or number of seats) as a causal 
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factor in descriptive representation. Recently, there has been some debate on the size of 
legislatures in conditioning political representation in established democracies such as the 
United States (Conley and Stevens 2011). Writers note that the size of legislatures has not 
been increasing in proportion to population. Thus, each Member of Parliament (MP) must 
represent a larger electorate. Conley and Stevens (2001) remark, “Americans today are 
numerically the worst-represented group of citizens in the country’s history. The average 
House member speaks for about 700,000 Americans. In contrast, in 1913 he represented 
roughly 200,000, a ratio that today would mean a House with 1,500 members.” In light of 
this trend, scholars concentrated on whether legislative size affects representation in 
democratic countries (Allen and Stoll 2014). Increasing legislature size proportionally to 
population could give opportunities for disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities to be 
represented. The basic question about increasing legislative size, however, concerns the 
tradeoff between better representation and efficient governance (Dahl and Tufte 1973). 
Larger legislatures could facilitate stronger, more centralized governance—because each 
individual legislator is less powerful, and parties tend to dominate. However, this assumption 
has not been empirically tested.  
In the debate concerning the relationship between legislative size and electoral 
outcomes, Arend Lijphart has made significant theoretical contributions (1994). In his work, 
Lijphart viewed legislature size as a major dimension of electoral systems, claiming that “if 
electoral systems are defined as methods of translating votes into seats, the total number of 
seats available for this translation appears to be an integral and legitimate part of the systems 
of translation” (Lijphart 1994: 12). In particular, he argued that there can be no doubt that 
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assembly size can have a strong influence on proportionality of party votes and seats 
(Lijphart 1994: 12).  
Meanwhile, a growing body of literature focuses on the relationship between 
legislative size and women’s representation (Darcy and Choike 1986; Oakes and Almquist 
1993; Stoll 2013; Allen and Stoll 2014; Kjaer and Elklit 2015), but such arrangements have 
not yet been included in discussions on increasing ethnic representation. Darcy and Choike 
(1986: 244) using formal modeling (Markov process) argue that legislative size has some 
impact on the number of women in the legislature at any given time, but has very little 
impact on the proportion of women in the legislature. In a recent study, Allen and Stoll test 
the impact of legislative size on women’s (and African American) representation in 50 states 
of the US (1860–2006) and 114 countries; they argue that “all else being equal, larger 
legislatures deliver better representational outcomes” (2014:1). They complain about lack of 
cross-national ethnic representation data that could facilitate further research. 
In the literature, only three studies examine the relationship between legislative size 
and women’s representation across nations.. These studies are summarized in Table 
3.1,which shows that the relationship of legislature size and representation has been 
confined to women’s representation in cross-national studies or ethnic representation in 
single country studies. To move beyond these contexts, the research design of this study 
exploits cross-country variation in legislature size as well as in ethnic representation. To 
examine the hypothesis that larger legislatures have greater ethnic representation, a new 
Ethnic Representation Index is created with a large (N=118) sample of countries. This study 
is thus the first to endeavor to examine the relationship between legislative size and ethnic 
descriptive representation in a cross-national fashion.    
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Table 3.1:  
Literature Review 
 
Study  Unit  o f  Analys i s   Soc ia l  g roup Resear ch  Des ign   Finding   Focus   
Allen & Stoll 2014 
50 state-years  Black    
Women.  OLS + Yes 114 countries 
Bird 2015 3 countries Ethnic. Qualitative 0 No 
Hughes 2013 81 countries Minority Women.  HLM 0 No 
Kjaer & Elklit 2015 98 municipalities Women & Age. OLS + Yes 
Lijphart 1994 27 countries Party Votes/Seats. OLS + Yes 
Oakes & Almquist 
1993 73 countries Women.  OLS + Yes 
Ruedin 2009 95 countries Ethnic. OLS 0 No 
Reynolds 2006 96 countries LGBT. OLS 0 No 
 
Finding: negative(-), positive (+), null (0). Focus on legislative size: Yes/No.  OLS: Ordinary                           
Least Squares. HLM: Hierarchical Linear Modeling. 
 
Theory 
Having considered the issue across 118 nations, this paper argues that legislative size 
enhances descriptive representation. There are four possible causal pathways for this 
observed phenomenon.  
First, a larger legislature provides more “room” to pay off supporters and key elites, 
allowing party leaders to satisfy both internal pressures (to satisfy supporters within the 
party) and external pressures (to represent under-represented groups). Both moves may be 
regarded within the framework of an informal bargain, where party leaders trade off political 
power (or at least the appearance of political power) in exchange for support. Seats perform 
essentially the same function as clientelistic goods, and may in fact serve as the vehicle for 
clientelistic goods. With more seats at their disposal, party leaders there are more goods to 
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go around. That said, we should not discount the possibility of enduring bonds of loyalty 
that do not respond solely to quid pro quo arrangements. Exchange relationships may foster 
norms of reciprocity. 
Second, a larger legislature deflates the value of a seat, making it less costly for elites 
to represent social groups that might not be part of their coalition or that might be socially 
disadvantaged or even stigmatized. As the size of legislature increases, the influence of each 
seat holder on decision-making diminishes. This makes it less costly for elites to spare seats 
for socially excluded minorities, who might not have the political wherewithal to compete 
with more privileged groups.  
Third, a larger legislature is less subject to stochastic features that might upset 
descriptive representation. For example, in a small legislature it is possible that most of the 
potential MPs for a party in a particular year could be from a particular social group, as a 
purely random feature of whatever it is that drives recruitment into politics. In a large 
legislature these stochastic features will be less marked. In statistics, this is called the law of 
large numbers. It follows that deviance from pure descriptive representation due to random 
selection is minimized as the legislature size increases.  
Lastly, a larger legislature is more efficient in translating votes into seats, almost 
regardless of the electoral rules in place (Lijphart 1994; Kjaer and Elklit 2013). To the extent 
that votes are cast along ethnic lines, ethnic groups are more likely to be represented 
proportionally in the legislature. This mechanism is most marked in a SMD electoral system 
where ethnic groups are spatially segregated. But it is apt to be true under PR rules and 
where ethnic groups overlap, as well. The most visible—and perhaps most consequential—
effect is the threshold effect, by which small ethnic groups may fail to clear the effective 
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electoral threshold, but may clear that threshold when the number of seats is increased. 
In short, paying off supporters from under-represented groups, deflating the value of 
legislature seats, limiting stochastic features, and providing fairer representation of small 
ethnic groups are some of the causal pathways through which larger legislative size can lead 
to greater ethnic descriptive representation.  
Concepts, Data and Measures 
I begin by defining key terms of this study: ethnicity, political elite, descriptive representation, and 
legislature size.  
Ethnicity.  Ethnicity is notoriously difficult to operationalize across diverse settings 
(Abdelal et al. 2009; Chandra 2006; Fearon 2003; Kanbur, Rajaram & Varshney 2011; 
Lieberman & Singh 2012; Posner 2004a, 2004b). Nonetheless, this article defines ethnicity as 
an ascriptive identity based on common ancestry (real or imagined), religion, language, race, 
and tradition, or any combination of these. The determining characteristics of ethnicity differ 
widely from one country to another. Although there is some mobility across groups, ethnic 
identity is assumed to be hereditary.  
There are still issues related to this ascriptive approach to ethnicity in many cross-
national studies including the GLP, as detailed in the first paper.  First, coders struggled with 
classifying individuals who have cross-cutting identities. The quality and recruitment process 
of coders is outlined below. Second, since ethnic differences are a matter of degree, the 
number of ethnic groups in a country can be debated. The only criterion the project has put 
forth for including an ethnic group in the project has been the size of the group. Ethnic 
groups which are considered to be politically significant or comprising at least one percent of 
the population in a country, according to the best available surveys or estimates, are included 
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in the dataset. Third, markers of group identity that help to create different ethnic identities 
– e.g., language, religion, dress, comportment, cuisine, and region – vary across countries. 
Expert coders are encouraged to make these judgments according to the context of the 
country they are coding.  
 Thus, the GLP acknowledges the subjective and often fluid nature of ethnicity 
(Gerring et al. 2015). Indeed, this project builds on the plasticity of ethnic categories. For our 
purposes, GLP coders capture social realities as they are perceived at a particular point in 
time in their respective countries. It is not assumed that these categories will be permanent. 
In discussing identity, there will inevitably be debates about the categories and individual 
identifications. However, the risks of cross-national data analysis of ethnic groups should not 
prevent scholars from undertaking it while noting its advantages and pitfalls. Moreover, 
there is no reason to suspect systematic error in the context of the objectives entertained by 
this article, because threats to efficiency and precision can be overcome by the large sample 
size of the GLP.  
Political elite. The notion of a “leader” or “elite” (terms used interchangeably in this 
article) can be defined in many ways (Blondel 1987; Dogan 2003; Higley & Pakulski 2007; 
Putnam 1976). In this study, the representation of an ethnic group is calculated based on its 
representation in Member of Parliament (MP) position. However, in specifications, I run all 
the models with the outcome variables (ERS_all) which is based on seven categories of the 
elite in a country: (1) the executive, (2) cabinet members, (3) executive staff, (4) party leaders, 
(5) assembly leaders, (6) supreme court justices and (7) members of parliament (MPs)14 
                                                
14 MPs signify lower house MPs in all countries except for Chile, where the upper house MPs are 
coded.  
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(Gerring et al. 2015). Most of these categories are defined in formal terms by law, while a 
few them rest on the judgment of the country experts.  
Descriptive representation. Descriptive representation refers to the idea that the body of 
legislators should reflect the demographic characteristics and experiences of the constituents 
it represents. Accordingly, a constituency that is 40 percent female and 20 percent Hispanic 
should have the same ratio of female and Hispanic legislators. The share of seats in 
parliament is often regarded as an indicator of political inclusion in a society.   
Legislative size. Legislative size is defined as the raw number of parliamentarians in the 
parliament (if bicameral, the lower house). 
Data Col lec t ion 
Given the difficulties associated with determining ethnicity across diverse settings, the GLP 
relied on country experts with deep knowledge of each country to code its data. Recruiting 
country experts can be challenging, particularly in small countries in the developing world. 
To identify potential coders, we began by contacting senior political scientists—area 
specialists with extensive networks among scholars of that region. We asked these scholars 
to recommend persons with country-specific knowledge who might be interested in the 
project. We then contacted them, informed them of the project, and—if they seemed 
appropriate for the job and willing to commit the requisite time—secured their appointment. 
Country experts chosen for this project were generally academics, graduate students, 
or professionals involved in civil service or an NGO. Since the questions of interest to this 
project are mostly factual (and the non-factual questions do not have a pronounced partisan 
or ideological slant), it was considered sufficient to recruit only one coder per country.  
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Coders were compensated according to the number of leaders classified and the ease of data 
access in that country. Average compensation was about $500.  
 All coders have the option of maintaining anonymity. However, most of those 
recruited to work on the GLP preferred to be publicly identified with their work, and thus 
appear (along with contact information) on the GLP website. This enhances the 
transparency and credibility of the GLP database and also allows the option of contacting 
those involved in the coding, to resolve ambiguities or pursue new collaborative research. 
The data on ethnic groups is coded in the following way. First, the country experts 
were asked to list all politically salient ethnic groups in their country. Fearon’s ethnic groups 
dataset was set as a guide for constructing ethnic groups. In the dataset, Fearon arbitrarily 
counts a cluster of groups on several dimensions—language (e.g., Hindi speakers), 
nationality (Portuguese), religion (Jews), Tribe (Santals) and aggregation levels (i.e. Hindi 
instead of Indo-Aryan languages). Experts were left free to change the list if they disagreed 
with the groupings. Experts were expected to map the ethnic, religious and linguistic group 
composition in their country of expertise. In most cases, linguistic and ethnic groups overlap 
(e.g. Kurdish in Turkey being both an ethnic and linguistic group) whereas in other cases, 
religious and ethnic groups overlap (e.g. Druze in Lebanon being both an ethnic and 
religious group).  Country experts have taken into account self-ascribed as well as “officially 
recognized” group identities while creating the groups in their country. For instance, the 
French state does not collect population census data with ethnic categories. However, it is 
estimated that North African Arabs comprise 5% of the general population.  
Second, country experts were asked to provide the size of each group, relying on 
survey or census data where available. If data on ethnic group size is not available in any 
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sources, then the experts were asked to give estimates. The countries where the ethnic 
identity information of leaders exists but group size information is missing have been 
dropped from the sample. 
Third, country experts identified each political leader with one of the ethnic group 
based on criteria of identity determination, such as self-proclamation, language, birthplace, 
ethnic political party affiliation, etc. There are cases where a leader was coded with multiple 
ethnic identities. In those instances, the GLP team decided to take the minority identity as 
the significant identity of the leader. This way, we avoid the risk of undercounting minority 
groups’	representatives and thus prevent a measurement error.  
Ethnic  Representat ion Scores 
Previous works on descriptive representation (regarding women, ethnic group, etc.) have 
used different versions of disproportionality indices to measure ethnic representation as a 
share of an ethnic group’s seats in the legislature (Ruedin 2009; Hughes 2013; Reynolds 
2006; Kjaer & Elklit 2014). This method is traditionally used to compare electoral outcomes 
across different parties. Two indices dominate the field: the Index of Proportionality of Rose 
(2000) and the Least Square Index of Disproportionality of Gallagher (1991).  
The Rose Index is calculated as 100 minus the sum of the absolute values of the 
vote/seat difference divided by two. The index runs from 0 to 100, with the latter implying 
perfect proportional representation. Ruedin (2009) used the Rose Index because, he argues, 
it enabled him to incorporate multiple ethnic groups at the same time (Ruedin 2009: 339). In 
contrast, the Gallagher Index is more sensitive to weighing larger deviations higher because 
it takes the square of the differences. After taking the square of differences, it takes the 
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square root of the total sum, divides it by 2 and subtracts it from 100. This measure also runs 
from zero to 100. Hughes (2013) used a transformed version of Gallagher Index.  
In this study, I constructed a new index of proportionality based on a transformed 
version of the Rose Index of Proportionality. The Rose Index, in its original formula, 
produces scores ranging from 99.3 to 100 – which amounts to perfect proportional 
representation. I transformed the index to make it more intuitive to interpret. There is one “defined” limit to an index of proportionality – the point of perfect representation. The 
other extreme is undefined, and has no limit. Because it has no limit it makes sense to allow 
it to vary from 0 to infinite, which is what the transformed version of my index allows. In 
my Ethnic Representation Scores, the scores range from 0 to 1.3. A value of 0 denotes 
perfect descriptive representation where all ethnic groups are proportionately represented 
among political leadership. 
                                               ERS= 
|P! − R!|!!!!  
 
In the formula, P is group i’s share of population and R is group i’s share of leaders among 
all political leadership. The variable i is categorical. There are a total number of n groups in 
each country. Lower values of ERS are associated with higher levels of proportionality, 
meaning the difference between the population share and political leadership share is 
smaller. The only country with zero ERS score is South Korea, known to be a homogenous 
country with the absolute majority of Korean ethnicity. 
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 For the data in this study, the measures of Ethnic Representation Scores (as with the 
Rose Index) and Gallagher Index of least squares produce similar results. Differences occur 
when the number of groups increases. The Rose and Gallagher indices are subtracted from 
100 and thus the calculated values are close to 100 whereas ERS starts from 0. Thus when 
interpreting the results, the models’ scores are exactly reversed. When ERS has a positive 
value, the measure of Rose index and Gallagher index should be negative. Otherwise, 
differences among these measures are only minor. The correlation between the three indices 
is extremely high.  
 I present and explore new data on 31,259 leaders and 1017 ethnic groups in 118 
countries from the GLP data. Table A2 lists all ethnic groups (N=1017) included in this 
study, along with their size (share in population) and their representation (share in leadership 
positions). The number of groups per country ranges from 1 (South Korea) to 58 (the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), with a mean of 9.2. Group size ranges from 0 to 100 with a 
mean of 11. Most countries have a modest number of ethnic groups showing a left-skewed 
distribution. All the countries (N=118) in this analysis, the number of elites and their Ethnic 
Representation Scores can be found in Table 3.2. 	
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Table 3.2: 
Country, Elite Size & 
ERS 
 
Country (Elite Size) ERS 
Korea, South (352) 0.0000 
Japan (644) 0.0004 
Lesotho (130) 0.0046 
Singapore (114) 0.0132 
Hungary (354) 0.0138 
Argentina (327) 0.0250 
Mongolia (81) 0.0253 
Tunisia (238) 0.0316 
Iceland (89) 0.0360 
Armenia (182) 0.0384 
Poland (492) 0.0480 
Portugal (255) 0.0480 
Romania (318) 0.0588 
Albania (161) 0.0606 
Malta (91) 0.0721 
Italy (657) 0.0786 
Kosovo (149) 0.0808 
United Kingdom (661) 0.0813 
Philippines (342) 0.0862 
Croatia (196) 0.0916 
China (3104) 0.0957 
Norway (203) 0.1040 
Jamaica (63) 0.1180 
Mexico (602) 0.1227 
Greece (269) 0.1228 
Vietnam (448) 0.1248 
Slovakia (178) 0.1252 
Bulgaria (281) 0.1278 
  
 
 
 
Guinea (213) 0.1362 
Denmark (214) 0.1391 
Honduras (155) 0.1400 
Azerbaijan (145) 0.1406 
Finland (205) 0.1500 
Malaysia (221) 0.1560 
Austria (256) 0.1586 
Yemen (346) 0.1595 
Serbia (298) 0.1599 
Germany (671) 0.1612 
Turkey (544) 0.1629 
Algeria (421) 0.1761 
Colombia (249) 0.1816 
Cuba (676) 0.1896 
Cambodia (200) 0.1900 
France (636) 0.2003 
Slovenia (109) 0.2015 
Kenya (225) 0.2078 
Iran (327) 0.2102 
Pakistan (353) 0.2233 
Russia (239) 0.2253 
Mauritius (76) 0.2305 
Uruguay (129) 0.2400 
Belgium (153) 0.2427 
Thailand (619) 0.2485 
Costa Rica (100) 0.2512 
Namibia (76) 0.2532 
South Africa (396) 0.2575 
Ghana (247) 0.2600 
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Lithuania (163) 0.2624 
United States (484) 0.2626 
Turkmenistan (167) 0.2781 
El Salvador (115) 0.2819 
Uzbekistan (181) 0.2848 
Montenegro (94) 0.2975 
Uganda (333) 0.2980 
Netherlands (167) 0.3001 
Lebanon (134) 0.3003 
India (579) 0.3023 
Czech Republic (207) 0.3221 
Niger (148) 0.3254 
Solomon Islands (60) 0.3263 
Tajikistan (101) 0.3286 
Kyrgyzstan (156) 0.3369 
Belarus (112) 0.3536 
Indonesia (627) 0.3541 
Bolivia (166) 0.3557 
Kazakhstan (153) 
 
Egypt (540) 
0.3672 
 
0.3799 
Nicaragua (114) 0.3919 
Guinea-Bissau (117) 0.4020 
Latvia (113) 0.4029 
Burkina Faso (122) 0.4127 
Trinidad and Tobago (41) 0.4283 
New Zealand (135) 0.4301 
Panama (69) 0.4377 
Estonia (121) 0.4581 
Bahrain (84) 0.4619 
Burundi (138) 0.4681 
Gabon (101) 0.4748 
Liberia (87) 0.4964 
Ethiopia (420) 0.5086 
Venezuela (188) 0.5111 
Moldova (118) 0.5169 
Guyana (83) 0.5185 
Central African Republic (88) 0.5391 
Djibouti (91) 0.5501 
Gambia (61) 0.5523 
Cape Verde (134) 0.5600 
Ivory Coast (231) 0.5762 
Dominican Republic (232) 0.5979 
Cameroon (265) 0.6030 
Morocco (280) 0.6109 
Congo, Republic of (75) 0.6200 
Jordan (172) 0.6249 
Guatemala (185) 0.6250 
Luxembourg (82) 0.6892 
Peru (152) 0.6895 
Rwanda (127) 0.7121 
Paraguay (122) 0.7311 
East Timor (84) 0.7333 
Israel (160) 0.7770 
Ecuador (158) 0.8566 
Saudi Arabia (198) 0.9095 
Oman (127) 0.9128 
Congo, Dem. Republic (527) 0.9484 
Qatar (62) 1.2000 
Australia (204) 1.2908 
Chile (110) 1.3182 
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These countries in the sample are located in Western Europe and Northern America 
(19), Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union (25), Latin America and the Caribbean (21), the 
Middle East and North Africa (14), Asia (15), and sub-Saharan Africa (24) and represent all 
levels of economic development (88 non-OECD & 30 OECD countries). The countries 
included in the analyses are representative of the full sample. Histograms of ERS and 
legislature size are shown in Figure A1 and Figure A2.   
Empirical Analysis 
Regression Models  
To determine the relationship between legislative size and ethnic representation, a series of 
regression models are applied, presented in Table 3.3. The variables were kept in the models 
only if they were theoretically reasonable and indicated a statistically significant effect on 
ethnic representation. The variables in the models are defined in Table C2 and descriptive 
statistics are provided in Table C3. 
The benchmark model (Column 3 in Table 3.3) consists of three explanatory 
variables. First, the causal factor of interest in this study is size of legislature. It is understood 
as the number of seats in legislatures of 118 countries for the relevant electoral periods 
(2010–2013). This data is drawn from the IPU dataset (PARLINE). The size of legislature is 
logged, both in order to attain a normal distribution and to conform to theoretical 
expectation that there is a linear relationship between legislative size and ethnic 
representation. One other way to measure legislative size can be seat-constituent or seat-
person ratios, as utilized in previous works (Allen & Stoll 2014; Stoll 2013). However, 
measuring legislative size as a combined variable (with population) does not do a good job in 
estimating its impact on the model. Although there is a strong link between the legislature 
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size and population size, it also known that they do not grow in tandem (Allen and Stoll 
2014). There are cases where population growth is not reflected in legislative size (e.g. Peru, 
a country of thirty million population with 130 seats) or a larger legislature exists despite a 
relatively small population (e.g. Cuba, a country of eleven million people, with 612 seats). 
A second explanatory variable is regime-type, which one expects theoretically to 
affect the level of ethnic representation, with democracies scoring higher in terms of ethnic 
representation. To test this assumption, this study includes Polity 2, drawn from the Polity 
IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010), which is the famous summary index of 
democracy. It ranges from -10 to +10. A country’s polity score (Polity2) is likely to influence 
the descriptive representation of ethnic groups. Several other democracy measures, such as 
the stock of democracy (Gerring et al. 2012) are tested to see whether the model holds. 
However, the results are not presented because the stock of democracy does not seem to 
have any significant effect on ethnic representation.  
The third important explanatory variable is the ethnic fractionalization measure, 
which indicates the ethnic diversity of a country by taking into account all ethnic groups and 
their respective share in the population. The composition of ethnicity in a society has a large 
impact on ethnic representation. To show this impact, a new ethnic fractionalization index is 
constructed (GLP_elf) on the basis of GLP’s dataset listing ethnic groups and their relative 
size. The Herfindhal formula is used to calculate the new ethnic fractionalization index. The 
resulting index provides us with a slightly better distribution of observations as well as 
complete data for the entire sample of the countries in the analysis. The correlation matrix of 
ethnic fractionalization indices, including nearly all samples of the countries in the analysis. 
(Table C4), shows that the GLP_elf measure is reliable.  
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Table 3.3:  
Regression Models 	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator 
Sample 
OLS 
Entire 
OLS 
Entire 
OLS 
Entire 
OLS 
Entire 
OLS 
-China 
OLS 
Reduced 
       
Legislative Size (ln) -0.111*** -0.122*** -0.0765** -0.0778*** -0.0764** -0.0782** 
 (0.0321) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0284) (0.0309) (0.0388) 
Polity2  -0.0101** -0.00698* -0.00467 -0.00472 -0.00607 
  (0.00405) (0.00377) (0.00386) (0.00385) (0.0126) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.437*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.746*** 
   (0.0807) (0.102) (0.102) (0.126) 
Reserved Seats    -0.0409 -0.0398 -0.0373 
    (0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0439) 
GDP per Capita (ln)    0.0214 0.0213 0.0649** 
    (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0303) 
District Magnitude     -0.000186*** -0.000211** -2.41e-05 
    (7.07e-05) (9.53e-05) (0.000544) 
America    0.103* 0.103* 0.135** 
    (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0650) 
Asia    -0.0104 -0.00976 0.0958 
    (0.0695) (0.0696) (0.0668) 
Africa    0.0555 0.0549 0.0443 
    (0.0708) (0.0709) (0.0787) 
Middle East/North Africa   0.176** 0.173** 0.0134 
    (0.0823) (0.0847) (0.0692) 
Former British Colony    -0.135** -0.135** -0.334** 
    (0.0524) (0.0523) (0.139) 
PR Electoral System      -0.00868 
      (0.117) 
Mixed Electoral System      -0.0917 
      (0.121) 
Constant 0.885*** 0.994*** 0.565*** 0.335 0.330 -0.124 
 (0.172) (0.167) (0.179) (0.285) (0.287) (0.325) 
       
Observations 118 116 116 116 115 70 
R-squared 0.107 0.184 0.397 0.499 0.495 0.647 
 
Outcome: ERS. OLS = Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses  
***p<0.01,  **p<0.05, * p<0.1(two-tailed test) 
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To consider in detail at the other columns in Table 3.3, Model 1 is the minimal base 
model where I regress logged legislature size against ethnic representation scores. Obviously, 
the effect is minimal. But the model demonstrates the relationship that the smaller the 
legislature size (-) the greater the ethnic disproportionality (+) in a country.  One percent 
change in legislative size is associated with 0.0011 decrease in ethnic representation score. 
In Model 2, the democracy measure Polity2 is introduced to the model, which 
increases the variance of the model. The literature on ethnic representation is based on the 
assumption that ethnic representation is greater in democracies. This model shows that the 
assumption holds empirically. The relationship between democracy and ethnic 
representation is positive in all models.  
In Model 3, ethnic fractionalization is included. Evidently, the ethnic composition of 
a society has a very large impact on ethnic representation, which is not surprising. All 
measures of ethnic fractionalization demonstrate a statistically significant and always negative 
effect on outcome variables in the benchmark equation. Greater ethnic fractionalization 
appears to lead to lower ethnic representation in elite positions, presumably because it is 
more difficult to incorporate different groups in a more heterogeneous society. The 
democracy level, as measured by Polity2, seems to have a positive but slight impact on 
representation.  
In Model 4, additional control variables are introduced. The sign (-) and significance 
of legislative size holds in all models. Two important control variables are included to test 
the effect of other institutional factors on ethnic representation. First, the existence of the 
reserved seats—a dummy variable—appears to have only very little impact on the outcome 
variable, all other things being equal. Second, district magnitude seems to have positive and 
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significant impact on ethnic representation. The greater the mean district magnitude of the 
lower house, the higher is the ethnic representation in a country.  
A series of regional dummies are also included to test unmeasured regional 
characteristics that might shape ethnic representation. All regions except Europe, which has 
the highest regional mean of ERS, are included. Being a country in the Americas (specifically 
Latin America), Africa, or the Middle East and North Africa has a negative impact on ethnic 
representation. Figures C3 and C4 in appendix show the regional distributions of ERS 
scores. Lastly, the model also suggests that former British colonies appear to have higher 
ethnic representation. A time-series analysis would help to illuminate this finding in future 
research.   
Model 5 removes the largest legislature, China, from the sample to test whether this 
country (with 3000 seats in parliament) is an influential case that drives the relationship. The 
results indicate that China is not an influential case in the model since both the coefficient of 
the legislative size and the	variance of the model does not change. 
The next Model (6) is a reduced sample where PR and mixed electoral system 
dummy variables are included. The PR and mixed electoral systems appear to have a slight 
positive impact on ethnic representation compared to majoritarian electoral systems (base 
variable).  While the literature on women’s representation indicates a strong relationship 
between a PR electoral system and representation, this finding in this study supports Ruedin 
(2009), who argues that PR electoral systems do not seem to have a significant effect on 
ethnic descriptive representation.  
The resulting sample for all these tests consists of 118 observations. However, the 
size of the sample drops to 116 in some models due to missing data in different covariates.  
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Alternate Outcomes and Specifications 
As previously stated, the empirical literature on ethnic representation is mostly confined to 
case studies of single or a few nations. Therefore, I had to mine the literature on women’s 
representation as well as ethnic representation to identify specifications for this study.  
In Table 3.4, different specifications are applied. First, I experiment with different 
measures of outcome variables. In the first two columns, different outcomes measures that 
are discussed in the previous section are introduced to the benchmark model. The first 
column focuses on ERS—Ethnic Representation Scores based on a transformed version of 
Rose Index—as the outcome variable used in this study.  Column 2 focuses on the Gallagher 
Index of Disproportionality. Since the range of different indices differs, the sign of 
coefficients differ as expected. Gallagher index is reverse compared to ERS. The signs of the 
coefficients in these two columns are opposite, but they are mathematically the same.  
Column 3 focuses on ERS for all political elite (rather than only Parliamentarians) in 
a country. Data for different elite categories were collected for the GLP. Comparing column 
1 and column 3 proves the model holds well with the ERS measure calculated for all political 
elite. 
In Column 4, I employed an interaction term between Polity2 and legislature size to 
further check whether legislature size matters differently for countries with varying degrees 
of democracy.  One would think that legislature size matters more for democratic countries 
than autocratic ones. However, the results for the interaction term are not significant. The 
inclusion of the interaction term does not change the performance of the legislature size. In 
several other models that I haven’t listed here, I also tested different democracy measures 
instead of Polity2 in order to see whether a change in variable makes any difference.  
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Table 3.4:  
Alternate Outcomes and Specifications 
 
            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome  
Estimator 
Effect  
Functional Form  
 
ERS 
OLS 
Main 
Linear 
Gallagher 
OLS 
Main 
Linear 
ERS_All 
OLS 
Main  
Linear 
ERS 
OLS 
Interaction 
Linear 
ERS 
OLS 
Main 
Quadratic 
ERS 
Logit 
Main 
Linear 
    Benchmark Model    
 
Leg. Size (ln) 
 
-0.0765** 
 
0.0532*** 
 
-0.0950*** 
 
-0.0787** 
  
-1.040898** 
 (0.0300) (0.0137) (0.0307) (0.0331)  (0.377467) 
Leg. Size#Polity2    0.000723   
    (0.00440)   
Leg. Size     -0.000335**  
     (0.000140)  
Leg. Size (Sq)      8.47e-08*  
     (4.38e-08) 
 
 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R-squared 
Log Likelihood  
 
 
 
 
Leg. Size (ln)  
 
Leg. Size#Polity2 
 
Leg. Size 
 
Leg. Size (Sq) 
 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
Log Likelihood 
 
0.397 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0778*** 
(0.0284) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
0.499 
0.170 
 
 
 
  Maximal 
 
0.0495*** 
(0.0134) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
0.323 
0.370 
 
 
 
Model  
 
-0.0921*** 
(0.0299) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
0.477 
0.398 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0001972** 
(.0000674) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
0.448 
 
 
0.383 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000382** 
(0.000158) 
9.49e-08* 
(5.27e-08) 
 
116 
0.456 
 
 
 
28.41 
 
 
 
 
-1.498634** 
(0.5306981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
33.82 
 
Benchmark covariates = Legislative size (ln), GLP_ELF, Polity2.  Maximal Covariates = Benchmark+ 
Mean District Magnitude, GDP per Capita (ln), Reserved Seats (dummy), Former British colony 
(dummy), Regional dummies (Africa, Middle East/North Africa, Americas, Asia).  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
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  In Column 5, I explore the possibility of non-linearity with quadratic terms (i.e. 
Legislative size squared). With the introduction of squared legislative size into the model, the 
main results hold confirming a quadratic relationship between legislative size and ethnic 
representation. However, the effect is extremely small and barely significant. Theoretically, 
there is no reason to expect the relationship between ethnic representation and legislative 
size to be curvilinear rather than linear. Hence, the regression models in this analysis are 
treated as linear.  
In Column 6, I recoded the outcome variable (ERS) into a binary dummy variable 
and ran logistic regression. I coded 1 if the country’s ERS score is greater than 0.3 (median) 
and 0 if otherwise. The results show that in countries with greater disproportionality (higher 
ERS but lower ethnic representation) the legislative size decreases. Thus, our main result 
holds when we change the estimator.  
In a second test, a maximal model with additional covariates was tested. Empirical 
literature on ethnic descriptive representation is in short supply due to data unavailability. 
The only important variables taken from the literature is the presence of reserved seats for 
ethnic groups and district magnitude in lower house. In countries with reserved seats, ethnic 
description representation is unnaturally imposed in the legislature. Data was collected and 
cross-checked from multiple sources (Htun 2004; IDEA 2006; Krook 2007). A binary 
variable was created to show countries having reserved seats for ethnic groups. The data on 
district magnitude (lower house) is taken from QoG dataset.  
Additional covariates are borrowed from literature on women’s representation. The 
relationship between these additional covariates to ethnic descriptive representation is not 
established theoretically and empirically. The additional confounders include: GDP per 
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capita (natural logarithm), dummies to represent different regions of the world (Africa, 
Americas, Asia, Middle East/North Africa) and Former British colony.  
Instrumental Variable Analysis  
None of the tests listed above were quasi-experimental in nature. However, there is one 
opportunity for quasi-experimental design where the presumed influence of population to 
ethnic representation can be tested. Legislative size can be altered for a number of factors 
(i.e., change in government size, district magnitude, population). However, population size 
of a polity can hardly change unless there are unusual reasons (such as war or migration).  
 There are three principles for assigning an instrument to a factor (Gerring 2013). 
First, the instrument variable (population) should be correlated with the explanatory variable 
(legislative size). This holds for the relationship between population and legislative size, as 
legislative size is causally downstream from population (Taagepera 1989; Dahl and Tufte 
1973). Second, the instrument variable (population) should have no causal impact on the 
outcome variable except through the explanatory variable (legislative size). This is called 
exclusion restriction. We know that legislative sizes have been changed due to population 
growth (Taagepera 1989; Dahl and Tufte 1973). However, change in the population size has 
no known direct effect on ethnic representation. It seems possible that general population 
growth will lead to growth of minority ethnic groups as well, which might then enhance 
ethnic representation. However, this backdoor from X to Y is at least partially blocked since 
the model conditions for ethnic fractionalization: in a cross-sectional model, the possibility 
of confounding causes due to simultaneous changes in population and ethnic 
fractionalization is minimal Last, there should be no unconditioned confounders associated 
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with the relationship between instrument and outcome variables.  
 If this quasi-experiment is correct, population (WDI Population, logarithm) can 
serve as an instrumental variable for legislative size in a two-stage regression analysis. In the 
first stage, the instrument is regressed against the causal factor (legislative size) and this 
accounts for 32 % of the variance. In the second stage, legislative size is regressed against the 
fitted values of the first analysis, as shown in Table 3.5. The results show that legislative size 
is still a significant causal factor when population is considered an instrumental variable and 
thus confirm our main finding. This indicates the causal effect for those countries whose 
legislative size is determined by their population, but not for others (Angrist and Piscke 
2009; Gerring and Maguire 2012). 
 
Table 3.5 
Instrumental Variable Analysis 
	
 (1a) (1b) 
Sample  
Estimator 
 
Stage  
Entire 
2SLS 
 
1st stage 
Entire 
2SLS 
 
2nd stage 
Legislative Size (ln)  -0.0849*** 
  (0.0223) 
Polity2 -0.0014593 -0.00701* 
 (.0098943) (0.00376) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.7491684*** 0.430*** 
 
Population  
 
Constant 
(0.2092897) 
2.24e-09*** 
(3.51e-10) 
5.319201*** 
(0.0767) 
 
 
0.612*** 
 (.1236408) 
 
(0.135) 
Observations 116 116 
R-squared 0.325 0.395 
	
Outcome: ERS. 2SLS= Two-Stage Least Squares.  
Instrument: Population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.		
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Discussion  
Our knowledge of ethnic representation has been severely limited due to lack of data until 
very recently, when a surge of interest in ethnic representation increased the number of 
empirical studies in this field. Measurement and operationalization of ethnicity is a daunting 
task, but there are ways to address it—such as creating a new dataset. This study draws on 
the GLP data where country experts have coded ethnic identities of political leaders in 118 
countries. The resulting dataset, which allows analysis at multiple levels across countries and 
regions, is unique. The descriptive data that this study provides can be used in many studies 
to further elaborate institutional, cultural and socioeconomic factors underpinning ethnic 
representation.  
 The results show that levels of ethnic descriptive representation vary significantly 
among countries. They range from 1.3 in Chile to almost perfect representation in South 
Korea. The mean representation score is 0.33, with a standard deviation of 0.27. The 
histogram of ERS (Figure A1) demonstrates a left-skewed distribution where 90 of countries 
have ethnic representation scores below 0.5. If the relatively homogenous countries (i.e. 
Iceland, South Korea, Japan, Lesotho) are excluded, the distribution does not seem to 
change. 
 This study confirms the finding of previous works, which assert that ethnic minority 
groups are underrepresented: Ethnic minority groups are generally underrepresented all over 
the world. Despite the rhetoric of the principle of political equality (Geissner 1997), the 
political integration of ethnic minorities appears to be incomplete even in democracies. 
However, this study breaks with previous works because it introduces a new institutional 
variable, namely legislative size, along with new cross-national data on ethnic representation. 
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The conventional approach of studying only electoral factors to explain the variation in 
ethnic representation fails to unfold the impact of other institutional factors. This study 
offers a new way of approaching institutional factors affecting levels of ethnic 
representation.  
Furthermore, this study argues that there is a causal relationship between legislative 
size and ethnic descriptive representation at the cross-national level. Various regression tests 
indicate that larger legislative size increases the level of ethnic descriptive representation. 
Furthermore, the ethnic composition of a society has a very large impact on ethnic 
representation. The higher the ethnic heterogeneity in a society, the lower the ethnic 
representation.   
The empirical section of this study shows that the causal relationship between 
legislative size and ethnic descriptive representation holds in cross-national tests. A wide 
range of specifications, samples and outcome measures, including an instrumental analysis, 
were conducted to show the robustness of this relationship.  
There has been an increasing interest among scholars, practitioners and politicians in 
the use of special electoral institutions, such as reserved seats and quotas, designed to 
increase descriptive representation of socially disadvantaged groups (more specifically of 
women). This study shows that legislative size deserves to be discussed alongside other 
electoral institutions for higher representation. The impact of legislative size should be tested 
in various types of representation, such as women’s or youth representation. Another topic 
that requires further study is the relationship between legislative size and representation in a 
time-series analysis. 
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Appendix C: 
Table C1: 
Countries, Groups, Size, and Representation 
 
This table, including the data for benchmark analyses in Table 3.3 and 3., lists all countries, all ethnic 
groups, and – for each group – its representation. Note that the size of ethnic groups may not add to 
100% if smaller groups are unidentified (and therefore missing).  
 
 
Albania 
Albanian 95.00 94.40 
Roma (Komuniteti Rom) 2.28 0.00 
Cham (Komuniteti Çam) 1.36 1.86 
Greek (Minoriteti Grek) 1.17 2.50 
Macedonian (Maqedonas) 0.14 0.00 
Vlach (Minoriteti Vllah) 0.03 1.24 
Serbian/Montenegrin 0.02 0.00 
Algeria 
Arab 86.00 77.19 
Berber 14.00 22.80 
Argentina 
White 98.50 97.24 
Jewish 0.80 1.52 
Mestizo 0.70 1.22 
Armenia 
Armenian 98.04 99.45 
Kurdish 1.30 0.00 
Russian 0.46 0.00 
Assyrian 0.11 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.05 0.00 
Greek 0.04 0.55 
Australia 
Australian 31.13 98.53 
British 27.00 0.49 
Irish 9.08 0.00 
Scottish 6.26 0.00 
Italian 3.35 0.00 
German 3.19 0.00 
Chinese 2.64 0.00 
Aboriginal 2.50 0.49 
Greek 1.44 0.00 
Dutch 1.22 0.00 
Indian 0.92 0.00 
Lebanese 0.72 0.00 
Vietnamese 0.68 0.00 
Polish 0.64 0.00 
Filipino 0.63 0.00 
Maltese 0.61 0.00 
Croatian 0.46 0.00 
French 0.39 0.00 
Serbian 0.38 0.00 
Maori 0.37 0.00 
South African 0.31 0.49 
Austria 
Austrian 90.90 98.82 
Turkish 2.30 0.39 
Serbian 2.20 0.39 
German 1.70 0.39 
Czech 0.70 0.00 
Croatian 0.60 0.00 
Hungarian 0.40 0.00 
Bosnian 0.40 0.00 
Slovene 0.30 0.00 
Roma 0.30 0.00 
Slovak 0.20 0.00 
Azerbaijan 
Azeri 90.60 96.56 
Lezgin 2.20 0.69 
Russian 1.80 0.69 
Armenian 1.50 0.00 
Talysh 1.00 0.69 
Avar 0.60 0.00 
Tatarian 0.40 0.00 
Sakhur 0.20 0.00 
Georgian 0.20 0.69 
Kurdish 0.20 0.00 
Tat 0.13 0.00 
Jewish 0.10 0.69 
Bahrain 
Baharna 50.00 33.00 
Sunni Arab 30.00 51.00 
Ajam 10.00 3.60 
Huwala 10.00 12.00 
Belarus 
Belarusian 83.70 72.32 
Russian 8.30 24.10 
Polish 3.10 0.00 
Ukranian 1.70 3.57 
Belgium 
Flemish 58.00 56.86 
Walloon 31.00 43.13 
Other (Mixed) 7.20 0.00 
Moroccan 1.80 0.00 
Turkish 1.80 0.00 
Congolese 0.20 0.00 
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Bolivia 
Mestizo 61.10 74.09 
White 19.90 3.61 
Indigenous 17.00 21.68 
Black 1.42 0.60 
Cholo 0.67 0.00 
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian 84.00 90.39 
Turkish 9.40 9.25 
Roma 5.00 0.36 
Pomak 1.60 0.00 
Burkina Faso 
Mossi 
Fulani 
45.37 
12.70 
50.72 
6.52 
Gurmantche 5.44 7.97 
Bissa 
Dagari 
3.62 
3.52 
11.59 
1.45 
Lobi 2.59 2.90 
Bwaba 2.54 2.17 
Nuni 2.31 2.17 
Sane 2.17 0.72 
Lele 2.04 1.45 
Bobo 1.95 1.45 
Marka Dafing 1.81 5.80 
Kurumba/Fulse 1.77 0.00 
Dogon 
Senoufo 
1.22 
1.27 
5.07 
0.00 
Songhai 1.13 0.00 
Kasena 1.08 0.00 
Birifor 0.99 0.00 
Burundi 
Hutu 85.00 61.59 
Tutsi 14.00 36.23 
Twa 1.00 2.17 
Cambodia 
Khmer 90.00 99.50 
Vietnamese 5.00 0.00 
Chams 2.10 0.50 
Chinese 1.00 0.00 
Cameroon 
Bamiléké 29.00 12.45 
Kirdi 18.00 9.06 
Sawa (Bassa - Bakoko - Douala) 12.00 10.19 
Pahouin (Béti, Bulu, Fang) 12.00 25.28 
Islamo-Peuhl/Fulani 11.00 18.87 
North Westerners/Bamenda 8.00 10.19 
Eastern Nigritic / Easterners 7.00 4.15 
South Westerners 2.10 7.55 
Bamoun 0.90 2.26 
Cape Verde 
Mestizo/Mulatto 71.00 98.51 
Black 28.00 0.00 
White 1.00 1.49 
Central African Rep 
Gbaya 33.00 45.45 
Banda 27.00 13.63 
Mandjia 13.00 5.68 
Sara 10.00 9.09 
Mbum 7.00 1.14 
Yakoma 4.00 7.95 
Mbaka (Bwaka) 4.00 12.50 
Nzandé-Nzakara 3.00 4.54 
Chile 
Mestizo 68.00 9.09 
White 25.00 90.90 
Indigenous  7.00 0.00 
China 
Han Chinese 91.50 86.82 
Zhuang 1.28 1.55 
Man 0.84 1.32 
Hui 0.77 2.03 
Other 0.73 1.32 
Miao 0.71 0.68 
Uyghur 0.66 0.87 
Tujia 0.63 0.71 
Yi 0.61 0.61 
Mongolian 0.46 1.22 
Tibetan 0.43 1.12 
Dong 0.23 0.19 
Bouyei 0.23 0.32 
Yao 0.21 0.19 
Bai 0.15 0.13 
Korean 0.15 0.29 
Hani 0.11 0.13 
Li 0.10 0.13 
Dai 0.10 0.16 
Kazak 0.10 0.19 
Colombia 
Mestizo 85.40 94.78 
Black 10.60 4.02 
Indigenous 3.40 1.20 
Congo 
Lari 22.00 26.67 
Teke 17.00 16.00 
Kongo 16.00 4.00 
Mbochi 12.00 30.67 
Yombe 8.00 0.00 
Vili 7.00 12.00 
Mbete 6.00 2.67 
Sangha 5.00 1.33 
Sundi 3.00 0.00 
Kouyou (Kuyu) 3.00 5.33 
Bembe 1.00 1.33 
Congo, DRC 
Balubakat 8.60 5.31 
Baluba 8.00 5.50 
Mbala 8.00 3.61 
Kusu 4.00 0.38 
 152 
 
Hema 4.00 2.10 
Lendu 4.00 3.98 
Bazimba 3.00 0.57 
Muzula (Bazula) 3.00 0.00 
Humbu 3.00 0.19 
Besi-Ngombe 2.90 0.19 
Komo 2.83 0.76 
Lamba 2.50 0.38 
Tabwa 2.50 1.14 
Lega (Rega) 2.00 2.66 
Fulero 2.00 0.76 
Ntandu 2.00 0.76 
Tutsi 2.00 0.19 
Kunda 2.00 0.19 
Teke 2.00 0.00 
Mbuun (Mbunda) 1.90 2.28 
Lwende 1.90 0.38 
Ngombe 1.60 4.36 
Kete 1.50 0.38 
Sakata 1.40 1.32 
Hutu 1.40 3.04 
Mputu 1.30 0.38 
Hemba 1.20 0.76 
Tembo 1.20 0.19 
Havu 1.20 0.95 
Pende 1.20 3.41 
Ngbandi 1.00 1.33 
Nande 1.00 5.12 
Ngengele 1.00 0.38 
Bayombe 1.00 2.85 
Cokwe 1.00 2.47 
Yaka 0.90 0.76 
Manyanga (Lari) 0.90 3.98 
Bangubangu 0.80 0.95 
Kuba 0.70 0.38 
Ruund 0.70 2.08 
Luluwa 0.70 5.69 
Shi 0.60 3.04 
Tetela 0.60 2.47 
Yansi 0.60 3.04 
Anamongo 0.60 11.01 
Sanga 0.60 0.76 
Hunde 0.50 1.52 
Lele 0.50 0.38 
Babemba 0.40 2.28 
Kanyok 0.40 0.76 
Bekalebwe 0.30 0.76 
Bena Milembwe 0.30 0.19 
Beneki 0.14 0.00 
Basongye 0.13 1.14 
Bena Kiofwe 
Bena Majiba 
Bakoji  
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
Costa Rica 
White or Mestizo 87.40 100.00 
Mulatto 7.00 0.00 
Indigenous 2.62 0.00 
Black 1.10 0.00 
Chinese 1.00 0.00 
Cote D'Ivoire 
Akan 41.20 31.60 
Voltaic 17.60 6.93 
Northern Mande 16.50 33.77 
Krou 12.70 24.24 
Western(Southern) Mande 10.00 3.46 
Croatia 
Croats 89.90 92.86 
Serbs 4.60 3.06 
Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) 0.47 0.51 
Italians 0.44 0.51 
Hungarian 0.40 0.51 
Albanian 0.34 0.00 
Slovenian 0.30 0.51 
Czech 0.24 0.51 
Roma 0.22 0.51 
Macedonian 0.10 0.00 
Slovak 0.10 0.00 
Cuba 
White 65.10 55.62 
Mulatto & Mestizo 24.80 27.51 
Black 10.10 16.86 
Czech Rep 
Czech 94.90 80.19 
Moravian 3.70 19.81 
Denmark 
Danish 90.00 97.66 
Turkish 1.10 1.40 
Greenlandic Or Inuits 1.01 0.00 
Faroese 0.90 0.00 
German 0.60 0.00 
Iraqi 0.50 0.00 
Bosnian 0.40 0.00 
Lebanese 0.40 0.00 
Somalian 0.40 0.00 
Pakistani 0.40 0.93 
Norwegian 0.30 0.00 
Iranian 0.30 0.00 
Yugoslavian (Former) 0.30 0.00 
Swedish 0.30 0.00 
Djibouti 
Adoimara (Afar) 34.00 39.56 
Issa (Somali) 33.00 54.95 
Gadaboursi (Somali) 14.50 2.20 
Isaak (Somali) 12.00 2.20 
Arab 3.00 1.10 
European 2.00 0.00 
Asaimara (Afar) 1.00 0.00 
Darod (Somali) 0.50 0.00 
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Dominican Rep 
Mulatto 73.00 43.10 
White 16.00 40.09 
Black 11.00 16.81 
Ecuador 
Mestizo 76.00 41.78 
White/European 10.50 50.00 
Afro-Ecuadorian 4.97 0.00 
Quichua 3.72 5.06 
Lebanese 0.80 1.90 
Shuar 0.38 1.27 
Chachi 0.05 0.00 
Tsa'chila 0.02 0.00 
Awa 0.02 0.00 
Achuar 0.02 0.00 
Huaorani 0.01 0.00 
A'l Cofan 0.01 0.00 
Egypt 
Egyptian 
Romani  
Bedouin 
96.00 
2.00 
1.00 
98.70 
0.00 
0.00 
Nubian 1.00 1.30 
El Salvador 
Mestizo 86.80 73.04 
White 12.90 26.96 
Amerindian 0.23 0.00 
Black 0.13 0.00 
Estonia 
Estonian 68.80 91.74 
Russian 25.60 8.26 
Ukrainian 2.07 0.00 
Byelorussian 1.16 0.00 
Finn 0.79 0.00 
Ethiopia 
Oromo 34.50 45.24 
Amhara 26.90 34.76 
Somali 6.20 5.95 
Tigre 6.10 10.48 
Sidama 4.00 0.00 
Other 3.87 0.00 
Gurage 2.50 0.24 
Welaita 2.30 0.71 
Hadiya 1.75 0.24 
Afar 1.70 2.14 
Gamo 1.50 0.00 
Gedeo 1.32 0.00 
Kefficho 1.20 0.00 
Silte 1.13 0.00 
Kambata 0.85 0.00 
Awi 0.85 0.00 
Dawro 0.74 0.00 
Goffa 0.49 0.00 
Bench 0.47 0.00 
Agaw 0.36 0.00 
Konso 0.34 0.00 
Gumuz 0.22 0.00 
Yem 0.22 0.00 
Nuer 0.20 0.00 
Anuak 0.12 0.00 
Hamer 0.06 0.00 
Irob 0.05 0.00 
Surma 0.04 0.00 
Issa 0.03 0.00 
Kunama 0.01 0.00 
Finland 
Finn 92.50 100.00 
Swedish 6.00 0.00 
Russian 0.50 0.00 
France 
French 89.46 99.21 
Algerian 2.44 0.00 
Moroccan 2.00 0.00 
Sub-Saharan African 1.72 0.00 
French overseas depts. & 
territories 1.21 0.31 
Portuguese 0.78 0.00 
Tunisian 0.76 0.00 
Turkish 0.70 0.00 
Other Asian 0.37 0.00 
Italian 0.28 0.00 
Spanish 0.21 0.47 
Cambodian/Vietnamian/Laotian 0.07 0.00 
Gabon 
Fang 34.00 36.63 
Bapounou 18.00 13.86 
M'beté 10.00 0.00 
Nzebi 8.00 8.91 
Kota 6.00 3.96 
Eschira 5.00 0.99 
Omyene (Myene) 4.00 11.88 
French 3.00 0.00 
Tsogo 2.00 1.98 
Mpongwe 1.00 3.96 
Apindji 1.00 0.99 
Duma 1.00 0.00 
Baloumbou 1.00 0.99 
Mpongwe 1.00 3.96 
Vili 1.00 1.98 
Gambia 
Mandinka 43.60 31.15 
Fula 18.00 21.31 
Wolof 16.00 8.19 
Jola 10.00 29.50 
Serahule 9.00 1.64 
Serer 2.00 6.55 
Mandjak 1.40 1.64 
Germany 
German 91.00 98.76 
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Turkish 1.99 0.79 
Italian 0.62 0.00 
Polish 0.60 0.00 
Serbian 0.35 0.00 
Greek 0.34 0.00 
Russian 0.30 0.00 
Croatian 0.26 0.00 
Austrian 0.20 0.45 
Bosnian 0.20 0.00 
Dutch 0.17 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.15 0.00 
Spanish 0.13 0.00 
American 0.13 0.00 
Portuguese 0.12 0.00 
China 0.12 0.00 
French 0.10 0.00 
British 0.10 0.00 
Vietnamese 0.10 0.00 
Bulgarian 0.09 0.00 
Iranian 0.05 0.00 
Swiss 0.04 0.00 
Ghana 
Akan 49.20 55.06 
Mole-Dagbon 16.50 21.05 
Ewe 12.67 10.53 
Ga-Dangbe 7.96 10.53 
Guan 4.35 2.02 
Gurma 3.89 0.00 
Grunsi 2.81 0.81 
Mande 1.10 0.00 
Greece 
Greek 93.86 100.00 
Albanian 4.42 0.00 
Bulgarian 0.39 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.18 0.00 
Pakistani 0.14 0.00 
Russian 0.12 0.00 
Georgian 0.12 0.00 
Indian 0.09 0.00 
Guatemala 
Mestizo 59.56 90.81 
Indigenous Maya 39.70 9.19 
Indigenous Non-Maya 0.20 0.00 
Garifuna 0.04 0.00 
Guinea 
Fulani/Peul 41.00 35.68 
Mande 30.70 32.39 
Soso/Susu/Mande Fu 20.00 21.60 
Guerze/Kpele 3.10 4.69 
Kisi/Kisie 2.90 1.41 
Toma/Loma 2.30 4.23 
Guinea-Bissau 
Balanta 28.00 9.40 
Fulani 20.00 27.35 
Mandinga 18.00 22.22 
Manjaco 12.00 13.67 
Papel 11.00 18.80 
Mancanhi 8.00 8.55 
Guyana 
East Indian 43.50 37.35 
Black 30.20 51.80 
Mixed 16.70 6.02 
Amerindian & Indigenous  9.10 0.00 
Chinese & Portuguese 0.50 4.82 
Honduras 
Mestizo 90.00 95.48 
Indigenous 7.00 0.00 
Black 2.00 3.23 
White 1.00 1.29 
Hungary 
Hungarian 97.89 98.59 
Roma 2.00 1.41 
Jewish 0.10 0.00 
Iceland 
White 98.20 100.00 
Other 1.80 0.00 
                            India   
Hindi (Indo-Aryan, Central) 41.03 30.22 
Bengali (Indo-Aryan, Eastern) 8.11 7.60 
Telugu (Dravidian) 7.19 7.43 
Marathi (Indo-Aryan, Southern) 6.99 10.54 
Tamil (Dravidian) 5.91 7.78 
Bihari 5.54 6.74 
Urdu Muslim (Indo-Aryan, 
Central) 5.01 4.14 
Gujarati (Indo-Aryan, Western) 4.48 3.63 
Kannadiga (Dravidian) 3.69 5.01 
Malayalam (Dravidian) 3.21 4.66 
Oriya (Indo-Aryan, Eastern) 3.21 3.11 
Punjabis (Indo-Aryan, 
Northwestern) 2.83 4.15 
Assamese (Indo-Aryan, Eastern) 1.28 1.90 
Maithili (Indo-Aryan, Eastern) 1.18 1.00 
Bhili/Bhilodi (Western Indo-
Aryan) 0.93 0.00 
Santhali (Munda Family) 0.63 0.17 
Gurjar 0.60 0.00 
Kashmiri (Indo-Aryan, Dardic) 0.54 0.00 
Bodo (Tibeto-Burman) 0.40 0.00 
Nepali (Indo-Aryan, Northern) 0.28 0.00 
Gondi (Central Dravidian) 0.26 0.00 
Sindhi (Indo-Aryan, 
Northwestern) 0.25 0.00 
Konkani (Indo-Aryan, Southern) 0.24 0.52 
Dogri (Indo-Aryan, Northwestern) 0.22 0.17 
Khandeshi (Indo-Aryan) 0.20 0.00 
Tulu (Southern Dravidian) 0.17 0.17 
Kurukh (Northern Dravidian) 0.17 0.00 
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Manipuri (Tibeto-Burman) 0.14 0.35 
Mundari (Austro-Asiatic Family) 0.11 0.00 
Khasi (Austro-Asiatic Family) 0.11 0.35 
Ho (Austroasiatic language family) 0.10 0.00 
Mizo 0.01 0.35 
Indonesia 
Javanese 41.70 44.50 
Sundanese 15.40 13.23 
Other 10.30 0.00 
Malay 3.40 3.51 
Madurese 3.30 1.28 
Batak 3.00 5.74 
Minangkabau 2.70 4.47 
Betawi 2.50 0.16 
Bugis 2.50 5.10 
Bantenese 2.10 2.55 
Banjar 1.70 1.91 
Balinese 1.50 2.07 
Sasak 1.30 1.44 
Dayak 1.30 0.80 
Makassarese 1.00 0.96 
Moluccan 0.90 0.96 
Acehnese 0.90 2.23 
Timorese 0.90 0.64 
Chinese 0.86 1.44 
Floresian 0.80 1.44 
Papuan 0.50 1.75 
Gorontalo (Hulandalo) 0.48 0.64 
Minahasa 0.30 1.44 
Indo (mixed Indonesian & 
European) 0.24 0.16 
Mandar 0.20 0.32 
Sumbawa/Semawa 0.16 0.16 
Ambonese 0.06 0.64 
Arab 0.01 0.48 
Iran 
Persian 58.00 51.99 
Azerbaijani (Azari) 16.00 17.74 
Kurdish 7.00 4.89 
Gilaki 4.00 4.59 
Arabs 4.00 5.81 
Mazandarani 4.00 4.89 
Turkmen 2.00 0.61 
Lurs 2.00 7.34 
Baluchis 2.00 2.14 
Bakhtiari 1.00 0.00 
                             Israel   
Sephardi 50.30 28.25 
Ashkenazi 23.30 61.25 
Arab 20.00 6.87 
Bedouin 3.50 0.62 
Druze 1.60 2.50 
Ethiopian 1.30 0.62 
Italy 
Italian 95.46 99.39 
Romanian 1.35 0.00 
North African 1.03 0.15 
Albanian 0.75 0.00 
Franco-Provencal & 
French/Occitan 0.51 0.00 
German 0.51 0.46 
Chinese 0.29 0.00 
Slovene 0.10 0.00 
Jamaica 
Black 91.30 87.30 
East Indian 3.30 4.76 
British 1.27 3.17 
Lebanese 0.98 4.76 
Portuguese 0.64 0.00 
Jew 0.01 0.00 
Japan 
Japanese 99.98 100.00 
Ainu 0.02 0.00 
Jordan 
Palestinian 53.50 23.25 
Arab 44.50 74.41 
Circassian 1.00 1.74 
Armenian 1.00 0.00 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakh 63.60 81.69 
Russian 23.30 13.07 
Other 4.50 1.31 
Uzbek 2.90 0.65 
Ukrainian 2.00 0.65 
Uyghur 1.40 0.65 
German 1.10 1.96 
Kenya 
Kikiyu 20.70 17.78 
Luhya 14.00 12.89 
Kalenjin 13.00 12.44 
Luo 10.40 11.11 
Kamba 10.00 9.33 
Kenyan Somali 6.10 8.44 
Kisii 6.00 4.44 
Mijikenda 5.10 6.66 
Meru 4.20 4.00 
Turkana 2.50 0.89 
Maasai 2.10 3.11 
Embu 0.80 2.67 
Teso 0.80 0.00 
Kuria 0.70 0.44 
Saboat 0.60 0.89 
Samburu 0.60 0.89 
Taita 0.60 0.44 
Tharaka 0.53 0.44 
Borana 0.48 1.33 
Swahili 0.33 0.00 
Rendile 0.18 0.00 
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Kenyan Arabs 0.18 1.33 
Kenyan Asian 0.14 0.44 
Korea, South 
Korean 100.00 100 
Kosovo 
Albanian 92.00 89.26 
Serbian 5.00 4.70 
Bosnian 0.50 2.68 
Ashkali 0.50 2.01 
Egyptian 0.50 0.00 
Turk 0.50 0.00 
Goran 0.50 0.67 
Roma 0.50 0.67 
Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyz 72.30 88.46 
Uzbek 14.40 3.21 
Russian 7.00 5.76 
Dungans 1.10 0.64 
Uigur 0.90 0.64 
Tajiks 0.80 0.00 
Turkish 0.70 0.00 
Tatar 0.60 0.00 
Kazakh 0.60 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.40 0.64 
Korean 0.20 0.64 
Latvia 
Latvian 59.30 78.76 
Russian 27.80 20.35 
Belarusian 3.60 0.00 
Ukrainian 2.50 0.00 
Polish 2.40 0.00 
Lithuanian 1.30 0.00 
Jewish 0.40 0.00 
Romani 0.40 0.00 
German 0.20 0.88 
Estonian 0.10 0.00 
Lebanon 
Shii 29.00 27.61 
Sunni 29.00 25.37 
Maronite 22.00 35.07 
Palestinian 10.00 0.00 
Druze 6.00 6.72 
Armenian 4.00 5.22 
Lesotho 
Sotho 99.00 99.23 
Xhosa 1.00 0.77 
Liberia 
Kpelleh 22.20 11.49 
Bassa 13.00 11.49 
Grebo 10.00 14.94 
Gio 8.00 3.45 
Mano 7.90 5.74 
Kru 6.00 13.79 
Lorma 5.00 9.20 
Kissi 4.80 3.45 
Gola 4.40 5.75 
Mandingo 4.00 4.60 
Krahn 3.00 3.45 
Congo, Americo-Liberians 3.00 3.45 
Gbandi 3.00 1.15 
Mende 2.00 0.00 
Vai 2.00 4.60 
Belle 1.00 3.45 
Di 0.70 0.00 
Lithuania 
Lithuanian 83.10 95.71 
Polish 6.00 2.45 
Russian 4.80 1.23 
Belorusian 1.10 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.60 0.00 
Jewish 0.10 0.60 
Roma 0.10 0.00 
Latvian 0.10 0.00 
German 0.10 0.00 
Luxembourg 
Luxemburger 63.10 97.56 
Portuguese 15.90 1.21 
Belgian 9.10 0.00 
French 5.90 0.00 
Italian 3.60 1.21 
German 2.40 0.00 
Malaysia 
Malay 50.40 52.94 
Chinese 23.70 23.98 
Other Bumiputera/Indigenous 11.00 14.93 
Other 7.80 0.00 
Indian 7.10 8.14 
Malta 
Maltese 92.00 95.60 
Gozitan 8.00 4.40 
Mauritius 
Hindu 45.00 53.75 
Creole 27.00 21.25 
Muslim 16.00 15.00 
Tamil 7.00 1.25 
Chinese 3.00 3.75 
Franco-Mauritian 2.00 5.00 
                               Mexico   
Indigenous 6.30 0.00 
Mestizo 93.70 100.00 
Moldova 
Moldovan 69.60 47.46 
Ukrainian 11.00 11.86 
Russian 9.00 10.17 
Gagauz 3.85 4.24 
Romanian 2.00 25.42 
Bulgarian 1.90 0.85 
Mongolia 
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Mongol 94.51 96.30 
Kazakh 4.35 3.70 
Russian 0.05 0.00 
Tungusic 0.04 0.00 
Chinese 0.01 0.00 
Montenegro 
Montenegrin 45.00 52.12 
Serb 30.00 25.53 
Bosniak 8.65 14.89 
Other 5.99 0.00 
Albanian 4.90 6.38 
Muslims 3.97 0.00 
Croatian 1.10 1.06 
Roma 0.41 0.00 
Morocco 
Arab 59.10 89.64 
Berber 40.00 10.35 
Jewish 0.20 0.00 
Namibia 
Ovambo 48.50 47.37 
Nama/Damara 11.50 11.84 
Afrikaan 11.40 6.58 
Kavango 9.70 7.89 
Herero 7.90 18.42 
Caprivi (Caprivian) 5.00 5.26 
English 1.90 0.00 
San 1.20 0.00 
German 1.10 2.63 
Not stated 0.60 0.00 
Other European 0.50 0.00 
Other African 0.40 0.00 
Tswana 0.30 0.00 
Netherlands 
Dutch 79.70 94.01 
Frisian 3.00 0.00 
Turkish 2.30 2.99 
Indonesian 2.30 0.00 
German 2.30 0.00 
Surinamese 2.10 1.20 
Moroccan 2.10 1.20 
Antillean and Aruban 0.80 0.60 
Jewish 0.30 0.00 
Chinese 0.30 0.00 
New Zealand 
New Zealander 61.50 82.96 
Maori 15.00 10.37 
Chinese 4.00 1.48 
Other 3.90 0.74 
Samoan 3.30 0.74 
Indian 2.60 1.48 
British 2.10 0.74 
Cook Islander 1.40 0.00 
Tonga 1.30 0.00 
Korean 0.80 0.74 
Dutch 0.70 0.00 
Australian 0.70 0.74 
Niuean 0.60 0.00 
South African 0.50 0.00 
Filipino 0.40 0.00 
Irish 0.30 0.00 
American 0.30 0.00 
Japanese 0.30 0.00 
German 0.30 0.00 
Nicaragua 
Mestizo 69.00 88.59 
White 17.00 7.01 
Black 9.00 0.88 
Indigenous  5.00 3.51 
Niger 
Haoussa 54.40 47.29 
Djerma Sonraï 21.00 24.32 
Peulh 10.00 2.70 
Touareg 9.30 7.43 
Kanouri Manga 4.00 4.73 
Arab 0.40 10.81 
Toubou 0.40 1.35 
Gourmantché 0.40 0.68 
Other 0.10 0.68 
Norway 
Norwegian 
Sami 
94.20 
0.80 
99.01 
0.00 
Swedish 0.65 0.00 
Pakistani 0.60 0.99 
Iraqi 0.55 0.00 
Somalian 0.55 0.00 
German 0.40 0.00 
Danish 0.40 0.00 
Vietnamese 0.40 0.00 
Iranian 0.30 0.00 
Bosnian 0.30 0.00 
Russian 0.30 0.00 
Turkish 0.30 0.00 
Sri Lankan 0.25 0.00 
Oman 
Arab 52.00 97.63 
African / Swahili 23.00 0.00 
Baluchi 15.00 1.57 
South Asian 4.00 0.00 
Persian 3.00 0.00 
South East Asian 2.00 0.00 
Lawati 1.00 0.79 
Pakistan 
Punjabi 44.15 49.85 
Pashtun 15.42 18.98 
Sindhi 14.12 14.16 
Saraiki 10.53 3.96 
Mohajir (Urdu-speakers) 7.59 7.65 
Baluchi 3.59 5.38 
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Panama 
Mestizo 69.00 60.87 
Indigenous 12.00 7.25 
White 10.00 31.88 
Afro Panamanian 9.00 0.00 
Paraguay 
Mestizo 75.00 42.62 
White 20.00 56.56 
Mulato 3.50 0.00 
Indigenous  1.50 0.82 
Peru 
Amerindian 45.00 10.53 
Mestizo 37.00 53.95 
White 15.00 30.92 
Asian 2.00 3.29 
Afro-Peruvian 1.00 1.32 
Philippines 
Malay 95.50 92.69 
Chinese 1.50 7.31 
Poland 
Polish 97.00 99.19 
German 0.40 0.41 
Silesian 0.40 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.10 0.20 
Belarusian 0.10 0.20 
Portugal 
Portuguese 97.60 100.00 
Brazilians 1.00 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.50 0.00 
Cape Verdean 0.40 0.00 
Romanian 0.30 0.00 
Angolan 0.20 0.00 
Qatar 
Qatari Arab 40.00 100.00 
Indian- Pakistani 36.00 0.00 
Other 14.00 0.00 
Iranian 10.00 0.00 
Romania 
Romanian 89.50 90.89 
Hungarian 6.60 7.86 
Roma 2.50 0.63 
Other 1.07 0.00 
German 0.30 0.31 
Jewish 0.03 0.31 
Russia 
Russian 78.00 86.19 
Chechen 4.70 1.26 
Tatar 3.80 2.5q 
Kazakh 2.30 0.42 
Ukrainian 2.00 1.67 
Bashkir 1.17 2.09 
Chuvash 1.15 0.00 
Armenian 0.79 0.42 
Avar 0.57 0.00 
Belorussian 0.56 0.84 
Udmurt 0.44 0.42 
Azerbaijani 0.43 0.00 
Mari 0.43 0.00 
German 0.42 0.00 
Kabardinian 0.36 0.00 
Ossetian 0.35 0.42 
Darghin 0.35 0.42 
Buryat 0.31 0.42 
Yakut 0.31 0.42 
Ingush 0.29 0.42 
Kumyk 0.29 0.00 
Lezghin 0.28 0.00 
Lak 0.11 1.26 
Rwanda 
Hutu 85.00 50.39 
Tutsi 14.00 49.61 
Twa 1.00 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 
Sunni Arab 52.00 97.47 
Foreign worker 33.00 0.00 
Shia Arab 15.00 2.53 
Serbia 
Serbs 83.30 90.60 
Hungarian 3.91 2.68 
Roma 2.10 0.67 
Bosniak 2.00 3.69 
Yugoslav 1.08 0.34 
Croat 0.94 0.34 
Montenegrin 0.92 0.00 
Albanian 0.82 0.34 
Slovak 0.80 0.34 
Romanian 0.50 0.67 
Vlach 0.50 0.00 
Macedonian 0.40 0.00 
Bulgarian 0.30 0.34 
Jewish  0.02 0.00 
Singapore 
Chinese 74.10 73.68 
Malay 13.40 13.16 
Indian 9.20 9.65 
Mixed/Other 3.30 3.51 
Slovakia 
Slovak 87.00 93.26 
Hungarian 9.60 6.74 
Roma 1.90 0.00 
Czech 0.90 0.00 
Ruthenian 0.40 0.00 
Ukrainian 0.20 0.00 
Slovenia 
Slovenian 87.10 96.33 
Other 8.50 0.00 
Serbian 2.00 0.92 
Croatian 1.80 1.83 
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Hungarian 0.32 0.00 
Roma 0.17 0.00 
Italian 0.11 0.92 
Solomon Islands 
Malaita 26.60 35.00 
Guadalcanal 21.00 16.67 
Western 14.80 21,67 
Makira & Ulawa 8.00 6.67 
Choiseul (Lauru) 5.40 5.00 
Isabel 5.40 3.33 
Central (Gela) 5.00 1.67 
Temotu 4.00 5.00 
Kiribati 1.20 0.00 
Rennell & Bellona 1.00 3.33 
Chinese 0.30 1.67 
South Africa 
Black African  
White 
79.00 
9.60 
68.43 
22.47 
Coloured 8.90 6.81 
Indian or Asian 2.50 2.72 
Sweden 
Swedish 85.30 93.92 
European 4.30 1.70 
Middle Eastern 2.50 1.70 
Finn 1.80 0.97 
Assyrian 1.20 0.49 
Africa 1.20 0.00 
South Slavic 1.00 0.73 
South American 0.75 0.49 
Tajikistan 
Tajik 80.60 97.02 
Uzbek 15.00 1.98 
Pamiri 1.60 0.99 
Russian 1.00 0.00 
Kyrgyz 1.00 0.00 
Tatar 0.30 0.00 
Turkmen 0.30 0.00 
Yagnobi 0.20 0.00 
Thailand 
Thai 74.00 66.07 
Chinese 14.00 30.37 
Malay 3.00 3.55 
Timor-Leste 
Mambai 12.30 23.61 
Makasai 9.55 29.17 
Tetun Terik 5.95 9.72 
Baikenu 5.83 1.39 
Kemak 5.76 9.72 
Bunaq 5.23 6.94 
Tokodede 3.70 1.39 
Fataluku 3.54 6.94 
Waima’a 1.73 1.39 
Naueti 1.41 0.00 
Idate 1.26 0.00 
Galolen 1.22 5.56 
Mikidi 0.89 1.39 
Makalero 0.73 1.39 
Oko (Kairui) 0.56 0.00 
Javanese 0.30 0.00 
Lakalei 0.30 1.39 
Bekais 0.30 0.00 
Habu 0.25 0.00 
Chinese 0.10 0.00 
Portuguese 0.10 0.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Indian 40.00 46.34 
African 37.50 21.95 
Mixed 20.50 14.63 
Other 1.20 4.88 
Tunisia 
Arab 98.00 99.58 
Berber 1.00 0.42 
Turkey 
Turkish 71.00 79.00 
Kurdish 17.00 18.93 
Circassian    2.50 0.36 
Zaza 1.50 0.10 
Albanian 1.60 0.00 
Arab 1.10 1.28 
Roma 0.90 0.18 
Turkmenistan 
Turkmen 81.50 92.81 
Uzbek 10.50 1.80 
Russian 2.50 4.19 
Kazakh 2.00 0.00 
Kurdish 2.00 0.00 
Armenian 0.50 0.00 
Azeri 0.50 0.60 
Baluchi 0.50 0.00 
Persian 0.50 0.00 
Turkish 0.10 0.60 
Uganda 
Baganda 17.30 24.62 
Banyankole 9.79 15.62 
Basoga 8.64 7.81 
Bakiga 7.03 4.50 
Iteso 6.57 6.61 
Langi 6.22 5.11 
Acholi 4.80 6.01 
Bagisu 4.68 4.80 
Lugbara 4.28 2.70 
Banyoro 2.54 3.60 
Batoro 2.54 4.20 
Alur 2.22 1.80 
Basamia 1.60 1.80 
Jopadhola 1.50 1.50 
Banyarwanda 1.32 0.00 
Madi 1.24 1.50 
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Karimajong 1.09 4.20 
Bagwere 1.00 1.20 
Baruli 0.70 0.30 
Kakwa 0.54 0.90 
Bafumbira 0.50 0.60 
Banyole 0.50 0.60 
United Kingdom 
White 92.00 96.07 
Indian 1.80 1.21 
Pakistani 1.30 0.76 
Mixed 1.20 0.76 
Black Caribbean 1.00 0.15 
Black African 0.80 0.61 
Bangladeshi 0.50 0.15 
Asian Other 0.40 0.15 
Chinese 0.40 0.00 
Black Other 0.20 0.15 
United States 
White 69.10 82.23 
Hispanic 12.50 5.17 
Black 12.10 9.92 
Asian 3.60 2.27 
Other 2.70 0.41 
Uruguay 
White 88.00 100.00 
Mestizo 8.00 0.00 
Black 4.00 0.00 
Uzbekistan 
Uzbek 80.00 92.82 
Tajik 4.90 0.00 
Russian 3.80 1.66 
Kazakh 3.60 0.55 
Karakalpak 3.00 4.42 
Tatar 1.00 0.55 
Kyrgiz 0.90 0.00 
Korean 0.60 0.00 
Venezuela 
Mestizo 67.00 92.55 
White 21.00 3.72 
African 10.00 3.19 
Indigenous 2.00 0.53 
   
Viet Nam 
Kinh 84.90 81.91 
Tày 2.00 2.23 
Thái 1.80 1.12 
Mường 1.50 2.68 
Khmer 1.37 2.01 
Hmông 1.30 2.01 
Hoa 1.20 0.22 
Nùng 1.12 0.89 
Thổ 0.90 0.00 
Dao 0.84 1.12 
Gia Lai 0.43 0.67 
ÊDê 0.40 0.67 
Bah Nar 0.23 0.45 
Sán Chay 0.20 0.22 
Cơ Ho 0.20 0.22 
Cham 0.20 0.22 
Sán Dìu 0.17 0.22 
Xơ Dang 0.17 0.22 
Hrê 0.15 0.22 
Mnông 0.13 0.45 
Raglai 0.13 0.00 
Xtiêng 0.09 0.22 
Khơ Mú 0.08 0.00 
Bru-Vân Kiều 0.08 0.22 
Giáy 0.07 0.22 
Mạ 0.05 0.00 
Tà Ôi 0.05 0.00 
Giẻ-Triêng 0.04 0.22 
Co 0.04 0.22 
Xinh Mun 0.03 0.00 
Chơ-Ro 0.03 0.00 
Lào 0.02 0.00 
La Chí 0.02 0.00 
Chu-Ru 0.02 0.00 
Pu Péo 0.00 0.22 
Hà nhì 0.00 0.22 
Bố Y 0.00 0.22 
Cống 0.00 0.22 
Kháng 0.00 0.22 
Yemen 
Arab 90.00 97.97 
Afro-Arab 9.00 2.03 
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Table C2: 
Variable Definitions 	
OUTCOME VARIABLE 
Ethnic Representation Score (GLP). Data of all elites in a country, drawn from GLP dataset. Formula: transformed version of Rose Index. ers 
Rose Index of Proportionality. Data drawn from GLP dataset. Formula: Rose index. Rose 
Gallagher Index of Disproportionality. Data drawn from GLP dataset. Formula: Gallagher Index of Disproportionality. Gallagher 
Ethnic Representation of Parliamentarians. Data on Parliamentarians, drawn from GLP dataset. Formula:transformed version of Rose Index. ers_parl 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY INDICES 
 
Ethnic fractionalization (GLP). [Benchmark Index] Groups drawn from the GLP dataset. Formula: HErfindahl Index. Base year: 2010. GLP_elf  
Ethnolingistic fractionalization (Easterly, Levine). Groups, drawn from Atlas Narodov Mira, defined as racial/linguistic. Formula: Herfindahl index. 
Base year: 1964. Source: Easterly, Levine (1997). Ethnolinguistic_fract_imp  
Ethnolinguistic homogenization (Vanhanen). Groups defined as national/linguistic; includes only the most important divisions. Formula: 
homogeneity index. Base year: 1980s–90s. Source: Vanhanen (1999). Ethnolinguistic_homog_Vanhanen  
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Fearon). Groups (>1% population) defined as linguistic. Formula: Herfindahl index. Base year: 1990s. Source: 
Fearon (2003). elf_Fearon2  
Ethnic homogenization (Vanhanen). Groups defined as ethnic, including only the most important divisions (with rare intergroup marriage as the 
proxy). Formula: homogeneity index. Base year: 1980s–90s. Source: Vanhanen (1999). Ethnic_homogeneity_Vanhanen  
Ethnic fractionalization (Alesina). Groups defined as racial/linguistic. Formula: Herfindahl index. Base year: 1990s–2001. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Ethnic_fractionaliz_Alesina  
Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon). Groups (>1% population) defined ethnic (those with commonly accepted characteristics). Formula: Herfindahl 
index. Base year: 1990s. Source: Fearon (2003). ef_Fearon2  
Ethnic fractionalization (Reynal-Querol). Groups defined as ethnolinguistic, including only the most important divisions (source: World Christian 
Encyclopedia). Formula: Herfindahl index. Base year: 1982. Source: Reynal-Querol (2002). ETHFRAC2_Reynal_Querol  
Largest group (Fearon). Groups (>1% population) defined as those with commonly accepted characteristics. Formula: homogeneity index. Base year: 
1990s. Source: Fearon (2003). plural_Fearon2  
Linguistic heterogeneity 1 (Gunnemark). Groups defined as linguistic. Formula: % not speaking the official language. Base year: 1980s. Source: 
Gunnemark (1991). Linguistic_heterogen1_Gunnemark  
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COVARIATES 
Legislative Size. Raw number of seats in legislatures, Source: IPU 2010–2013. numberseats 
Polity2. Polity 2 variable from PolityIV dataset. Source: Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2007. Polity2  
Reserved Seats. Dummy for countries with reserved seats. Source: Krook and O’Brien 2007. Quota 
District Magnitude. Mean District Magnitude of Lower House. Source: QoG dataset. Dpi_mdml 
GDP per cap. GDP per capita, natural logarithm. Source: World Bank 2007. Lwdi_gdpc 
Population. Population. Source: World Bank 2007. wdi_pop 
British Colony. Dummy for former British colonies. Source: Gerring et al. British  
America: Dummy for countries in Americas. Source: author. America 
Asia: Dummy for countries in Asia, including Oceania. Source: author. Asia 
Africa: Dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: author. Africa 
Middle East/North Africa: Dummy for countries with a PR electoral System. Source: author. mena 
PR Electoral System: Dummy for countries with a PR electoral System. Source: author. pr 
Mixed Electoral System: Dummy for countries with a Mixed electoral System. Source: author. mixed 
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Table C3: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Lef t  S ide  Variab le s  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ERS_All 118 0.3342289 0.2706694 0 1.318182 
ERS 118 0.3204875 0.2631165 0 1.296701 
Right  Side  Variab le s  
    
  
Legislative Size 118 230.6017 302.904 35 3000 
Legislative Size (ln) 118 5.088685 0.7759058 3.555348 8.006368 
Polity2 116 4.741379 6.178674 -10 10 
Population 117 4.90E+07 1.71E+08 319000 1.34E+09 
District Magnitude 118 3.699678 127.2272 -888 450 
Ethnic Fractionalization 118 0.415064 0.2928582 -0.9017 0.9635085 
GDP per Capita (ln) 118 8.948074 1.205364 5.796967 11.2643 
Reserved Seats 118 0.2288136 0.4218603 0 1 
PR Electoral System 72 0.3559322 0.4808366 0 1 
Mixed Electoral Systm 72 0.1440678 0.3526559 0 1 
Former British Colony  118 0.1864407 0.3911227 0 1 
Region Dummies  
    
  
Africa 118 0.2118644 0.4103718 0 1 
America 118 0.1779661 0.3841153 0 1 
Asia 118 0.2033898 0.4042366 0 1 
Europe 118 0.2881356 0.4548259 0 1 
Middle East/North Africa 118 0.1186441 0.3247482 0 1 
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Table C4: 
Correlation Table of Ethnic Fractionalization Indices 
 
 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	
1.GLP_Elf	 1.0000	         	
2.Ethnic Frac.-Alesina	 0.8249	 1.0000	        	
3.Ethnic hom.- (Vanhanen)	 -0.8203	 -0.8983	 1.0000	       	
4.E.linguistic hom.-(Vanhanen)	 -0.8085	 -0.9056	 0.9886	 1.0000	      	
5.Linguistic Frac.-Alesina	 0.7499	 0.7264	 -0.7319	 -0.7218	 1.0000	     	
6.Linguistic Frac.-Gunnemark	 0.7290	 0.7333	 -0.7399	 -0.7414	 0.8904	 1.0000	    	
7.Ethnic Frac.-Reynal & Querol	 0.7655	 0.8489	 -0.8392	 -0.8510	 0.7136	 0.7151	 1.0000	   	
8.Ethnic Plu.-Fearon	 -0.8344	 -0.9329	 0.8997	 0.8998	 -0.7229	 -0.7535	 -0.8540	 1.0000	  	
9.Ethnic Frac.-Fearon	 0.7750	 0.8195	 -0.8126	 -0.8262	 0.8674	 0.8314	 0.8260	 -0.8396	 1.0000	
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Figure C1: 
Histogram of ERS 
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Figure C2: 
Histogram of Legislature Size (Logged) 
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Figure C3:  
Distribution of Mean ERS across GLP regions 
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Figure C4:  
Distribution of Mean ERS across Geographical Regions 
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Figure C5: 
Legislative Size 	
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